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    題名: 薪酬差距之成因：探討經理人權力與不同類型機構投資人之影響
    The Cause of Pay Gap: Exploring the Influence of CEO Power and Different Types of Institutional Ownership
    作者: 蕭冠維
    Hsiao, Kuan-Wei
    貢獻者: 李佳玲
    Lee, Chia-Ling
    蕭冠維
    Hsiao, Kuan-Wei
    關鍵詞: 經理人權力
    暫時型機構投資人
    專門型機構投資人
    薪酬差距
    CEO Power
    Transient Institutional Investor
    Dedicated Institutional Investor
    Pay Gap
    日期: 2023
    上傳時間: 2023-09-01 14:40:54 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究基於管理者權力理論之觀點，探討形成差距的原因。首先，發現當經理人擁有越高的權力時，會因為管理據守而更有可能有租金提取的行為圖利自身，因而導致公司有越高的薪酬差距。其次，本研究按照機構投資人的持股集中度和投資組合週轉率進行分類，將機構投資人分類為擁有低持股集中度且投資組合週轉較高的暫時型機構投資人以及擁有較高持股集中度與投資組合週轉較低的專門型機構投資人。本研究發現當公司被越多的暫時型機構投資人所持有時，會有較高的薪酬差距，該結果代表被暫時型機構投資人持有的公司，高階經理人更有可能有管理據守的情形發生。然而並未發現專門型機構投資人的持股比會顯著地影響薪酬差距。在額外分析中，本研究改以公司最終控制者型態探討其對薪酬差距的影響，發現當公司係由政府持有時會有顯著較低的薪酬差距；若公司係由經理人主導時，會有顯著較高的薪酬差距。
    Based on the perspective of managerial power theory, this research explores the cause of pay gap. Firstly, because of managerial entrenchment, the managers who have more power would extract higher rent from the company to benefit themselves, leading to higher pay gap. Secondly, this research classifies institutional investors into transient institutional investors with low ownership concentration and high portfolio turnover and dedicated institutional investors with higher ownership concentration and lower portfolio turnover. It is found that when the company held by more transient institutional investors will be a higher pay gap. The result implied that it is likely to occur managerial entrenchment in the company held by transient institutional investor. However, it is not found that the ownership of dedicated institutional investors will significantly affect the pay gap. In an additional analysis, this study examines the influence of the ultimate controller type on pay gap and finds that companies controlled by the government have significantly lower pay gap, while companies controlled by managers have significantly higher pay gap.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    110353048
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110353048
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[會計學系] 學位論文

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