English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  Items with full text/Total items : 113303/144284 (79%)
Visitors : 50796592      Online Users : 740
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/153337
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/153337


    Title: 反貪腐法規域外效力對於企業租稅規避之影響
    The impact of extraterritoriality of anti-corruption regulations on corporate tax aggressiveness
    Authors: 鍾宜軒
    Chung, I-Hsuan
    Contributors: 何怡澄
    郭振雄

    Ho, Yi-Cheng
    Kuo, Jenn-Shyong

    鍾宜軒
    Chung, I-Hsuan
    Keywords: 反貪腐法規
    域外效力
    跨國企業
    租稅規避
    Anti-corruption regulations
    Extraterritoriality
    Multinational corporations
    Tax aggressiveness
    Date: 2024
    Issue Date: 2024-09-04 14:48:03 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文旨在探討反貪腐法規域外效力對於企業租稅激進之影響。反貪腐法規域外效力使跨國企業面臨更高的海外賄賂監管風險。過去文獻指出企業貪腐環境與企業租稅規避具有正向關係,惟尚未有文獻探討跨國貪腐環境。本文探討英國《反賄賂法》(The 2010 United Kingdom Bribery Act, UKBA) 是否影響美國跨國企業租稅激進行為,以在英國設有分支機構者認定受該法管轄(下稱受管轄企業),並使用差異中差異法進行迴歸分析。實證結果顯示,《反賄賂法》通過後,受管轄企業之租稅庇護可能性及租稅不確定性均減少。顯示《反賄賂法》影響受管轄美國企業之租稅激進行為。於敏感性分析,使用不同租稅規避指標、不同實驗組設定,及增加額外控制變數,皆不違反主要測試的結果,確保結果之穩健。額外測試,發現企業營運國家之貪腐程度與租稅規避呈正向關係。《反賄賂法》之通過將抑制受管轄企業於高貪腐國家之營運。
    This study examines the impact of the extraterritoriality of anti-corruption regulations on tax aggressiveness. The extraterritoriality of anti-corruption regulations exposes multinational corporations (MNCs) to higher regulatory risk of foreign bribery. Using U.S. MNCs’ different exposure to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the 2010 United Kingdom Bribery Act (UKBA), this study provides evidence suggesting that the likelihood of tax sheltering and tax uncertainty of exposed firms decrease after the adoption of the UKBA, relative to their unexposed U.S. peers. The finding suggests that the UKBA affects the tax aggressive of exposed U.S. firms. In addition, using alternative measures of tax avoidance, different treatment group proxy, and the inclusion of other control variables in robustness tests, the results are similar to the main test. Lastly, the additional analysis examines the relationship between the extent of business operations in high-corruption countries and tax avoidance and whether the UKBA affects business operations in high-corruption countries. The results indicate that there is a positive relationship between the extent of business operations in high-corruption countries and tax avoidance, and U.S. MNCs subject to the jurisdiction of the UKBA curb their business in high-corruption-risk countries following the adoption of the UKBA.
    Reference: 丘宏達與陳純一,2012,現代國際法(修訂三版),台北:三民書局。
    江世雄,2014,跨國犯罪防制條約之管轄權規範探討,涉外執法與政策學報,第4期:13–36。
    吳光平,2013,論反托拉斯法之域外效力,中華國際法與超國界法評論,第9卷第1期,頁115–138。
    許恒達,2012,反制跨國企業海外行賄──以美國海外反貪腐法為例,輔大法學,第44期(12月):1–11。
    謝大維,2023,私部門賄賂行為之入罪化—以英國反賄賂法為中心,國立臺灣大學法律學系未出版碩士論文。
    Akamah, H., OK. Hope, and W.B. Thomas. 2018. Tax havens and disclosure aggregation. Journal of International Business Studies 49 (January): 49–69.
    Al-Hadi, A., G. Taylor, and G. Richardson. 2022. Are corruption and corporate tax avoidance in the United States related? Review of Accounting Studies 27(March): 344–389.
    Alm, J., J. Martinez-Vazquez, C. McClellan. 2016. Corruption and firm tax evasion. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 124(April): 146–163.
    Bailey, D.H. 1966. The effects of corruption in a developing nation. Western Political Quarterly 19(December): 719–732.
    Bame-Aldred, C., J. Cullen, K. Martin, and K. Parboteeah. 2012. National culture and firm-level tax evasion. Journal of Business Research 66 (March): 390–396.
    Bankman, J. 2003. The tax shelter battle. In Crises and Tax Administration, edited by H. Aaron and J. Slemrod. Washington D.C.: Bookings. Institution Press.
    Bardhan, P. 1997. Corruption and development: A review of issues. Journal of Economic Literature 35(September): 1320–1346.
    Beasley, M.S., D.R. Hermanson, J.V. Carcello, and T.L. Neal. 2010. Fraudulent financial reporting: 1998-2007: an analysis of U.S. public companies. Association Sections, Divisions, Boards, Teams. 453.
