Loading...
|
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/30194
|
| Title: | 股權結構與董事會特性對董監酬勞與績效關聯性影響之探討 |
| Authors: | 蔡雅媛 |
| Contributors: | 林宛瑩
蔡雅媛 |
| Keywords: | 董監酬勞
薪酬與績效關聯性
compensation of board of director
pay-performance sensitivity |
| Date: | 2006 |
| Issue Date: | 2009-09-11 17:25:54 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 本研究主要針對影響董監酬勞與會計(市場)績效關聯性之因素進行探討。在現代公司之經營管理架構中，係由股東在股東大會選出代表進入董事會，由董事會成員選出主要執行業務經營之人，並代理所有投資人監督及管理經營層。換言之，相對於經理人，董事會成員為股東最為直接之代理人。因此，本研究認為董事會成員為外部股東最直接之代理人，故以董監酬勞為分析對象，從公司治理之角度，以股權結構(如是屬於家族控制企業、董監持股、外部大股東持股等)及董事會特性(獨立董監席次比率、董事是否兼任經理人、董事長是否兼任總經理)等相關變數，探討其對於董監酬勞與會計、市場績效間關聯性之影響。
實證結果顯示，家族企業與公司經理人兼任董事會職位時，會提升董監酬勞與績效間之關聯性；董監持股比例愈高、外部大股東持股比例愈高、獨立董監席次比例越高及董事長兼任總經理時，會降低董監酬勞與績效間之關聯性。
This study argues that members of corporate boards are the most direct delegate of external shareholders. Agency problem may exist between board members and external shareholders. Using a sample of firms listed in Taiwan Securities Exchange Corporation and Gre Tai Securities Market over 1996-2005, this study empirically examines the effect of ownership and board structures on the compensation of board members. This study expects that the pay-performance sensitivity of board compensation is weakened when a strong monitoring mechanism is in place. Using return on assets as the measures for performance, the primary empirical results show that family-controlled firms and firms with representation of executive directors illustrate higher pay-performance sensitivity. On the contrary, firms with higher shareholdings by board members and by outside block holders, and firms with representation of independent board members demonstrate lower pay-performance sensitivity. |
| Reference: | 一、中文部分
（期刊）
林宛瑩、許崇源，2007，「台灣集團企業之控股型態及公司治理衡量指標之研究
與建議」，交大管理學報，第28期，即將出刊。
林淑惠、胡星陽，2003，「上市公司高階經理人之酬勞結構」，經濟論文，
第31 卷第2 期：171-206。
林穎芬、劉維琪，2003，從高階主管薪酬的研究探討代理理論在臺灣的適用程度，
管理學報，第20卷第2期：365-395。
洪玉舜、王泰昌，2005b，績效衡量指標在高主管現金薪酬契約中之相對重要性，
證券市場發展，第17卷第2期：35-100。
陳茵琦，2005，機構投資人與公司治理，證券櫃臺，第111期：57-68。
around the world. Journal of Finance 54: 471-517.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 2002. Investor protection and corporate valuation. Journal of finance 54: 471-517.
Lambert, R.A. 1993. The use of accounting and security price measures of performance in managerial compensation contracts: A discussion. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16: 101-123.
───. and D.F. Larcker. 1987. An analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts. Journal of Accounting Research 25: 85-125.
Lin, Y.F. and W.C. Liu. 1997. Corporate ownership structure and CEO
compensation. Sun Yat-Sen Management Review 6: 75-92.
Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1988. Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 293-315.
McEachern, W. 1975. Managerial control and performance, Lexington, MA: Heath.
Matolcsy, Z.P. 2000. Executive cash compensation and corporate performance during different economic cycles. Contemporary Accounting Research 17: 671-692.
McConnell, H. and S. H.Servaes. 1990. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate valuation. Journal of Financial Economics 27: 696-612.
葉銀華，2002，台灣公司治理的問題與改革之道，證卷暨期貨管理，第20期：
Simon, H. A. 1957. Compensation of executives. Sociometry 20: 123-139.
