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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/157492


    Title: 跨界污染下資本移動性對環境政策之效果
    Transboundary Pollution, Capital Mobility, and Environmental Policy
    Authors: 賴育邦
    Contributors: 財政系
    Keywords: 資本移動性;寇斯定理;雙重紅利假說;排放稅;可交易排放權;跨界污染
    capital mobility;Coase theorem;double-dividend hypothesisemission tax;TEP program;transboundary pollution
    Date: 2021-12
    Issue Date: 2025-06-23 13:21:34 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 為處理日益普遍的跨界污染問題，排放稅與可交易排放權是兩種最常見的工具。本計畫欲建立一個包含可移動資本、獨占性競爭廠商，以及區域間貿易的模型，並以此架構探討資本移動性對環境管制之影響。本計畫預期，當資本無法在區域間移動時，排放稅與可交易排放權兩者的效果會相同。接下來，本計畫將延伸至資本可移動的情況。此情況下，吾人預期排放稅與可交易排放權之效果將有所不同。若是如此，本文第接下來將探討何者較有效率。此外，資本的移動性也可能使若干傳統的觀點不成立。例如，根據雙重紅利假說，排放稅或是以拍賣方式分配排放權會較無償發放排放權來得有效率，乃因前者可取得收入，以降低其他具扭曲性之租稅，而後者則無。但在資本可移動的情況下，政府可藉排放權的發放，改變資本配置，以增進福利。此或可導致無償發放排放權較以拍賣方式分配排放權來得更有效率。再者，按寇斯定理之主張，初始排放權如何發放不會影響資源配置的效率。然而資本的移動性可能使得上述結果不成立，也連帶使寇斯定理的適用性受到限制。
    Emission taxes and tradable-emission-permit (TEP) programs are two popular approaches to regulate transboundary pollution.By establishing a framework with mobile capital, monopolistic competition, and interregional trade, this project intends to investigate the impacts of capital mobility on the environmental regulation. This project anticipates that when capital is immobile, the two approaches are equivalent. Then this project will extend the model to consider mobile capital. The mobility of capital is expected to break down the equivalence the taxes and the capes. There arises a question: which approach is more efficient? This is our first concern. In addition, the presence of capital mobility is believed to reverses some conventional results. This project intends to demonstrate two things. First, capital mobility may lead the non-revenue-raising instruments to be more efficient than the revenue-raising instruments. If so, then it counters the double-dividend hypothesis. Second, with mobile capital, the initial allocation of permits affects the efficiency, which disputes the Coase theorem.
    Relation: 科技部, MOST109-2410-H004-121, 109.08-110.07
    Data Type: report
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 國科會研究計畫

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