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    题名: 銀行聯貸與ESG議合：碳盤查，減碳與資訊不對稱
    Syndicated Bank Loans and Interim ESG Engagement: GHG Emission Reporting and Abatement Effort under Asymmetric Information
    作者: 陳亭伃
    Chen, Ting-Yu
    贡献者: 何靜嫺
    Ho, Shirley J.
    陳亭伃
    Chen, Ting-Yu
    关键词: 資訊不對稱
    銀行
    金融風險與風險管理
    環境永續
    Information Asymmetry
    Banks
    Financial Risk and Risk Management
    Sustainable Environment
    日期: 2024
    上传时间: 2024-08-05 13:38:31 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 隨著全球氣候政策日益嚴格，企業面臨更高的環境風險和合規成本，貸款成本也隨之升高。針對聯合貸款市場，特別是融合了ESG議合和資訊不對稱等因素的理論研究相對稀少。本研究探討了淨零碳排政策和ESG議合如何在考慮資訊不對稱和碳排放報告的情況下影響聯合貸款市場的決策。我們構建了兩個模型：一個作為基準模型，另一個納入ESG議合的影響。研究結果顯示，(i)在考慮ESG議合的情況下，嚴格的排放要求使公司項目努力減少，而減排努力增加。(ii)當排放率是私有資訊時，公司項目努力會隨排放率增加而降低，減排努力則會增加。(iii)更有利的貸款條件能提高公司的減排努力。(iv)銀行的續貸意願隨預期排放率增加而減少，且隨排放上限和公司報告成本增加而降低。(v)在某些回報條件下，ESG議合會降低銀行的續貸意願。此外，我們還對聯貸模型進行了詳細分析，探討了公司努力效率、貸款規模、風險承擔等因素，並研究了公司的溫室氣體排放揭露策略。這些結果為理解公司和銀行的決策提供了有價值的見解。
    As global climate policies become increasingly stringent, companies face higher environmental risks and compliance costs, which in turn raise the cost of borrowing. Theoretical research on the syndicated loan market, particularly incorporating factors such as ESG engagement and information asymmetry, remains relatively scarce. This study examines how net-zero carbon policies and ESG engagement impact decision-making in the syndicated loan market under conditions of information asymmetry and carbon emissions reporting. We construct two models: a baseline model and another that incorporates the effects of ESG engagement. The results indicate that (i) under the conditions of ESG engagement, stringent emission requirements lead to decreased project effort by the firm and increased abatement effort. (ii) When the emission rate is private information, the firm's project effort decreases with an increase in the emission rate, while the abatement effort increases. (iii) More favorable loan conditions can enhance the firm's abatement efforts. (iv) Banks' willingness to continue the loan decreases with the expected emission rate and further decreases with higher emission limits and reporting costs. (v) Under certain return conditions, ESG engagement reduce banks' willingness to continue lending. Additionally, we conduct a detailed analysis of the syndicated loan model, exploring factors such as firm effort efficiency, loan size, and risk-bearing, as well as the company's greenhouse gas emission disclosure strategies. These findings provide valuable insights into the decision-making processes of companies and banks.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    經濟學系
    111258039
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111258039
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[經濟學系] 學位論文

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