Singh, H. and F. Harianto.1989. Management-board relationships, takeover risk, and the adoption of golden parachutes. The Academy of Management Journal 32: 7-24
Schaefer, S. 1998. The dependence of pay-performance sensitivity on the size of the firm. The Review of Economics and Statistics 80(3): 436-443.
Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 52: 737-783.
Sloan, R.G. 1993. Accounting earnings and top executive compensation.
Journal of Accounting and Economics 16: 55-100.
Smith, C. and R. Watts. 1992. The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of Financial Economics 32: 263-292.
Simon, H.A. 1957. Compensation of executives. Sociometry 20: 123-139.
Steve, W., T. Henry, and G. Luis. 2005. Organizational governance and employee pay: How ownership structure affects the firm’s compensation strategy. Strategic Management Journal 26: 377-384.
Suwina C. Y.and F. Michael. 2006. Family ownership, corporate governance, and top executive compensation. Managerial and Decision Economics 27 (7): 549-561.
1-16。
Tosi, H., and L. R. Gomez-Mejia. 1989. The decoupling of CEO pay and performance: an agency theory perspective. Administrative Science Quarterly 34: 169-189.
Ungson, G.R. and R.M. Steers. 1984. Motivation and politics in executive compensation. Academy of Management Review 9: 313-323.
Wang, D. 2006. Founding family ownership and earnings quality. Journal of Accounting Research 44(3): 619-656.
Weisbach, M. S. 1988. Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 431-460.
Walsh, J. P. and J. K. Seward. 1990. On the efficiency of internal and external corporate control mechanisms. Academy of Management Review 15: 421-458.
Werner, S., Tosi, H.L., and L.R. Gomez-Mejia. 2005. Organizational governance and employee pay: How ownership structure affects the firm`s compensation strategy. Strategic Management Journal 26(4): 377-384
Yeh, Y.H., t.S. Lee., and T. Woidtke. 2001. Family control and corporate governance: Evidence for Taiwan. International Review of Finance 2: 21-48.
Zahra, S. A., and J. A. PearceⅡ.1989. Boards of directors and corporate financial performance：A review and integrated model. Journal of Management 15：293.
（Working Paper）
Anderson, M.C., R.D. Banker, and S. Ravindran. 1999. Interrelations between components of executives’ compensation and market and accounting based performance measures. Working paper, School of Management, the University of Texas.
葉銀華、邱顯比，1996，資本結構、股權結構與公司價值關聯性之實證研究：
Claessens, S., S. Djankov., J. P. H. Fan., and L. H. Lang. 1999. Expropriation on minority shareholders: Evidence from East Asia. Working paper. World Bank.
Crocker, K. J. and J. Slemrod. 2005. The economics of managements manipulation
and managerial. Working papers, The Pennsylvania state university and university of Michigan business school.
Fernands G. 2005. Board compensation and firm performance: The role of independent board members. Workijng Paper. Universidade Católica Portuguesa.
Mcconaught W. 1975. Managerial incentives and firm performance under three different control conditions. Doctoral Dissertation. University of Virginia.
（Book）
Berle. Adolph A. and G. C. Means. 1932. The Modern Corporate and Private Property, New York: Macmillan.
Bacon, J. 1973. Corporate directorship practice: Member and committees of the board. New York: The conference board.
Colley, J. L., J. L. Doyle, W. Stettinius, and G. Logan. 2003. Corporate governance. NY：McGraw-Hill.
David C. and P. K. Robins. 1999. Financial incentives for increasing work and income among low-income families. Working Paper. University of California at Berkeley.
