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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 財務管理學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/152071


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    题名: 質押變動與股價報酬之關係
    Changes in Share Pledges and Future Stock Returns
    作者: 李珍妮
    贡献者: 湛可南
    李珍妮
    关键词: 股權質押
    分析師追蹤
    代理問題
    Share pledging
    Analyst coverage
    Agency problem
    日期: 2024
    上传时间: 2024-07-01 12:40:34 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 過去質押的研究，大多探討質押與公司決策的相關性，較少觀察質押對資產定價的影響。因此本研究以台灣上市公司作為研究對象，探討質押增加與未來股價超額報酬的關聯性。研究結果顯示，當質押比率增幅越大，未來股價報酬越高，在解決內生性後仍然穩健，透過分析內部人持股以及分析師追蹤，顯示質押與未來報酬的關係可能是來自控制股東與外部股東的代理問題，同時也支持分析師評等有助於加強對公司的監督，進而減輕代理問題。
    Previous studies on share pledging mainly focused on its correlation with corporate decisions, neglecting its impact on asset pricing. Therefore, this study examines the correlation between pledge increases and future stock excess returns using Taiwanese listed firms. Results show that higher pledge increases correlate with higher future stock returns, remaining robust after addressing endogeneity. Analysis of insider ownership and analyst coverage suggests that the relationship between pledging and future returns may result from agency problems between controlling and external shareholders. Additionally, it supports that analyst coverage enhances corporate monitoring, thereby alleviating agency problems.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財務管理學系
    111357029
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111357029
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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