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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 財務管理學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/152716


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    題名: 教育連結對獨立董事之獲利影響
    Education tie and independent directors’ trading profits
    作者: 沈佑霖
    Shen, Yu-Lin
    貢獻者: 車倫周
    Cha, Yun-Ju
    沈佑霖
    Shen, Yu-Lin
    關鍵詞: 教育連結
    內線交易
    獨立董事
    Education tie
    Insider trading
    Independent directors
    日期: 2024
    上傳時間: 2024-08-05 13:41:22 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究主要探討教育連結對獨立董事的交易利潤。當獨立董事與高階主管透過教育背景建立連結時，這些獨立董事往往能從股票購買交易中獲得明顯更高的報酬率。因為高階主管更願意與有教育連結的獨立董事分享公司特有的資訊。此外，在資訊不對稱程度較高、 高階主管權力較大、董事居住在公司附近的公司中，教育連結對報酬率的影響會進一步擴大。然而，在公司任職期間較長的獨立董事和同時擔任審計委員會成員的獨立董事則會降低教育連結對報酬率的影響，這隱含教育連結的影響力會被公司以及董事的狀態影響。本研究還發現在股票賣出的交易中，有教育連結的獨立董事也能從中獲得超額報酬。綜上所述，本研究結果表明，教育連結是幫助獨立董事從公司高階主管獲取公司特有資訊的關鍵。
    My study pins down on education tie and analyzes the trading profits from independent directors with education ties. When independent directors and senior executives (CEOs) are connected through education ties, these independent directors tend to achieve markedly higher profits from stock purchase transactions since senior executives are more willing to share private information with connected independent directors. The influence of education tie on trading profits is further amplified in a firm with higher information asymmetry, with more powerful executives, and when directors reside near the firm. Conversely, the influence of education tie is reduced by independent directors with longer tenure in the firm and audit committee memberships. Moreover, I find that independent directors with education ties can also generate abnormal profits from sales transactions. Put together, my results suggest that education tie serve as a key to assisting independent directors to access private information from firms’ senior executives.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財務管理學系
    111357002
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111357002
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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