代理成本理論，台大管理論叢，第7 卷第2 期：57-90。
Watts, R. L. and J. L. Zimmerman. 1986. Positive accounting theory. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
蔡柳卿，2006，相對績效評估與高階主管薪酬：論產業競爭程度之影響，管理評論，第25卷第1期：69-94。
蔡柳卿，2007，依會計盈餘時效性設計高階主管薪酬契約：董事會所扮演的角
色，會計評論，第44 期：61-94。
（研討會論文）
洪玉舜、王泰昌，2005a，高階主管薪酬與績效衡量指標關聯性影響因素之研究，2005會計理論與實務研討會，國立台灣大學會計系。
（論文）
王萬成，2004，股權結構、盈餘管理與公司價值之關聯性－以我國上市公司為例，
國立成功大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
白慧平，1991，公司特性與高階主管薪酬制度關係研究，私立東吳大學會計學研
究所未出版碩士論文。
江佳明，2001，公司成長、規模及負債與高階主管獎酬績效敏感性之實證研究，
國立中正大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
宋致皓，2005，董監酬勞與公司治理關聯性之研究，國立政治大學會計學研究所
未出版碩士論文。
林穎芬，1989，民營企業最高主管報酬與公司績效之研究，國立中山大學企業管
理學研究所未出版碩士論文。
林峰成，1996，台灣上市公司高階主管酬勞、公司績效與控制權型態之關聯性實
證研究，國立中正大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
林振祥，1997，企業人員之人口統計變項、工作特性與激勵因素之相關研究－以
中部地區企業為例，私立東海大學工業工程研究所未出版碩士論文。
吳政穎，2000，我國上市公司股權集中度、薪酬設計與公司經營績效關係之研究，
國立政治大學企業管理研究所未出版博士論文。
施念恕，1996，會計盈餘、股價與高階主管薪酬之相關性研究，國立中興大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
翁淑育，2000，台灣上市公司股權結構、核心代理問題與公司價值之研究，輔仁
大學金融研究所未出版碩士論文。
曾玉潔，2000，我國高階主管薪酬決定因素之實證研究，國立中正大學會計學研
究所未出版碩士論文。
辜秋屏，1997，高階主管酬勞與公司績效之實證研究，國立台灣大學會計學研究
所未出版碩士論文。
廖秀梅，2004，董事會結構特性與公司績效關係之研究－探討台灣家族控制企業
因素的影響，國立台北大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
鄭為庠，1992，高階主管薪酬計畫與薪酬決定因素之研究，國立政治大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。
蕭弘毅，1994，高階管理薪酬計畫與企業營運績效關係之研究，私立東吳大學管
理學研究所未出版碩士論文。
蕭黎明，1993，台灣上市公司最高主管之報償、持股比例與公司績效之關係研究，
國立台灣大學財務金融學研究所未出版碩士論文。
二、英文部分
（Journal Paper）
Agarwal, N. 1981. Determinants of executive compensation. Industrial Relations 20 :36-46.
Anderson, R. C., S. A. Mansi, and D. V. Reeb. 2003. Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt Journal of Financial Economics 68(2): 263-285.
Antle, R. and S. Abbie. 1986. An empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation of oorporate executives. Journal of Accounting Research 124(1): 1-39.
Alexander, D.L. and H. Zhou.1995. Product-market competition and executive compensation. Journal of Economics and Business 47: 441-456.
Abdullah, S. N. 2004. Board composition, CEO duality and performance among Malaysian listed company. Corporate Governance 4 (4): 47.
Baber, W.R., S. N. Janakiraman and S. H. Kang. 1996. Investment opportunities and the structure of executive compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 21: 297-319.
Banker, R.D. and S.M. Datar.1989. Sensitivity, precision, and linear aggregation of signals for performance evaluation. Journal of Accounting Research 27 : 21-39.
Beatty, R. and E. Zajac. 1994. Managerial incentives, monitoring, and risk bearing: A study of executive compensation, ownership, and board structure in initial public offerings. Administrative Science Quarterly 39: 313-335.
Bebchuk, L. A, J. M. Fried. 2005. Executive compensation at fannie mae: A case study of perverse incentives, nonperformance pay, and camouflage. Journal of Corporation Law 30(4): 807-822.
Boyd, B. K.. 1994. Board control and CEO compensation. Strategic Management Journal 15(5):335-344.
Claessens, S., S. Djankov., J. P. H. Fan., and L. H. P. Lang. 2000. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporation. Journal of Financial Economics 58: 81-112.
───, J. P. H. Fan., and L. H. P. Lang. 2002. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. Journal of Finance 57: 2741-2771.
Clinch, G. 1991. Employee compensation and firms research and development activity. Journal of Accounting Research 29: 59-78.
Core, J., R. W. Holthausen., and D. F. Larcker. 1999. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 51: 371-406.
