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    题名: 新冠疫情下，CEO薪水縮減之決定因素與其對Say-on-Pay結果之影響
    Determinants of CEO Pay Cut and Its Impact on Say-on-Pay During the COVID-19
    作者: 陳奐君
    Chen, Huan-Chun
    贡献者: 梁嘉紋
    Liang, Jia-Wen
    陳奐君
    Chen, Huan-Chun
    关键词: 新冠疫情
    CEO權力
    薪水縮減
    Say-on-Pay
    COVID-19 pandemic
    CEO power
    Pay cuts
    Say-on-Pay
    日期: 2024
    上传时间: 2024-08-05 12:21:16 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 經理人薪酬待遇包含了薪水、紅利及股票酬勞等項目，本研究主要檢視疫情期間，CEO權力對其薪水縮減及薪水縮減主導權之影響，同時檢視薪水縮減之主導者與縮減比例對於薪水縮減與Say-on-Pay支持率間正向關係之調節性。本研究透過2020年之EXECUCOMP公司資料發現，CEO權力越大越能促使公司採取縮減CEO薪水之措施，而對於是否自願提出縮減薪水則無顯著相關；此外透過薪水縮減主導者與縮減薪水裁量交乘分析，本研究發現CEO自願縮減薪水與否並無法正向調節薪水縮減對Say-on-Pay結果之正向關係；而透過薪水縮減比例與縮減薪水裁量交乘分析，則發現薪水縮減比例能正向調節薪水縮減對Say-on-Pay支持率之正向關係，說明當CEO縮減薪水比例越高，能有效加強縮減薪水裁量提升Say-on-Pay支持率。
    CEO compensation package includes salary, bonuses, and stock-based compensation. This paper primarily examines the effect of CEO power on pay cuts of salary and the authority to initiate pay cuts during the pandemic. Moreover, this paper also investigates how the initiator and the extent of pay cuts moderate the positive relationship between pay cuts and Say-on-Pay support rates. From the data of listed companies on EXECUCOMP from 2020, I find that greater CEO power increases the likelihood of companies implementing CEO pay cuts, though it does not significantly relate to whether the CEO voluntarily proposes the pay cut. Additionally, through the interaction analysis between the initiator of the pay cut and the decision to initiate pay cuts, this study finds that whether the CEO voluntarily reduces their salary does not positively moderate the relationship between pay cuts and Say-on-Pay outcomes. However, through the interaction analysis between the extent of the pay cut and the decision to initiate pay cuts, I found that the extent of the pay cut positively moderates the relationship between pay cuts and Say-on-Pay support rates. This indicates that higher proportions of CEO pay cuts effectively enhance the positive impact of discretionary pay cuts on Say-on-Pay support rates.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    111353021
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111353021
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[會計學系] 學位論文

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