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    题名: 不忠誠董事與內幕交易
    Disloyal Directors and the Profitability of Insider Trading
    作者: 葉琇月
    Yeh, Hsiu-Yueh
    贡献者: 車倫周
    Cha, Yunju
    葉琇月
    Yeh, Hsiu-Yueh
    关键词: 公司機會豁免
    內幕交易
    內線交易
    內部人交易
    交易獲利能力
    法律風險
    Corporate Opportunity Waiver (COW)
    Insider trading
    Trading profitability
    Legal risk
    日期: 2024
    上传时间: 2024-07-01 12:39:47 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究旨在探討公司機會豁免法實施後，董事是否會因為法律風險降低而在內幕交易中獲得較多盈利。從2003年至2020年間，美國有七個州前後採用了公司機會豁免法。本研究發現，當公司總部所在的州實施公司機會豁免法，董事在內幕交易中能夠獲得較多的盈利。本研究進一步發現，董事的年齡、性別以及地理位置對其獲取更大盈利的能力有所影響。此外，機構投資人持股比例較高的公司之董事，其從內幕交易中獲得的盈利較少。研究結果表明，當內部人士面臨較低的法律風險時，他們會追求更大的私人利益。
    We examine whether the adoption of the Corporate Opportunity Waiver (COW) law enables directors to earn more profits from their informed trading by reducing the legal risk. Using the staggered adoption of the COW law across seven states from 2003 to 2020, we find that when firms’ incorporated states have enacted COW laws, directors earn more profits from their informed trading. We further find that directors’ age, gender, and geographical proximity help them to achieve greater profitability. Furthermore, directors in firms with higher institutional ownership earn less insider profit. Our findings suggest how insiders pursue their private benefits when facing lower legal risk.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財務管理學系
    111357018
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111357018
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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