Loading...
|
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/149662
|
| Title: | 分析TCL v. Ericsson案之FRAND權利金計算方法及其對資通訊產業之影響
Analysis of the FRAND Royalty Calculation Methods in TCL v. Ericsson Case and Its Impact on the ITC Industry |
| Authors: | 張凱博
Chang, Kai-Po |
| Contributors: | 陳秉訓
Chen, Ping-Hsun
張凱博
Chang, Kai-Po |
| Keywords: | 標準必要專利
公平合理無歧視
合理權利金
由上而下計算法
可比較授權法
standard essential patents(SEPs)
fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (F/RAND)
reasonable royalties
top-down approach
comparable license |
| Date: | 2023 |
| Issue Date: | 2024-02-01 11:45:04 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 資通訊產業自通訊技術以及標準制定組織開始發展以來，標準必要專利(Standard Essemtial Patents, SEPs)相關案件在全球各地法院層出不窮，至今為止已經累積不少經典之標準必要專利案件，而隨著通訊技術發展至5G及5G技術之應用愈趨成熟和多樣化，未來5G標準必要專利之案件亦勢必大量發生。
在過往之標準必要專利案件中，有關F/RAND原則之定義以及合理權利金之計算一直是被廣泛討論之爭點，而經過多年後，F/RAND原則之定義似有逐漸明顯之輪廓，然合理權利金之計算方法則是百家爭鳴並無一統一之方式，全憑各案件之法官和當事人共同建構一項合乎F/RAND原則且具可信性的合理權利金計算方式。
而在各標準必要專利案件中，TCL v. Ericsson案實屬對於F/RAND原則定義以及合理權利金計算方式討論內容相當豐富之案件，本文亦希望能透過分析TCL案了解影響合理權利金計算結果之關鍵性因素，以期能為未來之5G標準必要專利之案件提供一些洞見。本文首先介紹標準必要專利之定義及可能帶來之正反面影響。再來介紹F/RAND承諾之定義以及F/RAND承諾在實務上運作之爭議。接著進入本文之重點，即TCL案，此部分可分為四小部分，第一是有關TCL案地方法院判斷授權要約是否符合F/RAND原則之方法及細節；第二是TCL案地方法院計算合理權利金之方法，即以「由上而下計算法為主，可比較授權法為輔」的方式進行計算；第三是上訴法院對於Ericsson是否有請求陪審團審理之權利之見解；第四則是對於TCL案整體之分析。最後，本文整理出TCL案之重點並提供建議予將來之標準必要專利合理權利金計算案件當事人。
Since the beginning of the development of communication technology and standards-setting organizations (SSOs) in ITC industry, cases related to standard essential patents (SEPs) have emerged in an endless stream in courts around the world. So far, many classic SEP cases have accumulated. As communication technology develops to 5G and the applications of 5G technology become more mature and diversified, a large number of 5G standard essential patent cases are bound to occur in the future.
In past standard essential patent cases, the definition of the F/RAND principle and the calculation of reasonable royalties have always been widely discussed issues. After many years, the definition of the F/RAND principle seems to have gradually become clearer. However, there is no unified method for calculating reasonable royalties, and it depends on the judges and parties in each case to jointly construct a reasonable and credible method of calculating royalties that is consistent with the F/RAND principle.
