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    题名: 數位經濟之結合管制——以使用者數據與殺手併購產生之影響為中心
    Merger Control in the Digital Economy — Focused on the Impact of User's Data and Killer Acquisitions
    作者: 吳寧軒
    Wu, Ning-Hsuan
    贡献者: 王立達
    Wang, Li-Dar
    吳寧軒
    Wu, Ning-Hsuan
    关键词: 數位平台
    科技巨擘
    結合管制
    使用者數據
    殺手併購
    動態競爭
    Digital platform
    Big Tech
    Merger control
    User’s data
    Killer acquisition
    Dynamic competition
    日期: 2024
    上传时间: 2024-08-05 13:23:04 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 數位經濟以創新和數據為驅動力，研發新的產品或商業模式，更透過使用者數據的應用與分析促進創新的循環，動態地帶動市場與競爭的變遷，造就平台的興起。平台建置基礎設施作為用戶間交易與資源共享的媒介，連結雙邊或多邊市場用戶。在網路效應、規模經濟、範疇經濟的作用下，平台的價值與影響力日漸提升，跨產品的組合形塑出數位生態圈，科技巨擘GAFAM隨此浪潮蓬勃發展取得穩固的市場地位。此等巨型平台透過併購不斷拓展版圖，甚至以搶占市場或排除市場未來競爭為目的瞄準新創事業為收購對象，引發殺手併購。
    數位經濟對於傳統結合管制帶來衝擊與挑戰，本文回顧歐美結合管制規範以及結合案件審查實務經驗。整體而言，事前管制從調整申報門檻著手，或聚焦於巨型平台，對其所為的結合交易課予作為或不作為義務。結合案件的審查將數位經濟的特色納入考量，發展出較具體化的衡量指標。靈活地運用附帶條件通過結合案，為結合管制的另一種解方。例如使用者數據的分享與授權、使用者隱私的保護、限制數據使用在特定商品或服務等諸多行為面矯正措施，如果搭配上監管人制度，將可降低限制競爭疑慮，亦得在結合完成後持續進行監管。此外亦可保留結構面矯正措施的實施空間，透過拆分構成殺手併購的結合事業，維持市場競爭並促進經濟效率。
    本文認為，國際間的執法經驗值得吾人借鑑與參考。考量在地連結後，可以針對殺手併購加入以交易價值界定的申報門檻，且在審查限制競爭疑慮之時應考數位經濟特殊性以及動態觀點，具體化質性分析的衡量因素。若能活用結合案件通過審查時所附加的附帶條件，將有助於達到維持市場競爭之目的。
    本文亦肯認使用者數據衍生之隱私保護，以及對於產生創新或未來市場競爭損害且對市場競爭存在實質限制競爭疑慮之殺手併購有加以管制之必要性。隱私得作為重要的競爭參數，分析非價格競爭是否存在限制競爭疑慮。而殺手併購之分析得在實體審查過程中透過兩階段的分析架構，辨認殺手併購以及衡量殺手併購對市場競爭之影響。此外，跨部門的協作以及數位市場的調查與了解，將對我國長期結合管制之執法有所助益。持續追蹤動態競爭的影響，方得採取適當地策略方針，有效地因應市場環境或競爭的變遷。
    The digital economy is driven by innovation and data, developing new products or business models, and promoting the cycle of innovation through the application and analysis of user’s data. Dynamic competition driving market changes in the digital era. The platform builds infrastructure for transactions to connect users in bilateral or multilateral markets. Under the influence of network effects, economies of scale, and economies of scope, increase the value and influence of the platform. And also shape the digital ecosystem by the combination of cross-products. GAFAM, the big five technology companies, maintained a strong position of market power as digital platforms and ecosystems become the dominant organizational form of the digital economy. GAFAM also expand into new markets or territories through mergers and acquisitions, and even target new businesses for acquisitions with the purpose of seizing the market or eliminating future competition in the market, which may trigger killer acquisitions.
    The digital economy has brought impacts and challenges to traditional merger control. This paper reviews European and American merger control regulations and practical experience in merger cases by the competition authorities in Europe and the United States. Adjusting the reporting threshold is a method of ex-ante control. European Commission focuses on big tech, imposing obligations on them for act or omission with their merger and acquisition transactions. The characteristics of the digital economy should be taken into consideration. To develop specific measurement indicators is also important. Flexible use of remedies is another solution to merger control. Behavioral remedies, such as the sharing and authorization of user data, protection of user privacy, restrictions on the use of data in specific goods or services, can reduce concerns about restrictive competition. Through the application of remedies maintains business competition and promotes economic efficiency.
    This paper believes international law enforcement experience would be instrumental. After considering local connections, a transaction value threshold can be added to bring potential killer acquisition cases into the scope of review. When considering restrictive competition, factors such as the particularity of the digital economy, data, innovation, and dynamic perspectives to reduce the risk of potential error costs in measurement due to subjective judgments or predictions of dynamic competition. The purpose of maintaining market competition can be achieved with remedies.
    This article also believes that it is necessary to protect privacy of user’s data and control killer acquisitions. Privacy can be regarded as an important competitive parameter to analyze whether non-price competition may restrict competition. Through the two stages of identifying killer acquisitions and measuring the impact on restrictive competition as the framework to assess killer acquisitions, helps to decide whether to pass the merger case or not. The development of merger regulation in the long-term digital economy relies on collaboration and exchanges between cross-sectoral sectors. Only by continuously tracking the impact of dynamic competition can we adopt appropriate strategies and effectively cope with changes in the market environment or competition.
