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    Title: 交叉股權對企業社會責任的影響初探
    A Preliminary Study on the Impact of Cross ownership on Corporate Social Responsibility
    Authors: 林安琪
    Lin, An-Qi
    Contributors: 潘振宇
    Pan, Chen-Yu
    林安琪
    Lin, An-Qi
    Keywords: 交叉持股
    環境社會和治理
    Cournot競爭
    Bertrand競爭
    Cross Ownership
    Cournot Competition
    Bertrand Competition
    Environmental,social,and governance
    Date: 2025
    Issue Date: 2025-08-04 14:16:13 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 環境社會和治理(Environmental,social,and governance,ESG)是目前全球提倡永續發展的主流,也是評估企業發展的重要指標。交叉持股對企業投資ESG的影響具體是何種表現為本文探討的一個重要核心。本文考慮了一個寡佔模型,其中廠商自由選擇ESG投入、產出水準或產品價格。在企業交叉持有對方股權的情況下,探究交叉股權對均衡ESG投資、產業利潤與社會福利的影響。結果表明,在交叉持股的Cournot競爭下,交叉持股比重上升,會使產業利潤上升,但會導致ESG投入、產量、社會福利下降。本文亦考慮Bertrand競爭,結論與Cournot競爭非常相似。
    Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) has become a global mainstream approach to promoting sustainable development and serves as a key indicator for evaluating corporate performance. This paper investigates the impact of cross ownership on firms' ESG investment decisions. We consider an oligopoly model in which firms freely choose their levels of ESG investment, output, or product price. Under mutual shareholding structures, we explore how cross ownership affects equilibrium ESG investment, industry profits, and social welfare. Our findings suggest that under Cournot competition with cross ownership, an increase in cross ownership raises industry profits but reduces ESG investment, output, and social welfare. Similar results are observed under Bertrand competition, where the effects of cross ownership closely mirror those found in the Cournot setting.
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    [6] Gilo, David, Yossi Moshe, and Yossi Spiegel. (2006). Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion. The RAND Journal of Economics, 37:81–99.

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    [8] Hirose, K., Matsumura T., (2022). Common ownership and environmental corporate social responsibility, Energy Economics, 114,106269. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2022.106269

    [9] Innes, Robert, and Abdoul G. Sam. 2008. Voluntary pollution reductions and the enforcement of environmental law: An Empirical Study of the 33/50 Program. Journal of Law and Economics, 51 (2): 271–96.

    [10] Johnston, Robert J., and Cathy A. Roheim. 2006. A battle of taste and environmental convictions for ecolabeled seafood: A contingent ranking experiment. Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 31 (2): 283–300.

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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    國際經營與貿易學系
    112351054
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0112351054
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[國際經營與貿易學系 ] 學位論文

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