Among the various SEP cases, the TCL v. Ericsson case is indeed a case that contains a full discussion of the definition of the F/RAND principle and the calculation methods of reasonable royalties. This article also hopes to understand which key factors will impact the result of reasonable royalty calculation by analyzing the TCL case. Besides, these key factors are expected to provide some insights into 5G SEP cases in future. This article first introduces the definition of SEPs and the possible positive and negative impacts. Next, this article will introduce the definition of F/RAND commitment and the disputes over the practical operation of F/RAND commitment. Then, here comes to the key point of this article, the TCL case. This part can be divided into four subsections. The first is about the methods and details of how did district court in the TCL case determine whether the licensing offer complied with the F/RAND principle; the second is the calculation method adopted by the district court in the TCL case, which is taking "top-down approach as the main method, comparable license as the supplementary method" the third is the Court of Appeal's opinion on whether Ericsson has the right to request a jury trial; the fourth is an overall analysis of the TCL case. Finally, this article summarizes the key points of the TCL case and provides suggestions to potential parties involved in future SEP reasonable royalty calculation cases. |
| Reference: | 壹、中文文獻
一、專書
‧ 王澤鑑，〈債法原理：基本理論債之發生〉，2006年9月。
‧ 李亭林編譯，Schilling, Melissa A.著，〈科技創新管理〉，2011年3版。
‧ 林誠二，〈債法總論新解：體系化解說（下）〉， 2010年3月。
‧ 經濟部智慧財產局，〈通訊標準專利訴訟教戰手冊〉，2014年4月。
二、期刊
‧ 王立達，〈標準必要專利權行使之國際規範發展與比較分析──FRAND承諾法律性質、禁制令、權利金與競爭法規制〉，月旦法學雜誌，第275期， 2018年。
‧ 李素華，〈技術標準制定之競爭法規範與調和〉，東吳法律學報，第15卷第1期，2003年。
‧ 沈宗倫，〈標準必要專利之法定授權與專利權濫用──以誠實信用原則為中心〉，政大法學評論，第149期，2017年。
‧ 林誠二，〈預約之認定與不履行之損害賠償範圍－－最高法院一○三年度台上字第一九八一號民事判決評釋〉，裁判時報，第35期，2015年。
‧ 莊弘鈺、鍾京州、劉尚志，〈標準必要專利FRAND權利金計算〉，交大法學評論，第5期，2019年。
‧ 陳皓芸，〈標準必要專利權之行使、權利濫用與獨占地位濫用〉，公平交易季刊，第25卷第1期，2017年。
‧ 黃惠敏，〈標準必要專利之戰爭─禁制令行不行〉，月旦財經法雜誌，第39期，2016年。
‧ 黃惠敏，〈F/RAND授權聲明之性質〉，萬國法律，第234期，2020年。
‧ 楊宏暉，〈標準關鍵專利之濫用與限制競爭〉，公平交易季刊，第 23 卷第 4 期，2015年。
‧ 楊宏暉，〈論FRAND 授權聲明之意義與性質〉，月旦民商法雜誌，第50期，2015年。
‧ 楊智傑，〈美國智慧產權訴訟中核發禁制今之審査〉，智慧財産權月刊，第160期，2012年。
三、學位論文
‧ 李兆國，〈標準制定組織及標準專利權之爭議〉，國立交通大學科技法律研究所碩士論文，2003年12月。
‧ 李德倫，〈標準必要專利授權與合理權利金研究〉，東吳大學法學院法律學系碩士班碩士論文，2016年7月。
‧ 束孟軒，〈標準必要專利爭議探討─以FRAND授權承諾下之合理權利金為中心〉，國立台灣大學法律學院法律學系碩士論文，2019年7月。
‧ 陳俐妤，〈標準必要專利權利金爭議之探討〉，國立政治大學智慧財產研究所碩士論文，2014年7月。
‧ 葉家齊，〈標準制定組織之專利集管型態與授權爭議分析〉，國立交通大學科技法律研究所碩士論文，2015年1月。
四、司法判決及其他政府機關決定
‧ 最高法院29年渝上字第762號民事判例。
‧ 最高法院64年台上字第1567號民事判例。
‧ 最高法院89年台上字第2606號民事判決。
‧ 最高法院98年台上字第690號民事判決。
貳、外文文獻
一、研究報告
‧ Jorge L. Contreras, TCL v. Ericsson The First Major U.S. Top-Down FRAND Royalty Decision, UNIVERSITY OF UTAH COLLEGE OF LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 245 (Dec. 27, 2017), https://dc.law.utah.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1083&context=scholarship#:~:text=The%20court%20recognized%20that%20Ericsson's,provides%20the%20SEP%20owner%20a.