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    19. Hovenkamp, Herbert J., Antitrust Interoperability Remedies, 123 COL. L. REV. 1 (2023).
    20. Latham, Oliver, Isabel Tecu & Nitika Bagaria, Beyond Killer Acquisitions: Are There More Common Potential Competition Issues in Tech Deals and How Can These Be Assessed?, 2(2) CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE 26 (2020).
    21. Peret, Maayan, Digital Remedies, 35 BERKELY TECH. L. J. 1 (2020).
    22. Petit, Nicolas & David J. Teece, Innovating Big Tech firms and competition policy: favoring dynamic over static competition, 30(5) INDUSTRIAL AND CORPORATE CHANGE 1168 (2021).
    23. Ren, Yi, Killer Acquisition: Antitrust Control on Internet Platform, 5(3) SCI. J. ECON. & MGMT. REV. 227 (2023).
    24. Ribera Martínez, Alba, The Facebook/Giphy Divestiture: The (New) First Of Many?, 1 J. L. MKT.& INNOVATION 95 (2022).
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    30. Xing, Ziyi, Research on Market Definition of Digital Economy and Case Analysis: Based on the Perspective of Bilateral Market, 12 FRONTIERS IN BUS., ECON. & MGMT. 87 (2023).
    學位論文
    1. Alves Fulgencio, Aline, Killer acquisitions and European merger control in the digital era, Master's Thesis in European and International Trade Law (2021), http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9051039.
    2. Kolloge, Alexander, Killer Acquisitions in the Platform Economy: Do Tech Giants Acquire Target Firms to Leverage Innovation or Eliminate Competition?, Master’s thesis in Copenhagen Business School (2021), https://research-api.cbs.dk/ws/portalfiles/portal/68333515/1150378_Killer_Acquisitions_in_the_Platform_Economy_S133465_S133363.pdf.
    撰寫中論文（Working paper/ Discussion paper）
    1. Bagnoli, Vicente, The Big Data Relevant Market As A Tool For A Case By Case Analysis At The Digital Economy: Could the EU decision at Facebook/WhatsApp merger have been different?, 12th ASCOLA Conference (2017), https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfile.php/5841763/mod_resource/content/1/Bagnoli%20Antitrust%20big%20data%20SSRN-id3064795.pdf.
    2. Barefoot, Kevin, Dave Curtis, William Jolliff, Jessica R. Nicholson & Robert Omohundro, Defining and Measuring the Digital Economy, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis Working Paper (2018), https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/papers/defining-and-measuring-the-digital-economy.pdf
    3. Barefoot, Kevin, Dave Curtis, William Jolliff, Jessica R. Nicholson & Robert Omohundro, Defining and Measuring the Digital Economy, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis Working Paper, 6-8 (2018), https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/papers/defining-and-measuring-the-digital-economy.pdf.
    4. Cabral, Luís, Big Tech Acquisitions, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 18272 (Jul. 4, 2023), http://luiscabral.net/economics/workingpapers/bigtech%202023%2006.pdf.
    5. Cartapanis, Marie, Killer Acquisitions in Digital Markets, Aix Marseille University Research paper (2023), https://competition-forum.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Rapport-A.-HUMEAU-PAYET.pdf.
    6. e Lemos, Thales de Melo & Guilherme Mendes Resende, Nascent Competition and Killer Acquisitions in Digital Markets: A Decade of Acquisitions by Big Tech, RESEARCH SQUARE (DEC. 28, 2023), https://www.researchsquare.com/article/rs-3793931/v1.
    7. Gugler, Klaus, Florian Szücs & Ulrich Wohak, Start-up Acquisitions, Venture Capital and Innovation: A Comparative Study of Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft, Department of Economics Working Paper Series 340, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business (2023), https://research.wu.ac.at/ws/portalfiles/portal/44832243/WP340.pdf.
    8. Hoffmann, Jörg & Germán Johannsen, EU-Merger Control & Big Data on Data-specific Theories of Harm and Remedies (Apr. 9, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3364792.
    9. Kamepalli, Sai Krishna, Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Kill Zone (2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3555915.
    10. Norbäck, Pehr-Johan & Lars Persson, Why Big Data Can Make Creative Destruction More Creative – But Less Destructive, Research Institute of Industrial Economics Working Paper No. 1454 (2023), https://www.ifn.se/wfiles/wp/wp1454.pdf.
    11. Pradhan, Sadev & Arpit Bansal, Privacy as a Non-Price Competition Factor: Antitrust Perspectives from the EU and the US. (2023), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4559144.
    12. Stavroulaki, Theodosia, Unraveling Ariadne’s Thread: Antitrust and the Big Data Revolution in Healthcare (2023), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4465529#paper-citations-widget.
    13. von Ingersleben-Seip, Nora & Zlatina Georgieva, Old Tools for the New Economy? Counterfactual Causation in Foreclosure Assessment and Choice of Remedies on Data-driven Markets (May 15, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3861967.
    14. Yun, John M., Potential Competition, Nascent Competitors, and Killer Acquisitions, The Global Antitrust Institute Report on the Digital Economy 18 (Nov. 11, 2020), HTTPS://PAPERS.SSRN.COM/SOL3/PAPERS.CFM?ABSTRACT_ID=3733716.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    法律科際整合研究所
    110652001
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    数据类型: thesis
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