    Beck, P.J. and M.W. Maher. 1985 Competition, regulation and bribery. Managerial and Decision Economics 10(March): 1–12.
    Blouin, J. 2014. Defining and Measuring Tax Planning Aggressiveness. National Tax Journal 67(4): 875–899.
    Byard, D., H. Lee, E. Li, and A. Sanseverino. 2023. Anti-corruption laws and geographic reporting transparency. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4266130. Accessed 22 April 2024.
    Chen, S., X. Chen, Q. Cheng, and T. Shevlin. 2010. Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms? Journal of Financial Economics 95(January): 41–61.
    Christensen, H.B., M. Maffett, and T. Rauter. 2022. Policeman for the world: The impact of extraterritorial FCPA enforcement on foreign investment and internal controls. The Accounting Review 97(September): 189–219.
    Christensen, H.B., M. Maffett, and T. Rauter. 2024. Reversing the resource curse: Foreign corruption regulation and the local economic benefits of resource extraction. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 16(January): 90–120.
    Colangelo, A. J. 2014. What Is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction. Cornell Law Review 99(September): 1303–1352.
    D’Souza, A., and D. Kaufmann. 2013. Who bribes in public contracting and why: worldwide evidence from firms. Economics of Governance 14(November): 333–367
    DeBacker, J, BT. Heim, and A. Tran. 2015. Importing corruption culture from overseas: Evidence from corporate tax evasion in the United States. Journal of Financial Economics 117(July): 122–138
    Desai, M. A. and and D. Dharmapala. 2006. Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives. Journal of Financial Economics 79(January): 145–179.
    Desai, M. A., A. Dyck, and L. Zingales. 2007. Theft and taxes. Journal of Financial Economics 84(June): 591-623
    Dreher, D. and M. Gassebner. 2013 Greasing the wheels? The impact of regulations and corruption on firm entry. Public Choice 155(June): 413–432
    Dyreng, S.D., M. Hanlon, and E. L. Maydew. 2008. Long run corporate tax avoidance. The Accounting Review 83 (January): 61-82.
    Dyreng, S.D., M. Hanlon, and E. L. Maydew. 2019. When does tax avoidance result in tax uncertainty? The Accounting Review 94(March): 179–203.
    Dyreng, S.D. and B.P. Lindsey. 2009. Using financial accounting data to examine the effect of foreign operations located in tax havens and other countries on US multinational firms’ tax rates. Journal of Accounting Research 47(December): 1283–1316.
    Ellis, J., J. Smith, and R. White. 2020. Corruption and corporate innovation. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 55(November): 1–51.
    Erickson, M., M. Hanlon, and E.L. Maydew. 2004. How much will firms pay for earnings that do not exist: Evidence of taxes paid on allegedly fraudulent earnings. The Accounting Review 79 (April): 387–408.
    FASB. 1997. Disclosures about segments of an enterprise and related information. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131. Norwalk, CT. Available at: https://www.fasb.org/Page/Document?pdf=aop_FAS131.pdf&title=FAS%
    20131%20(AS%20AMENDED) Accessed: 8 May 2024.
    Frank, M.M., L.J. Lynch, and S.O. Rego. 2009. Tax reporting aggressiveness and its relation to aggressive financial reporting. The Accounting Review 84 (March): 467–496.
    Goldman, J. and S. Zeume. 2021. Who benefits from anti-corruption enforcement? Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3745751. Accessed: 22 April 2024.
    Graham, J. R. and A. L. Tucker 2006. Tax shelters and corporate debt policy. Journal of Financial Economics 81(September): 563–594.
    Gray, W. and D. Kaufman. 1998. Corruption and development. World Bank Publications - Reports 11545. The World Bank Group.
    Guenther, D.A., R.J. Wilson, K. Wu. 2019. Tax uncertainty and incremental tax avoidance. The Accounting Review 94 (March): 229–247.