‧ Justus Baron & Daniel F. Spulber, Technology Standards and Standard Setting Organizations Introduction to the Searle Center Database, NORTHWESTERN LAW & ECON RESEARCH PAPER NO. 17-16 (2018).
‧ Nicolas Petit, EU Competition Law Analysis of FRAND Disputes, THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW (Dec., 2017).
二、期刊
‧ Brian Dean Abramson, The Patent Ambush: Misuse or Caveat Emptor?, 51 IDEA 71 (2011).
‧ Damien Geradin & Miguel Rato, Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent Hold-up, Royalty Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND, 3 EUR. COMPET. J. 101, (2007).
‧ Damien Geradin et al., The Complements Problem Within Standard Setting: Assessing the Evidence on Royalty Stacking, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 144 (2008).
‧ Dennis W. Carlton & Allan L. Shampine, An Economic Interpretation of FRAND, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 531 (2013).
‧ Florian Mueller, The German approach to FRAND: let's err on the side of injunctions, FOSS PATENTS (May 23, 2012), http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/05/german-approach-to-frand-lets-err-on.html.
‧ Gregory K. Leonard & Mario A. Lopez, Determining Rand Royalty Rates for Standard-Essential Patents, 29(1) ANTITRUST 86 (2014).
‧ Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other Patent Pledges, 2015 UTAH LAW REVIEW 479 (2015).
‧ Jorge L. Contreras, Global Rate Setting: A Solution for Standards-Essential Patents?, 94 WASH. L. REV. 701 (2019).
‧ Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889 (2002).
‧ Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135 (2013).
‧ Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 1991 (2007).
‧ Richard Vary, Dissecting TCL v Ericsson – what went wrong?, 91 IAM 9 (2018), https://www.twobirds.com/-/media/pdfs/iam91_tclvericsson.pdf.
‧ Richard Wingfield, SPOTLIGHT ON THE ITU #2: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE ITU, GLOBAL PARTNERS DIGITAL (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.gp-digital.org/spotlight-on-the-itu-2-a-brief-introduction-to-the-itu/.
‧ Roger G. Brooks & Damien Geradin, Interpreting and Enforcing the Voluntary FRAND Commitment (2010).
‧ Rudi Bekkers et al., An Empirical Study on the Determinants of Essential Patent Claims in Compatibility Standards, 40 RESEARCH POLICY 1001 (2011).
‧ Thomas F. Cotter, Comparative Law and Economics of Standard-Essential Patents and Frand Royalties, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 311 (2014).
‧ Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, JOURNAL OF CORPORATION LAW, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151 (2009).
三、政府機關公告文件
‧ JAPAN PATENT OFFICE, GUIDE TO LICENSING NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS 2ND EDITION (July, 2022).
四、司法判決及其他政府機關決定
‧ Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (W.D. Wis. 2012).
‧ Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
‧ eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
‧ Ericsson Inc. v. TCL Commc'n Tech. Holdings, Ltd., 2018 WL 2149736 (E.D. Tex. May 10, 2018).
‧ Ericsson Inc. v. TCL Commc'n Tech. Holdings Ltd., 955 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
‧ General Instrument Corporation v. Microsoft, case no. 2O240/11.
‧ Huawei Tech. Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp., C-170/13 (CJEU) (July 16, 2015).
‧ In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Pat. Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013).
‧ In the Matter of Certain Wireless Devices with 3G and/or 4G Capabilities & Components Thereof Initial Determination on Violation of Section 337 & Recommended Determination on Remedy & Bond, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-868 (June 13, 2014).
‧ In the Matter of Negotiated Data Sols. LLC, A Ltd. Liab. Co.., No. 51-0094, 2008 WL 4407246 (MSNET Sept. 22, 2008).
‧ Intellectual Prop. High Ct., Special Div., May 16, 2014, 2013 (Ne) 10043.
‧ Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996)
‧ Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
‧ Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2012 WL 5993202 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 30, 2012).
‧ Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
‧ Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012).
‧ Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013).
‧ TCL Commc'n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, 2018 WL 4488286 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2018).
‧ TCL Commc'n Tech. Holdings Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, 943 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
‧ TCL Commc'n Tech. Holdings, Ltd v. Telefonaktienbolaget LM Ericsson, 2020 WL 11193553 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2020).
‧ TCL Commc'n Tech. Holdings, Ltd v. Ericsson, 2020 WL 12762767 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2020).
五、網路資料
‧ Blake Brittain, Ericsson, TCL settle long-running smartphone patent disputes, REUTERS, (July 20, 2021):
https://www.reuters.com/legal/transactional/ericsson-tcl-settle-long-running-smartphone-patent-disputes-2021-07-19/
‧ ETSI, ABOUT US: https://www.etsi.org/about#mytoc1 (last visited July 21, 2022).
‧ ETSI, ETSI Directives ANNEX 6: ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy: https://www.etsi.org/images/files/IPR/etsi-ipr-policy.pdf
‧ Florian Mueller, The German approach to FRAND: let's err on the side of injunctions, FOSS PATENTS (May 23, 2012):
http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/05/german-approach-to-frand-lets-err-on.html
‧ Haris Tsilikas, Comparable Agreements and the “Top-Down” Approach to FRAND Royalties Determination, COMPETITION POLICY INTERNATIONAL, (Jul. 21, 2020): https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/comparable-agreements-and-the-top-down-approach-to-frand-royalties-determination/
‧ IEEE, ABOUT US: https://standards.ieee.org/about/ (last visited July 18, 2022).
‧ IEEE, HOW IS FINAL APPROVAL OBTAINED?: https://standards.ieee.org/develop/gaining-final-approval/finalapp/ (last visited Sep. 29, 2022).
‧ IEEE , IEEE AT A GLANCE: https://www.ieee.org/about/at-a-glance.html (last visited July 18, 2022).
‧ IEEE, IEEE SA Standards Board Bylaws, CLAUSE 6.1 DEFINITIONS: https://standards.ieee.org/about/policies/bylaws/sect6-7/
‧ IEEE, THE SA BALLOTING PROCESS: https://standards.ieee.org/develop/balloting-standard/balloting/ (last visited Sep. 29, 2022).
‧ Integration, Interoperability, Compatibility and Portability: http://www.testingstandards.co.uk/interop_et_al.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2021).
‧ ISO, STANDARDS: https://www.iso.org/standards.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2021).
‧ ITU, ABOUT INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION (ITU): https://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/default.aspx (last visited July 18, 2022).
‧ ITU, COMMON PATENT POLICY FOR ITU-T/ITU -R/ISO/IEC, https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/ipr/Pages/policy.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2022).
‧ ITU, STANDARDS APPROVAL: https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/about/Pages/approval.aspx (last visited Sep. 29, 2022).
‧ ITU/ISO/IEC, Guidelines for Implementation of the Common Patent Policy for ITU-T/ITU-R/ISO/IEC (16/12/2022), PART I-2 (2022): https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-t/oth/04/04/T04040000010006PDFE.pdf
‧ Kevin Post et al., Why evidence remains king when it comes to pricing SEPs, IAM (Mar. 28, 2023): https://www.iam-media.com/hub/sepfrand-hub/2022/article/why-evidence-remains-king-when-it-comes-pricing-seps.
‧ Kevin Post et al., Juries to play key role in SEP litigation for infringement and damages, IAM (Jan. 6, 2023): https://www.iam-media.com/hub/sepfrand-hub/2022/article/juries-play-key-role-in-sep-litigation-infringement-and-damages |
| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
科技管理與智慧財產研究所
107364212 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107364212 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [科技管理與智慧財產研究所] 學位論文
|
Files in This Item:
| File |
Size | Format | |
|---|
| 421201.pdf | 2265Kb | Adobe PDF | 0 | View/Open |
|
All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.
|
