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    题名: 標準必要專利公平、合理、無歧視授權金計算方法之研究
    The Study upon FRAND Royalties Calculation Models for Standard Essential Patents
    作者: 劉彥麟
    Liu, Yen-Lin
    贡献者: 沈宗倫
    劉彥麟
    Liu, Yen-Lin
    关键词: 標準必要專利
    FRAND授權金
    專利箝制
    假設性協商
    整體市場價值法則
    事後觀點的夏普利值計算法
    棒球式仲裁
    拍賣模型
    可比較授權前例
    授權金總額 先定計算法
    最小可銷售元件
    Standard Essential Patent
    FRAND Royalties
    Patent Holdup
    Hypothetical Bargain
    Baseball-Style Arbitration
    Auction Model
    comparable license
    Top-down approach
    Entire Market Value Rule
    Smallest Saleable Patent-Practicing Unit
    Ex post Shapley pricing
    日期: 2023
    上传时间: 2023-09-01 16:23:58 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 如何訂出符合FRAND承諾之授權金，為標準必要專利至關重要的議題。多數的標準發展組織並未介入標準必要專利權人以及技術實施者間之授權談判，也消極地避開判斷標準必要專利之授權條件與授權金之數額是否符合FRAND承諾之任務，惟此部分卻是標準領域中最容易產生爭端之處，如協商未果，後續進入訴訟程序，身為公正第三方之爭端解決機構究竟應該如何訂出符合FRAND承諾之授權金數額？此問題為本文所欲探討之核心議題。
    目前國際上之法院實務見解在面對標準必要專利FRAND授權金爭議時，多有援用一般專利（即非屬標準必要專利）領域中侵權案件以「合理權利金計算法」計算損害賠償時所運用之「假設性事前協商法」，作為計算之基礎架構，並做出一定程度之修正以迎合標準領域之特殊性。後續學說亦陸續提出FRAND內涵之實質詮釋探討，其中不乏以法律經濟分析之觀點，點出法院實務在援引假設性協商法之過程上需進一步修正的地方，更有論者提出其認為可最符合FRAND承諾要求之新計算模型與架構。較近期之法院判決見解亦開始出現併用「授權金總額先定計算法（Top-Down Approach）」與「可比較授權前例法」等數種計算方法交互參照比對之趨勢。
    欲妥適建構FRAND授權金之計算原則，首要者為辨別標準必要專利領域之特性，藉由瞭解與一般專利領域不同之處後，可進一步明瞭、印證FRAND承諾被提出之目的，係為解決何種類之經濟或法律上問題，並討論其在FRAND授權金計算架構上有何應加以調整之處。本文期盼藉由針對比較法實務見解之分析與學說建議之整理，辨析FRAND授權金之計算指引與原則，於未來我國有機會處理此問題時，也可作為計算方法建構之參考。
    本文共分為五章，第一章說明研究動機、研究方法與研究架構；第二章旨在整理技術領域標準制定之生態，介紹標準發展組織各自不同之組織構造與程序；接著說明標準制定所帶來之影響，包含是否加劇專利箝制、授權金堆疊等現象，與FRAND授權承諾之效力；第三章介紹國際上法院見解已在判決中表示過之計算原則；第四章則主要整理學界對於FRAND授權金計算原則之見解與對法院實務作法之評論；最後第五章的部分，將介紹目前司法實務計算FRAND授權金之趨勢，討論何種組織機構之設計較適合處理全球性FRAND授權金之問題。
    參考文獻: 壹、中文文獻
    王立達，標準必要專利權行使之國際規範發展與比較分析—FRAND承諾法律性質、禁制令、授權金與競爭法規制，月旦法學雜誌，第275期， 2018年3月。
    沈宗倫，專利侵權下合理權利金損害賠償法制之反省與再建構—以我國專利法第97條第1項第3款之解釋適用為中心，政大法學評論，第168期，2022年3月。
    沈宗倫，標準必要專利之法定授權與專利權濫用─以誠實信用原則為中心，政大法學評論，第149期，2017年6月。
    吳靜怡，美國專利侵權合理權利金之計算方式及發展趨勢，科技法學評論，13卷2期，2016年
    周伯翰，以合理權利金法計算專利侵害損害賠償之研究，高大法學論叢，第14卷第1期，2018年9月。
    莊弘鈺、鍾京洲、劉尚志，標準必要專利FRAND權利金計算-兼論智慧財產法院105年度民專上字第24號判決，交大法學評論，第5期，2019年。
    陳龍昇，我國專利法增訂以相當於授權金為損害計算基準之評析，專利師，第12期，2013年。
    劉純妤，開源軟體與標準制定協作策略之法制研析，科技法律透析，第33卷第12期，2021年12月。

    貳、英文文獻
    一、專書
    Biddle, C. Bradford et al., PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS: TOWARD A GLOBAL CONSENSUS (2019).
    Jorge L. Contreras eds., THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST AND PATENTS, (2018).
    二、期刊論文
    Anderson, J. Jonas, Reining in a ‘Renegade’ Court: TC Heartland and the Eastern District of Texas, 39 CARDOZOL. REV. 1569 (2018).
    Bartlett, Jason R. & Jorge L. Contreras, Rationalizing FRAND Royalties: Can Interpleader Save the Internet of Things, 36 REV. LITIG. 285 (2017).
