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Title: | 淨值比作為保險業法定資本監理指標之妥適性 —兼論適用於總體審慎監理之必要性 Study on Suitability for Adopting the Net Worth Ratio as an Insurance Regulatory Capital Standard — Further Discussion on Whether Applying it to Macroprudential Supervision |
Authors: | 邱炯能 Chiu, Chiung-Neng |
Contributors: | 林建智 Lin, Jan-Juy 邱炯能 Chiu, Chiung-Neng |
Keywords: | 清償能力 資本適足性 淨值比 槓桿率 總體審慎監理 Solvency Capital Adequacy Net Worth Ratio Leverage Ratio Macroprudential Supervision |
Date: | 2024 |
Issue Date: | 2024-02-01 13:05:47 (UTC+8) |
Abstract: | 依保險法第 143 條之 4 第 1 項規定:「保險業自有資本與風險資本之比率及淨值比率,不得低於一定比率。」基此,淨值比屬我國保險業法定資本監理指標,一旦低於一定比率,監理機關須依法採取相關監理行動或其他必要措施。惟淨值比僅透過業主權益與總資產之比率衡量最低資本要求,於其數值易受市場變化之影響而在短期內出現大幅波動,往往無法反映保險公司實際之清償能力,故淨值比是否適合作為保險業法定資本監理指標一問,便成為監理機關、保險公司及專家學者爭論之焦點。 基於以下三項理由,本文認為淨值比不適合作為保險業之法定資本監理指標,而應自保險法上刪除:其一,保險業資本監理之趨勢係從單一資本制度往風險資本基礎發展,而淨值比非以風險為之衡量方式本質上承襲單一資本制之精神及缺陷,與保險業資本監理趨勢相悖;其二,我國於 2026 年適用之ICS 將修正 RBC 於風險衡量上失準之缺陷,並以更加嚴格之標準檢視保險業之資本要求,故於適用 ICS 應無續行適用淨值比之理由;其三,淨值比具評估短市場風險之監理功能,惟基於保險業經營模式與資產負債結構,保險業實質之清償能力不易受到短期市場變化之影響,故淨值比無法正確反映保險業之清償能力。 此外,淨值比本質上屬於槓桿率之衡量方式,於近年來總體審慎監理之浪潮下,EIOPA參考銀行業之監理架構,指出基於總體審慎監理目的得將槓桿率作為控制系統性風險之監理工具。然而與 EIOPA 提出其他之監理工具比較,槓桿率之監理功能於總體審慎監理上仍存有未竟之處,且其監理功能得透過其他總體審慎監理工具替代,故槓桿率及淨值比於總體審慎監理上尚欠缺適用之必要性,惟考量 EIOPA 針對槓桿率之適用僅屬初步分析而非最終結論,故此議題之進一步研究仍有待後續實務及學理之發展。 According to Article 143-4, Paragraph 1 of the Insurance Act, “An insurance enterprise's ratio of total adjusted net capital to risk-based capital and the net worth ratio shall not be less than a certain ratio.” The net worth ratio is a regulatory capital standard of insurance industry, failure of which may lead to regulatory actions by supervisory authority. While the net worth ratio means the owner's equity divided by total assets, its value may easily affected by market changes and fluctuate significantly in a short term, which cannot measure the insurance’s solvency precisely. As a consequence, whether the net worth ratio is suitable as an insurance regulatory capital standard, has debated intensely among regulatory authority, insurance companies, and scholars. For the three following reason, this paper holds that the net worth ratio is unsuitable as a regulatory capital standard in the insurance industry, and should be eliminated from Insurance Act. The historical changes of insurance regulatory capital standard is shifting from Uniform Capital Ratio approach to Risk Based Capital approach (RBC). But the non-risk based approach of net worth ratio inherits the spirit and shortcomings of Uniform Capital Ratio, which is contrary to the threads of insurance capital standard. Secondly, the Insurance Capital Standard (ICS) will be applied in our country in 2026, which will fix the inaccuracy of risk measurement of RBC and impose stricter requirements. As a result, when the is ICS applied in 2026, there should be no reason to apply the net worth ratio continually. Third, the supervisory function in assessing of net worth ratio is assessing the short-term market risks, while the unique business model and asset-liability structure of insurance industry make itself minorly impacted by short-term market changes. Net worth ratio is one of the measure methods of leverage ratio, and in the threads of macroprudential supervision, European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) has referenced the regulatory framework of the banking industry and considered the leverage ratio be used as a macroprudential tool to control systemic risks. While compared with other potential macroprudential tools and measurement proposed by EIOPA, the function of leverage ratio has some deficiencies and could be replaced by other macroprudential tools and measures. As a result, this paper holds that there is no necessity for applying the leverage ratio (or net worth ratio) in macroprudential supervision. While consider the application of the leverage ratio is only a preliminary analysis rather than a final conclusion for EIOPA, the conclusion of this issue remains more academic research. |
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Description: | 碩士 國立政治大學 風險管理與保險學系 110358021 |
Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110358021 |
Data Type: | thesis |
Appears in Collections: | [風險管理與保險學系] 學位論文
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