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| Title: | 習近平下的中美半導體政策競爭: 以企業收購與人才為例
Xi Jinping Era for China-U.S. semiconductor policy competition: Example for Enterprise Acquisition and Talents |
| Authors: | 李宜娟
Lee, Yi-Jiuan |
| Contributors: | 李世暉
李宜娟
Lee, Yi-Jiuan |
| Keywords: | 習近平
中美競爭
半導體政策
企業併購
海外高層次人才
Xi Jinping
China-US competition
Semiconductor policy
Corporate mergers and acquisitions
Overseas high-level talents |
| Date: | 2023 |
| Issue Date: | 2023-08-02 14:30:25 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 本研究透過整理習近平任內中國共經歷三屆黨代會政府工作報告、「中國製造2025」、十三到十四五規劃等在中國政府網站內整理有關先進半導體科技創新政策，利用時間排序與分析以歸納其政策變化，再比對美國智庫及白宮等政府網站對中戰略與政策，搭配美智庫學者對中國大戰略與歷任美國總統差異作為驗證，來了解中美在先進半導體的政策競爭情形。案例則選用中國資金收購美企在內的外企半導體及對海外高層次拉攏為案例，了解中國如何在美國歐巴馬到拜登時期不同寬嚴程度的對中政策下，中國如何大量或有限制地獲取其所需的戰略技術與人才。最後透過美智庫學者整理習近平時期經歷美國三任總統對中國政策的差異，並以拜登政府時期的政策為主，分析美國反制中國政策的變化趨勢。
研究發現，習近平二十大後雖強調中國「安全發展」，但先進半導體技術創新與軍民融合仍占據其國家戰略與政策之首，而中國雖然用舉國資金與權力，或成功發展足以威脅全球各地成熟產業如汽車、家電、大數據相關交易及其衍生的數據分析與人工智慧技術，唯獨難以複製到智慧財產權密集的先進半導體產業，其先進半導體研發製造雖不如預期，但中國並未放棄其以舉國之力發展軍民融合及半導體技術為核心的科技創新重視、而是更加積極對外擴大結盟以提高本身先進軍用科學技術能力，無論是對外企包含美國、歐盟或臺灣的技術、人才，只是做法將轉向不在CFIUS職權或審查範圍、透過國際交流、私募基金的股份增持、收購早期或非矽基半導體技術，在海外創新人才密集的地點、工廠，以企業或人民之間的「技術合作」來進行，並加強對同文同種的臺灣軍民兩用半導體人才與企業拉攏合作。而美國則修改以往WTO或傳統貿易協議的方式，藉由與不同國家、不同領域的方式簽訂適合雙邊或多邊的框架，以保護美國會影響其國安領域、先進基礎技術的商品對中國進行「小院高牆」圍堵。
藉由研究發現 本文提出對臺灣政策建議如下：一是先以半導體產業與美國貿易協議開始，再逐漸針對不同國家訂定屬於雙方或多邊協議；二是發布針對影響臺灣國安產業不同國家風險評估調查報告，以協助國家與企業在不同市場及早調整資源；三是培養人才，加強在重點領域或城市展開國際交流合作，以及早發現中國等國家對臺灣技術與產業的威脅，也可同時確保臺灣能及時跟上市場、先進科技技術發展變化。
This research sorts out the government work reports of the three party congresses, "Made in China 2025", and the 13th to 14th Five-Year Plans during Xi Jinping`s tenure, and sorts out the policies related to advanced semiconductor technology innovation on the Chinese government website, using time sorting and The analysis summarizes its policy changes, and then compares the strategies and policies of the US think tanks and the White House and other government websites, and uses American think tank scholars to verify the differences between China`s grand strategy and previous US presidents to understand the policy competition between China and the United States in advanced semiconductors . The case uses Chinese funds to acquire semiconductors of foreign companies including US companies and to attract high-level overseas companies as examples to understand how China has a large or limited Acquire the strategic technology and talents it needs. Finally, scholars from American think tanks sorted out the differences in the policies of the three US presidents towards China during the Xi Jinping period, and focused on the policies of the Biden administration to analyze the changing trend of the US counter-China policy.
The study found that although Xi Jinping emphasized China`s "safe development" after the 20th National Congress, advanced semiconductor technology innovation and military-civilian integration still occupy the top of his national strategy and policy. Although China uses the whole country`s funds and power, its successful development may be enough to threaten the rest of the world. Mature industries such as automobiles, home appliances, big data-related transactions and their derivative data analysis and artificial intelligence technologies are difficult to copy to the advanced semiconductor industry with intensive intellectual property rights. Although its advanced semiconductor R&D and manufacturing are not as expected, China has not given up on its Emphasis on scientific and technological innovation at the core of developing military-civilian integration and semiconductor technology with the power of the whole country, but more actively expanding alliances with foreign countries to improve their own advanced military science and technology capabilities. Whether foreign companies include technology and talents from the United States, the European Union or Taiwan, it is just a practice It will turn to "technical cooperation" between enterprises or people in places and factories where overseas innovation talents are concentrated, through international exchanges, private equity fund shareholding increase, acquisition of early or non-silicon-based semiconductor technologies, which are not within the scope of CFIUS`s authority or review To carry out, and strengthen cooperation with Taiwanese military and civilian dual-use semiconductor talents and enterprises of the same language and the same species. The United States, on the other hand, has revised the way of WTO or traditional trade agreements in the past, and signed a suitable bilateral or multilateral framework with different countries and fields, so as to protect the products of the United States that will affect its national security field and advanced basic technology against China by using " small yard, high fence" strategy
Based on the research findings, this paper proposes the following policy recommendations for Taiwan: First, start with the semiconductor industry and the United States trade agreement, and then gradually formulate bilateral or multilateral agreements for different countries; second, release a risk assessment survey for different countries that affect Taiwan`s national security industry report to assist the country and enterprises to adjust resources early in different markets; the third is to cultivate talents, strengthen international exchanges and cooperation in key areas or cities, and early detect threats from China and other countries to Taiwan’s technology and industry, and at the same time ensure Taiwan’s ability to Keep up with the market and the development and changes of advanced technology in a timely manner. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
國家安全與大陸研究碩士在職專班
110981003 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110981003 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [國家安全與大陸研究碩士在職專班] 學位論文
|
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