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    Title: 民進黨全面執政下的立法策略與立法表現
    The Legislative Strategies and Legislative Performance under the DPP Rule
    Authors: 梁珈瑄
    Liang, Chia-Hsuan
    Contributors: 盛杏湲
    Sheng, Shing-Yuan
    梁珈瑄
    Liang, Chia-Hsuan
    Keywords: 分權立法制度
    立法提案
    立法成功
    民進黨
    全面執政
    Date: 2024
    Issue Date: 2024-09-04 15:58:42 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文以民進黨首次全面執政之下的第九屆立法院(2016-2020)為研究範圍,透過量化研究方法,分析這段期間內全部的立法提案,瞭解各立法者提案的平均通過天數,以及在不同立法成功標準下,各政黨黨團、立法委員、行政院間立法成功的差異。此外,本文亦運用深入訪談法,探討民進黨內部強化政黨團結與內部溝通的制度、在立法上採取的具體策略,以及國民黨及其他小黨在民進黨全面執政下的應對策略,並檢視分權立法制度是否能確實保障他們的立法參與。
    量化研究結果發現,行政院提案的三讀通過的速度相比於其他立法者更佳,也比第八屆國民黨全面執政下的行政院更快速,而立法成功的部分,行政院、民進黨黨團表現方面優於其他黨團,但民進黨立委與在野黨立委之間的差異並不大。
    深入訪談結果發現,民進黨內部存在許多強化政黨團結的制度,以確保政黨團結以及對外表現的一致,雙召委和黨團協商制度確實在程序上,能為在野黨提供更多參與立法過程的機會,但就提案內容上,民進黨對於爭議性較大的議題時,仍會透過相應立法策略去確保最終三讀通過的版本是按其提案版本通過,此外,民進黨的全面執政之下,行政主導立法的現象比過去更加明顯,但各立法者也順應此現象發展出相應的策略,針對行政院的提案提出對案,透過併案審查的方式使自己的提案通過三讀,藉此收獲立委個人的立法功勞。
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    政治學系
    109252001
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109252001
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[政治學系] 學位論文

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