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Title:	證券團體訴訟對公司治理之影響－以我國上市櫃公司為例 The Impact of Securities Class Actions on Corporate Governance - Evidence from Listed Companies in Taiwan
Authors:	黃佑婷 Huang, You-Ting
Contributors:	陳俊元鄭士卿 Chen, Chun-Yuan Jeng, Shih-Ching 黃佑婷 Huang, You-Ting
Keywords:	證券團體訴訟公司治理實證研究傾向性評分匹配方法（PSM）差異中的差異法（DID） Securities Class Actions Corporate Governance Empirical Research Propensity Score Matching Method (PSM) Difference in Difference Method (DID)
Date:	2023
Issue Date:	2023-12-01 10:48:39 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	本文之目的在於，藉由對我國證券團體訴訟進行實證研究，探討公司治理之優劣，是否導致證券團體訴訟之發生。以及證券團體訴訟發生後，對於公司治理是否產生影響。在研究架構上，本文首先介紹證券團體訴訟之緣起，與公司治理之相關理論，經由搜集與分析各國有關證券團體訴訟之實證研究、公司治理理論，提出本文之假設並建立實證模型。此外，本文更使用差異中的差異法（Difference-in-Difference, DID），加入家族企業特徵進行研究，探討家族企業對於證券團體訴訟後之公司治理的影響，是否有別於一般公司。本研究為首篇針對證券團體訴訟對公司治理之影響所進行之實證研究。本研究之主要結果發現若企業之董事長與總經理為同一人時，公司的代理問題較為嚴重，更傾向發生舞弊之情事，與先前之研究結果相符。因此，本文認為當董事長與總經理同一人時，應更加重視進行決策時所可能發生之代理問題，透過密度更高的監督機制予以制衡。在受訴企業為家族企業時，證券團體訴訟更能發揮其強化公司治理之功能，使受訴企業購買董監事責任保險，符合社會情感財富理論。但是，此為事後之補救，若能為事前之預防，強化公司治理之制度，更能夠達成正向之循環，成就家族企業之永續經營。 The purpose of this article is to explore whether the quality of corporate governance leads to the occurrence of securities class action through empirical research on listed companies in Taiwan. And whether the securities class action will have an impact on corporate governance. In terms of research structure, we first introduce the origin of securities class actions and related theories of corporate governance. After collecting and analyzing empirical research on securities class actions and corporate governance theories from various countries, this article puts forward the hypothesis and established an empirical model. In addition, this paper uses the Difference-in-Difference (DID) method and adds the characteristics of family businesses to explore whether the impact of family businesses on corporate governance after securities class actions is different from that of general companies. This study is the first empirical study on the impact of securities class action on corporate governance. The main result of this study is that when the chairman and general manager of a company are the same person, the company's agency problem is more serious and fraud is more likely to occur. Therefore, this article believes that when the chairman and general manager are the same person, more attention should be paid to the agency problems that may occur when making decisions, and checks and balances should be implemented through a more intensive supervision mechanism. When the company being sued is a family business, securities class action can better play its role in strengthening corporate governance, allowing the company to purchase D&O insurance, which is in line with the social-emotional wealth theory. However, this is an after-the-fact remedy. If it can be prevented beforehand and the corporate governance system is strengthened, a positive cycle can be achieved and the sustainable operation of the family business can be achieved.
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Description:	碩士國立政治大學風險管理與保險學系 109358015
Source URI:	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109358015
Data Type:	thesis
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Risk Management and Insurance] Theses

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