    Carlton, Dennis W. & Allan L. Shampine, An Economic Interpretation of FRAND, 9 J. Competition L. & Econ. 531 (2013).
    Contreras, Jorge L., Anti-Suit Injunctions and Jurisdiction Competition in Global FRAND Litigation: The Case for Judicial Restraint, 11 NYU J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 171 (2022).
    Contreras, Jorge L., National FRAND Rate-Setting Legislation: A Cure For International Jurisdictional Competition In Standards-Essential Patent Litigation?, CPI Antitrust Chron. (2022). https://ssrn.com/abstract=4173485
    Contreras, Jorge L., Global Rate Setting: A Solution for Standards-Essential Patents, 94 Wash. L. Rev. 701 (2019).
    Contreras, Jorge L., The New Extraterritoriality: FRAND Royalties, Anti-Suit Injunctions and The Global Race to The Bottom in Disputes Over Standards-Essential Patents, 25 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 251 (2019).
    Contreras, Jorge L., TCL v. Ericsson: The First Major U.S. Top-Down FRAND Royalty Decision, (2017). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3100976.
    Contreras, Jorge L., A Brief History of FRAND: Analyzing Current Debates in Standard Setting and Antitrust Through a Historical Lens, 80 Antitrust L. J. 39 (2015).
    Contreras, Jorge L., A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitment and Other Patent Pledges, 2015 Utah L. Rev. 479 (2015).
    Cotter, Thomas F., Is Global FRAND Litigation Spinning out of Control?, 2021 Patently-O Pat. L.J. 1 (2021).
    Cotter, Thomas F. & Erik Hovenkamp & Norman Siebrasse, Demystifying Patent Holdup, 76 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1501 (2019).
    Cotter, Thomas F. & Erik Hovenkamp & Norman Siebrasse, Demystifying Patent Holdup, 76 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1501 (2019).
    Cotter, Thomas F., Comparative Law and Economics of Standard-Essential Patents and FRAND Royalties, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 311 (2014).
    Cotter, Thomas F., Four Principle for Calculating Reasonable Royalties in Patent Infringement Litigation, 27 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L. J. 725 (2010).
    Denicolò, Vincenzo, Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar & A. Jorge Padilla, Revisiting Injunctive Relief: Interpreting eBay in High-Tech Industries with Non-Practicing Patent Holders, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 571 (2008).
    Durie, Daralyn J. & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating Reasonable Royalties, Lewis & Clark Law Review 14 (2010).
    Elhauge, Einer, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive Royalties, http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1139133.
    Elmore, John, The Technological Comparability of Patent License Agreements, 46 les Nouvelles 115 (2011).
    Farrel, Joseph & John Hayes & Carl Shapiro & Therasa Sullivan, Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-up, 74 Antitrust Law Journal 603 (2007).
    Galetovic, Alexander & Kirti Gupta, The Case of The Missing Royalty Stacking in The World Mobile Wireless Industry, 5 (2019). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2790347.
    Galetovic, Alexander et al., An Empirical Examination of Patent Holdup, 11 J. OF COMPETITION L. & ECON. 549 (2015).
    Katz, Michael L. & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985).
    Kesan, Jay P. & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND`s Forever: Standards, Patent Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 Ind. L. J. 231 (2014).
    Layne-Farrar, Anne & Klaus M. Schmidt, Licensing Complementary Patents: Patent Trolls, Market Structure, and Excessive Royalties, 25 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 1121 (2010).
    Layne-Farrar, Anne et al., Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 671 (2007).
    Lee, William F. & A. Douglas Melamed, Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent Damages, 101 CORNELLL. REV. 385 (2016).
    Lemley, Mark A. & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1135 (2013).
    Lemley, Mark A., Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 655 (2009).
    Lemley, Mark A. & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1991 (2007).
    Masur, Jonathan S., The Use and Misuse of Patent Licenses, 110 Nw. U. L. Rev. 115, 145-146 (2015).
    Sidak, J. Gregory & Jeremy O. Skog, Using Conjoint Analysis to Apportion Patent Damages, 25 FED. CIR. B.J. 581 (2016).
    Sidak, J. Gregory, How Relevant Is Justice Cardozo’s “Book of Wisdom” to Patent Damages?, 17 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 256 (2016).
    Sidak, J. Gregory, The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties, 9 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 931 (2013).
    Siebrasse, Norman V. & Thomas F. Cotter, The Value of the Standard, 101 Minnesota Law Review 1159 (2017).
    Siebrasse, Norman V. & Thomas F. Cotter, A New Framework for Determining Reasonable Royalties in Patent Litigation, 68 Fla. L. Rev. 929 (2016).
    Spulber, Daniel F., Complementary Monopolies and Bargaining, 60 J. L. & Econ. 29 (2017).
    Swanson, Daniel G. & William J. Baumol, Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties, Standards Selection, and Market Power, 73 Antitrust L.J. 1 (2005).
    Taylor, David O., Using Reasonable Royalties to Value Patented Technology, 49 Ga. L. Rev. 79 (2014).
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    Yang, Zelin, Damaging Royalties: An Overview of Reasonable Royalty Damages, 29 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 647 (2014).
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    法律學系
    108651037
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108651037
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[法律學系] 學位論文

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