Coughlan, A. T., and R. M. Schmidt. 1985. Compensation, management turnover firm performance: an empirical investigation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7：43-66.
Cyert, R.M., S.H. Kang., and P. Kumar. 2002. Corporate governance, takeovers, and top-management compensation: Theory and evidence. Management Science 48：453-470.
Daniel, L. 2000. Family CEOs vs. nonfamily CEOs in the family-controlled firm: An examination of the level and sensitivity of pay to performance. Family Business Review 13: 121-131.
Davidson, E. S. 1998. Configuration independent analysis for characterizing shared memory applications. Proceedings of the 12th International Parallel Processing Symposium : 485-491.
Demsetz, H. and K. Lehn. 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economy 93:1155-1177.
Dyl, E. A. 1988. Corporate control and management compensation: Evidence on the agency problem. Managerial and Decision Economics 9: 21-25.
Finkelstein, S. and D. C. Hambrick. 1989. Chief executive compensation: A study of the intersection of markets and political processes. Strategic Management Journal 10: 121-134.
Fama, E. 1980. Agency problems and theory of the firm. The Journal of Political Economy 88(2): 288-307.
───, and M. C. Jensen. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics 26: 301-327.
Fan, P. H., and T. J. Wong. 2002. Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33: 401-425.
Firth, M. 1999. Company takeovers and the auditor choice decision. Journal of International Accounting 8 :197-214.
Gibbons, R. and K.J. Murphy. 1990. Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43: 30-51.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R. and H. Tosi. 1989. The decouping of CEO pay and performance: An agency theory perspective. Administrative Science Quarterly 34: 169-189.
Grinstein, Y., and P. Hribar. 2004. CEO compensation and incentives: Evidence from M&A bonuses. Journal of Financial Economics 73(1): 119-143.
Hambrick, D. C. and S. Finkelstein. 1995. The effects of ownership structure on conditions at the top: The case of CEO pay raises. Strategic Management Journal 16: 175-194
Hambrick, D. C. and E. M. Jackson. 2000. Outside directors with a stake: The linchpin in improving governance. California Management Review 42: 108-127.
Herzberg, F. B., B. Mausner, and B. B. Snyderman. 1959. The Motivation to
Work , New York, NY: John Willey & Sons.
Hillman, A.J., G. D. Klein and R. A. Luce. 2001. Board Composition and stakeholder performance: do stakeholder directors make a difference? Business and Society 40: 295-314.
Holmstrom, B. 1979. Moral hazard and observability. The Bell Journal of Economics
10: 74-91.
───, and P. Milgrom. 1987.Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives. Econometrica 55: 303-328.
Ittner, C.D., R.A. Lambert and D.F. Larcker. 2003. The structure and performance consequences of equity grants to employees of new economy firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics 34: 89-127.
Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior-agency cost and ownership structure. Journal of Financial and Economics 3: 305-360.
______. and R. S. Ruback. 1983. The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 11: 5-50.
───. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit and the failure of internal control system. Journal of Finance 148: 831-880.
───. and K.J. Murphy.1990. Performance pay and top-management incentives. The Journal of Political Economy 98: 225-264.
Kanter, R.M. 1968. Commitment and social organization : A study of commitment mechanisms in Utopian Communities, American Sociological Review 33(4): 499-517.
Ke, B., K. Petroni and A. Safieddine 1999. Ownership concentration and sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance measures: Evidence from publicly and privately-held insurance companies. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 28: 185-209.
Kerr, J. and R.A. Bettis. 1987. Boards of directors, top management compensation, and shareholder returns. Academy of Management Journal 30: 645-664.
Kaplan, S.N. 1994. Top executive rewards and firm performance: A comparison of Japan and the United States. The Journal of Political Economy 102: 510-546.
Kraft, K. and A. Niederprum. 1999. Determinants of management compensation with risk-averse agents and dispersed ownership of the firm. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 40: 17-27.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 1999. Corporate ownership |
| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
會計研究所
94353010
95 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0094353010 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [會計學系] 學位論文
|
Files in This Item:
| File |
Size | Format | |
|---|
| index.html | 0Kb | HTML2 | 264 | View/Open |
|
All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.
|
