English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  Items with full text/Total items : 113648/144635 (79%)
Visitors : 51574317      Online Users : 932
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    政大機構典藏 > 學術期刊 > 會計評論 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/146810
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/146810


    Title: 殭屍企業養出董監肥貓?兼論薪酬委員會角色
    Are the Directors or Supervisors Fat Cats in Zombie Firms? Discuss the Role of the Compensation Committee
    Authors: 蔡麗雯;許智盛
    Tsai, Lih-wen;Hsu, Chih-sheng
    Contributors: 會計評論
    Keywords: 殭屍企業;董監肥貓;薪酬委員會
    Zombie firms;Fat cat directors or supervisors;Compensation committee
    Date: 2023-07
    Issue Date: 2023-08-22 16:49:16 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文探討殭屍企業存在董監肥貓之可能性,亦測試薪酬委員會的開會次數多寡,是否影響公司存在董監肥貓之機率。以2013年至2019年,10,237筆臺灣上市櫃公司為樣本,實證結果顯示殭屍企業發生董監肥貓的可能性高於非殭屍企業,代表政府或銀行對殭屍企業的資金援助,不僅無法改善殭屍企業長期獲利不足以支付利息的窘境,還可能成為董監自肥的利益來源;此外,研究結果也指出薪酬委員會的參與程度愈高,愈能減少董監肥貓發生的可能性,不過家族企業或公司治理評分等級較低的公司一旦淪為殭屍企業,薪酬委員會即使有較高的參與程度,也無法減少董監肥貓存在的概率,因此反映出企業公司治理的重要性;最後,本文並未發現我國殭屍企業與非主管職員工低薪之間具有關聯性。
    This study explores the probability of zombie firms with fat cat directors or supervisors, and also examines whether the frequency of compensation committee meetings affects the incidence of directors or supervisors becoming fat cats. Using 10,237 firm-year observations of Taiwanese listed firms from 2013 to 2019, empirical evidence indicates that directors or supervisors of zombie firms are more likely to be fat cats than non-zombie firms. This means that the government or banks that provided funding to zombie firms not only failed to increase their profitability but also ran the risk of creating a conflict of interest for the directors or supervisors. In addition, the results show that the higher the frequency of compensation committee meetings, the more likely it is to reduce the chances of directors or supervisors becoming fat cats. However, we also point out that in the sub-samples of family-owned businesses or firms with poor corporate governance ratings, even if the compensation committee of zombie firms has more meetings, it cannot reduce the possibility of directors or supervisors as fat cats. These results emphasize the significance of corporate governance. Lastly, there is no relationship between zombie firms and the low salaries of non-executive full-time employees.
    Relation: 會計評論, 77, 139-181
    Data Type: article
    DOI 連結: http://dx.doi.org/10.6552//JOAR.202307_(77).0004
    DOI: 10.6552/JOAR.202307_(77).0004
    Appears in Collections:[會計評論] 期刊論文

    Files in This Item:

    File Description SizeFormat
    77-4.pdf960KbAdobe PDF2273View/Open


    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏,無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用,惟仍請適度,合理使用本網站之內容,以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用,則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

    2.本網站之製作,已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益,如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者,請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw),維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback