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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 金融學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/155177


    请使用永久网址来引用或连结此文件: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/155177


    题名: Essays on capital market
    作者: 詹育儒
    Chan, Yu-Ju
    贡献者: 金融系
    关键词: Stocks;Individual investors;Bank loans;Mutual funds
    日期: 2024-06
    上传时间: 2025-01-17 10:23:37 (UTC+8)
    摘要: This thesis consists of three essays, each focusing on a different capital market: the stock market, the corporate loan market, and the mutual fund market. The first essay explores how retail investors alter their trading behaviors after learning about nearby jackpot winning events. Using lottery jackpot winnings around the neighborhood as exogenous shocks, we find that retail investors, whose brokers’ branches are located close to the lottery stores selling jackpot-winning tickets, buy more stocks than their counterparts after the shocks. The aggressive stock purchases lead to relatively lower returns. To pin down the mechanisms, we use a survey and identify that the emotions of salient gambling and feeling lucky drive our main finding. Moreover, these investors tend to buy more lottery-like stocks, and their selling decisions are unaffected. Finally, we perform several falsification tests and robustness checks and find consistent results. The second essay discloses the tacit collusion among top banks in the corporate loan market. While there is no apparent reason for loan spreads to cluster at certain numbers, we find that around 70% of bank loans have round-yard spreads (i.e., multiples of 25 basis points). We hypothesize that dominant banks implicitly collude by using the round-yards as focal pricing points when negotiating with their borrowers. The tacit collusion leads to higher spreads and total costs of the round-yard-priced loans than non-round-yard-priced loans. Consistent with our tacit collusion hypothesis, dominant banks round up rather than round down loan spreads to multiples of yards. Moreover, round-yard pricing is more prevalent among lower-quality and non-repeat borrowers. The third essay examines the effects of board gender diversity on mutual fund behavior. We show that funds with more female independent directors have a lower probability of involving in trading scandals. Gender diversity also reduces the intensity of intra-year risk-shifting by mid-year losers and cuts those funds’ underperformance substantially in the quarter following risk-shifting. Instrumenting gender diversity of mutual fund boards with a diversity of directors from non-local firms yields qualitatively similar results. We also find evidence that women directors are more likely to cut advisory fees than male directors.
    關聯: The University of Hong Kong, Doctor of Philosophy, pp.1-184
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[金融學系] 學位論文

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