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| Title: | 經理人樂觀程度與企業投資決策：以財務危機公司為例
Managerial Optimism and Corporate Investment: the Case of Distressed Firms |
| Authors: | 葉晴雯
Yeh, Ching-Wen |
| Contributors: | 陳嬿如
Chen, Yenn-Ru
葉晴雯
Yeh, Ching-Wen |
| Keywords: | 財務危機
經理人人格特質
過度自信
過度樂觀
代理問題
關係人交易
文本分析
LIWC
Financial distress
Executive characteristic
Overconfidence
Optimism
Agency problem
Related party transactions
Text analysis
LIWC |
| Date: | 2023 |
| Issue Date: | 2023-08-02 13:34:15 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 過去在討論債務代理問題的研究主要關注於公司的財務特性、國家破產政策以及風險避免等方面，對於經理人的人格特質如何影響公司陷入財務危機後的投資行為和風險轉移行為卻鮮少有相應的討論和研究。而少數關於經理人財務危機中風險轉移行為的實證研究，結果卻是不一致的。本研究利用文本分析方法，探討經理人過度樂觀與債務代理問題的關係，並分析其對投資行為和關係人交易行為兩個方面的影響。
本研究使用臺灣在2010年至2019經歷財務危機或財務危機前兆的上市櫃公司，加上使用傾向分數配對法配對出的危機和非危機公司共288家，以經理人在致股東報告書中正面情緒詞相對於負面情緒詞的比率作為主要解釋變數，來觀察其對於公司財務危機後投資行為及關係人交易行為的影響。
實證結果顯示，企業陷入財務危機當年並不會立即有風險轉移行為，但後續幾年若公司現金水準持續減少或是獲利持續低迷，則越可能會增加投資水準以求獲得更高的報酬。關係人交易方面，在非家族企業中，具有樂觀特質的經理人較可能在發生財務危機後以貸款基礎的關係人交易方式而不是關係人銷售的方式來向集團企業的其他成員尋求資源上的支撐，而在家族企業中的樂觀經理人在財務危機後均可能透過關係人融資或關係人交易來進行支撐。
整體來說，本研究證實了經理人的樂觀特質確實會對於財務危機後的投資行為或關係人交易行為造成影響，也影響了公司的獲利能力與償債能力，但由於財務危機後公司資源較有限，也限制了經理人在財務危機後的行動與作為，因此經理人樂觀特質的因素在財務危機後行為影響性相對於財務危機前較小。
Past research on debt agency issues has primarily focused on company financial characteristics, national bankruptcy policies, and avoidance. This study aims to utilize text analysis methods to explore the relationship between executives’ optimism and debt agency problems, and analyze their impact on investment behavior and related-party transactions (RPTs).
This study uses a sample of total 288 listed and over-the-counter companies in Taiwan that experienced financial distress or pre-distress signs between 2010 and 2019 as well as non-distressed companies matched by propensity score matching method. We use the ratio of positive emotion words to negative emotion words used by executives in their letters to shareholders as the main explanatory variable to observe its influence on post-distress investment behavior and RPTs.
The empirical findings of this study indicate that companies do not immediately engage in risk-shifting behavior when they experience financial distress. However, in the subsequent years, if a company`s cash level continues to decrease or its profitability remains low, it is more likely to increase its investment level in order to seek higher returns. Regarding RPTs, in non-family firms, managers with optimistic traits are more likely to seek support from other members of the corporate group through loan-based RPTs rather than related-party sales after experiencing financial distress.
Overall, this study confirms that managers` optimistic traits do indeed have an influence on investment behavior and RPTs behavior after financial distress. However, the factors influencing managers` optimism have relatively less impact on their behavior after financial distress compared to non-distress time. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
企業管理研究所(MBA學位學程)
110363043 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110363043 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [企業管理研究所（MBA學位學程）] 學位論文
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