    Guenther, D.A., S.R. Matsunaga, and B.M. Williams. 2017. Is tax avoidance related to firm risk? The Accounting Review 92 (January): 115–136.
    Gupta, S. and K. Newberry. 1997. Determinants of the variability in corporate effective tax rates: Evidence from longitudinal data. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 16(Spring): 1–34.
    Hainmueller, J. 2012. Entropy balancing for causal effects: A multivariate reweighting method to produce balanced samples in observational studies. Political Analysis 20(Winter): 25–46.
    Hanlon, M, E.L. Maydew, and D. Saavedra. 2017. The taxman cometh: Does tax uncertainty affect corporate cash holdings? Review of Accounting Studies 22(September): 1198–1228.
    Hanlon, M., and S. Heitzman. 2010. A review of tax research. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50(December): 127–178.
    Heckelman, J.C. and B. Powell. 2010. Corruption and the institutional environment for growth. Comparative Economic Studies 52(September): 351-378.
    Hope, OK., MS. Ma, and W.B. Thomas. 2013. Tax avoidance and geographic earnings disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics 56(November–December): 170–189
    Huntington, S.P. 1968. Political order in changing societies. Yale University Press, New Haven.
    Khieu, H., N.H. Nguyen, H.V. Phan, and J. A. Fulkerson 2023. Political corruption and corporate risk-taking. Journal of Business Ethics 184(April): 93–113
    Klitgaard, R. 1998. International cooperation against corruption. Finance and Development 35(March): 1–4.
    Lamont, O., C. Polk, and J. Saá-Requejo. 2011. Financial constraints and stock returns. The Review of Financial Studies 14(Summer): 529-554.
    La Porta, R., F. López-de Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R.W. Vishny. 1998. Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy 106(December): 1113–1155.
    Lambsdorff, J.G. 2002. Corruption and rent-seeking. Public Choice 113 (October): 97–125.
    Leff, N.H. 1964. Economic development through bureaucratic corruption. American Behavioral Scientist 8(November): 8–14.
    Leys, C. 1965. What is The problem about corruption? The Journal of Modern African Studies 3(August): 215–230.
    Lippman, J. 2013. Business without bribery: Analyzing the future of enforcement for the UK Bribery Act. Public Contract Law Journal 42(Spring): 649–668.
    Lisowsky, P. 2010. Seeking shelter: Empirically modeling tax shelters using financial statement information. The Accounting Review 85(September): 1693–1720.
    Lisowsky, P., L. Robinson, and A. Schmidt. 2013. Do publicly disclosed tax reserves tell us about privately disclosed tax shelter activity? Journal of Accounting Research 51(June): 583–629.
    Liu, X. 2016. Corruption culture and corporate misconduct. Journal of Financial Economics 122(November): 307–327.
    Mauro, P. 1998. Corruption and the composition of government expenditure. Journal of Public Economics 69(June): 263–279.
    McGuire, S.T., T.C. Omer, and D. Wang. 2012. Tax avoidance: Does tax-specific industry expertise make a difference? The Accounting Review 87(May): 975–1003.
    Méon, P.-G. and K. Sekkat. 2005. Does corruption grease or sand the wheels of growth? Public Choice 122(January): 69–97.
    Méon, P.-G. and L. Weill 2010. Is corruption an efficient grease? World Development 38(March): 244–259.
    Myrdal, G. 1968. Asian drama: An enquiry into the poverty of nations, vol 2. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund.
    OECD. 2012. Implementing the OECD anti-bribery convention. Report by the OECD Working Group on bribery in international business transactions: United Kingdom, phase 3. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/
    UnitedKingdomphase3reportEN.pdf. Accessed: 8 May 2024.
    Ortas, E. and I. Gallego-Álvarez. 2020. Bridging the gap between corporate social responsibility performance and tax aggressiveness. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 33(March): 825–855.
    Pan, A., W. Zhang, X. Shi, and L. Dai. 2022. Climate policy and low-carbon innovation: Evidence from low-carbon city pilots in China. Energy Economics 112(August): 106–128.
