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| Title: | 股權結構、員工紅利及董監酬勞與公司績效關聯性之研究-以台灣上市電子公司為例 |
| Authors: | 林晏仲 |
| Contributors: | 陳錦烽
林晏仲 |
| Keywords: | 公司治理
員工紅利及董監酬勞
公司績效 |
| Date: | 2004 |
| Issue Date: | 2009-09-11 17:21:55 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 公司在追求規模經濟的同時，由於其所有者的時間精力有限，就必須放釋放一定的代理權，以求得企業的規模發展。當代理權釋出後，代理關係就無可避免，利害關係衝突於是產生。代理人會傾向偷懶、保守、自利、短視，以維護自己的利益，引發了所謂的代理成本，於是便需要公司治理機制加以解決。本研究除了繼續以前的研究探討我國上市電子公司之股權結構及董監酬勞與員工分紅對公司績效的影響外，由於我國高科技業的「員工分紅配股」措施，使公司的股本增大，造成其EPS降低、股價的稀釋及選舉權受到侵蝕，因而損害原股東的權益。因此，本研究也欲探討我國上市電子公司股權結構是否會影響其董監酬勞及員工分紅政策。
本研究以1997起至2002年止台灣上市電子公司為樣本，經刪除資料不完整的公司後，共計有55家公司330個觀察值為研究樣本。本研究是以複迴歸模型來進行實證研究。實證結果顯示經理人持股比率、機構法人持股比率、董事監察人持股比率，以及員工分工及董監酬勞佔盈餘比率與公司績效呈正相關。經理人持股比率及機構投資者持股比率與員工分工及董監酬勞佔盈餘比率呈正相關，至於董事持股比率、監察人持股比率及監察人佔全部董事監察人比率，則與員工分工及董監酬勞佔盈餘比率無關。
When the size of the company is growing, the owners of the company have the limit time and the energy, the company must have the agent. Once the company has the agent, the interest relationship among the owner and agent will conflict. The agents are easily lazy, conservative, selfish, and nearsighted to pursue their interest, so the agent cost happen. This study beside continue the former research about the relationship between the ownership structure and the company performance, and the relationship between the the the employee bonus and the company performance in the TSE-listed electronic company. Because the high-tech company in Taiwan practice the policy of “the employee stock distribution”, the policy will cause the expansion of the stock. The expansion of the stock lessens the EPS, dilutes the stock price and erodes the right of the election. That damage the right of the original stockholders, and therefore this study examine the relationship between the ownership structure and the employee bonus in the TSE-listed electronic company as well.
This study samples are the TSE-listed electronic company from 1997 to 2002, but exclude the company with insufficient data. The rest are 55 companies, and 330 observations that are obtained. This study uses complex regression model on this empirical research. The empirical result indicates the stock ownership of the managers, the stock ownership of the institution investors, the stock ownership of the board, and the bonus rate of the employee are positively related to the company performance. The stock ownership of the manager, and the stock ownership of the institution investors are positively related to the employee bonus rate. The stock ownership of the directors, the stock ownership of the supervisors, and the supervisor rate of the board reveal no significant relationship with the bonus rate of the employee. |
| Reference: | 中文部分
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楊俊中，1998，股權結構與經營績效相關性之研究，國立台灣大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。
楊慧玲，2000，董事會結構及其變動對股東財富與經營績效影響之研究，私立朝陽大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。
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英文部分
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
會計研究所
91353047
93 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0091353047 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [會計學系] 學位論文
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