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| Title: | 我國公司董監事特性與審計公費及非審計公費關聯性之研究
The relation between board characteristics and audit/non-audit fees in Taiwan. |
| Authors: | 劉晏秀
Liu, Yen-Hsiu |
| Contributors: | 周玲臺
Chou, Ling-Tai Lynette
劉晏秀
Liu, Yen-Hsiu |
| Keywords: | 董監事獨立性
董監事專業性
審計公費
非審計公費
Board independence
Board expertise
audit fee
non-audit fee |
| Date: | 2003 |
| Issue Date: | 2009-09-11 17:20:53 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 為降低資訊不對稱下企業管理階層與資金提供者間之代理問題，公司須設計有效之治理機制以降低代理成本，如聘任外部董監、設置審計委員會及聘任會計師查核等。而當董監事所具備的獨立性及專業性越高，基於維護專家信譽及降低訴訟成本的考量下，將需要會計師投入較多的查核人力及時間，以降低資訊不對稱現象，並減少會計師與公司管理階層間經濟依存度，以獲得較高品質的審計服務。然目前公司治理議題多著重於公司內部監理機制與公司經營績效間的關係，較少觸及內部董監事會監督功能對外部會計師監督功能的影響，是以本研究嘗試以公司治理的角度出發，探討台灣上市、上櫃及興櫃公司董監事獨立性與專業性對於審計公費以及非審計公費之影響。
本研究實證結果發現，目前我國上市櫃及興櫃公司董監事獨立性對於審計公費及非審計公費尚未有統計上顯著之影響，唯董監事兼任其他公司董監事職位數與非審計公費間存有負向關係。不同於 Carcello et al. (2000)的結論，本研究發現台灣公司董監事會之專業性對審計公費及非審計公費之影響較董監事獨立性大，其原因可能是公司治理在台灣始見萌芽，社會大眾對公司治理及董監事功能之概念不深，一方面股東會欠缺聘任獨立董監之誘因，一般公司設置獨立董監多半僅為符合表面規定，所選出之獨立董監亦未必與管理階層維持實質獨立，而無法收實質監督之效；一方面董監事對其職權之行使並未擴及會計師聘任之實質決策，而多僅接受管理當局推薦，獨立董監亦無法對審計及非審計公費進行審議。反是董監事平均兼任其他公司董監職位數越多，代表其所享之專家信譽越高，會為維護自身信譽且降低訴訟風險，藉由限制管理階層向會計師所購買的非審計服務種類及金額，以降低會計師與管理階層間的經濟依存度。
To reduce the agency problem between management and capital suppliers, the business should design an effective corporate structure to reduce agency cost, including hiring outside board members and/or the establishment of an audit committee. The board members with higher independence and expertise will ask the auditors to put in more audit time to reduce information asymmetry. And they will expect to lessen the auditor’s economic dependency on the management by restricting non-audit services the company will purchase from the independent auditor firm. Most researches recently focus on the relation between characteristic of the board and business operation results. This research attempted to examine the relation between board characteristics and audit/non-audit fees paid to the independent auditors.
This study found there’s no significant relation between board independence and audit fees or non-audit fees, but a negative relation existed between the board expertise and non-audit fees. Opposite to the conclusion of Carcello et al. (2000), this result indicated that the effect of board expertise on fees is greater than that of board independence. It could be due to the initial development of corporate governance in Taiwan. Most companies hire outside board members and set up an audit committee just to meet the regulation stipulated by law. On the other hand, the greater expertise a board processes, the less non-audit fee it will pay to the auditor in order to reduce the economic dependency of the auditor on the management. |
| Reference: | 一、國外參考文獻
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二、中文參考文獻
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三、網路參考資料
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
會計研究所
91353028
92 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0091353028 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [會計學系] 學位論文
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