    Rego, S.O. 2003. Tax-Avoidance Activities of U.S. Multinational Corporations. Comtemporary Accounting Research 20(Winter): 805–833.
    Rose-Ackerman, S. 1996. Democracy and ‘grand’ corruption. International Social Science Journal 48(September): 365–380
    Russell, H. and G. Brock. 2016. Abusive Tax Avoidance and Responsibilities of Tax Professionals. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 17(May): 278–294
    Sanseverino, A. 2023. The impact of foreign laws on US firms: evidence from the UK Bribery Act. Review of Accounting Studies.
    Schein, E.H. (1992) Organizational culture and leadership: A dynamic view. 2nd Edition, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco.
    Schneider, S.C. 1988. National vs. corporate culture: Implications for human resource management. Human Resource Management 27(Summer): 231–246.
    Shleifer, A. and R.W. Vishny. 1993. Corruption. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(August): 599–617.
    Scholes, M., M. Wolfson, M. Erikson, E. Maydew, and T. Shevlin. 2008. Taxes and business strategy: A planning approach. 4th ed. Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice Hall.
    Siegfried, J. 1974. Effective average u.s. corporation income tax rates. National Tax Journal 27(June): 245-259.
    Slemrod, J. 2004. The economics of corporate tax selfishness. National Tax Journal 57(December): 877–899.
    Smith, J.D. 2016. US political corruption and firm financial policies. Journal of Financial Economics 121(August): 350–367.
    Stiglitz, J.E. 2008. Regulating multinational corporations: Towards principles of cross-border legal frameworks in a globalized world balancing rights with responsibilities. American University International Law Review 23(January): 451–558.
    Svensson, J. 2005. Eight questions about corruption. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 19 (Summer): 19–42
    Transparency International. 2023. Corruption perceptions index technical methodology note. Available at: https://transparencia.org.es/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/
    CPI2022_TechnicalMethodology.pdf Accessed: 9 May 2024.
    U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. (DOJ and SEC). 2020. A resource guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 2nd Edition. Available at: https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/fcpa-resource-guide Accessed: 8 May 2024.
    U.S. Department of the Treasury 1999. The problem of corporate tax shelters: discussion, analysis and legislative proposals. Washington D.C.
    UK Ministry of Justice. 2012. The Bribery Act 2010 – guidance. https://www.justice.
    gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf. Accessed: 7 May 2024.
    Warin, F.J., C. Falconer, and M.S. Diamant. 2010. The British are coming! : Britain changes its law on foreign bribery and joins the international fight against corruption. Texas International Law Journal 46(Fall): 1–72.
    Wilson, RJ. 2009. An examination of corporate tax shelter participants. The Accounting Review 84(May): 969–999
    Zeume, S. 2017. Bribes and Firm Value. The Review of Financial Studies 30(May): 1457–1489.
    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    111353102
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111353102
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 學位論文

    Files in This Item:

    File Description SizeFormat
    310201.pdf3558KbAdobe PDF0View/Open


    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏,無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用,惟仍請適度,合理使用本網站之內容,以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用,則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

    2.本網站之製作,已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益,如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者,請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw),維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback