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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 企業管理學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/29919


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    题名: 管理者持股比例對公司資本結構與負債期限之影響
    作者: 洪琬瑜
    贡献者: 盧秋玲
    洪琬瑜
    关键词: 管理者持股比例
    負債期限
    資本結構
    成長機會
    日期: 2008
    上传时间: 2009-09-11 16:51:51 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本次研究將以台灣地區1988年至2008年的上市櫃公司，再扣除金融保險業後作為研究對象。本文使用混合資料的兩階段式迴歸模型來進行實證分析，欲了解在實際經營情況下，當公司有其管理者與股東、股東與債權人的代理問題時，管理者持有公司股份的多寡，是否會對公司的融資決策，如資本結構與負債期限，產生影響。實證結果發現如下：
    1. 管理者持股比例與公司負債比例呈現不顯著負向關係。
    2. 固定資產、公司規模與公司負債比例呈現顯著正向關係。
    3. 獲利能力、營運風險與公司負債比例呈現顯著負向關係。
    4. 公司成長機會與營運風險皆與公司負債期限呈現顯著負向關係。
    5. 傳統產業、航運產業、觀光產業等三種產業與負債期限呈現顯著相關。
    6. 在公司成長機會高時，管理者持股比例與公司負債期限為顯著負向關係。
    7. 在公司成長機會低時，管理者持股比例與公司負債期限為顯著正向關係。
    8. 在公司營運風險高時，管理者持股比例與公司負債期限為不顯著正向關係。
    9. 在公司營運風險低時，管理者持股比例與公司負債期限為不顯著負向關係。
    參考文獻: 一、 中文文獻：
    1.陳淑萍，”從代理理論的觀點探討所有權結構與資本結構之關係”，國立中央大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文，民國87 年。
    2.張瀞，”企業主要經理人持股與資本結構之相關性研究-以台灣上市企業為例”，東吳大學企業管理研究所，碩士論文，民91年。
    3.李詩將，“台灣上市公司所有權結構、資本結構與公司績效間相關性研究”，高雄第一科技大學金融營運系碩士班，碩士論文，民90年。
    4.吳雅茹，”成長機會與負債期限對公司資本結構之影響”， 高雄第一科技大學金融營運系碩士班，碩士論文，民93年。
    二、 英文文獻：
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    2.Barclay, Michael J., Clifford W. Smith Jr., 1995, “The maturity structure of corporate debt”, Journal of Finance 50, 609–631
    3.Baskin, J., 1989,”An empirical investigation of pecking order hypothesis”, Financial Management (spring), 26-35
    4.Bathala, C. T., K. P. Moon, and R. P. Rao,1994, “Mangerial Ownership, Debt Policy, and the Impact of Institutional Holdings: An Agency Perspective”, Financial Management 3,38-50
    5.Brealey, R., and Stewart C. Myers, 1984, “Principles of Corporate Finance”, New York: McGraw-Hill
    6.Berle, Adolph A. and G. C. Means, 1932, “The Modern Corporate and Private Property”, New York: Macmillan
    7.Chen, C. R. and T. L. Steiner,1999, “Managerial Ownership and Agency Conflicts: A Nonlinear Simultaneous Equation Analysis of Managerial Ownership, Risk Taking, Debt Policy, and Dividend Policy”, The Financial Review 34,119-136
    8.Cruthley, Claire E., and Robert S. Hansen, 1989, “A Test of the Agency Theory of Managerial Ownership, Corporate Leverage, and Corporate Dividends”, Financial Management, 36-46
    9.Diamond, Douglas, 1991, “Debt maturity structure and liquidity risk”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 709–737
    10.Donaldson, G., 1961, “Corporate Debt Capacity: A Study of Corporate Debt Policy and the Determination of Corporate Debt Capacity”, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration
    11.Fama, E. R. and M. C. Jensen, 1983, “Separation of Ownership and Control.” Journal of Law and Economics 26, 301-325
    12.Friend, I. and Larry H. P. Lang, 1988, “An Empirical Test of the Impact of Managerial Self-Interest on Corporate Capital Structure”, Journal of Finance 53, No.2, 271-281
    13.Guedes, Jose, Tim Opler, 1996, “The determinants of the maturity of corporate debt issues”, Journal of Finance 51, 1809–1833
    14.Harris, M., and A. Raviv, 1990, “Capital Structure and the Information Role of Debt,” Journal of Finance, 45, 321-349
    15.Haugen, R. A. and L. W. Senbet, 1981, “Resolving the agency problems of external capital through option. ”, Journal of Finance 36, 629-647
    16.J. A. Hausman, 1978, “Specification Tests In Econometrics”, Econometrica 46, 6, 1251-1272
    17.Jensen, G. R., D. P. Solberg, and T. S. Zorn, 1992, “Simultaneous Determination of Insider Ownership, Debt, and Dividend Policies”, Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis 27, 247-263
    18.Jensen, M. and W. Meckling, 1976, “ Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360.
    19.Jensen, Michael C., 1986, “Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers”, American Economic Review 76, 323–329
    20.Johnson, Shane A., 2003, “Debt maturity and the effects of growth opportunities and liquidity risk on leverage”, Review of Financial Studies 16, 209–236
    21.Jung, Kooyul, Kim, Yong-Cheol, Stulz, Rene M., 1996, “Timing, investment opportunities, managerial discretion, and the security issue decision”, Journal of Financial Economics 42, 2, 159-186
    22.Mehran, Hamid, 1992, “Executive Incentive Plans, Corporate Control, and Capital Structure”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 27, 539-560
    23.Miller, M. H., 1977, “Debt and Taxes”, Journal of Finance, 261-275
    24.Modigliani, F. and M. H. Miller, 1958, “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment”, American Economic Review 48, 261-929
    25.Modigliani, F. and M. H. Miller, 1963, “Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital”, American Economic Review 53, 433-443
    26.Mohd, M. A., L. G. Perry, and J. N. Rimbey,1998, “The Impact of Ownership Structure On Corporate Debt Policy: a Time-Series Cross-Sectional Analysis”, The Financial Review 33,85-98
    27.Morck, R., A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny, 1988, “Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis”, Journal of Financial Economics, 20,293-315
    28.Myers, Stewart C., 1977, “Determinants of corporate borrowing”, Journal of Financial Economics, 5, 147-176
    29.Myers, Stewart C., 1984, “The Capital Structure puzzle”, Journal of Finance l39, 575-592.
    30.Rajan, Raghuram, Andrew Winton, 1995, “Covenants and collateral as incentives to monitor”, Journal of Finance 50, 1113–1146
    31.Scott, J., 1977, “Bankruptcy, Secured Debt and Optimal Capital Structure”, Journal of Finance 32, 1-20
    32.Skinner, D.J., 1993, “The Investment Opportunity Sets and Accounting Procedure Choice,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 16,407-443
    33.Smith, Clifford, Ross Watts, 1992, “The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies”, Journal of Financial Economics 32, 263–292
    34.Stulz, René, 2000, “Does financial structure matter for economic growth? A corporate finance perspective”, Working paper, Ohio State University
    35.Sudip Datta, Mai Iskandar-Datta, Kartik Datta, 2005, “Managerial Stock Ownership and the Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt”, Journal of Finance 60, 5, 2333-2350
    36.Williamson, o., 1988, “Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance,” Journal of Finance, 43, 567-591
    37.Zwiebel, J., 1996, “Dynamic Capital Structure under Managerial Entrenchment”, The American Economic Review 86, 1197-1215
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    企業管理研究所
    96355010
    97
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0096355010
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[企業管理學系] 學位論文

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