| Reference: | 李靜妮，2011，公司治理與裁量性紅利關聯性之研究，國立政治大學會計學系碩士論文。
郭家瑀，2019，不同類型機構投資人持股對公司債殖利率利差影響，國立台灣大學管理學院財務金融研究所碩士論文。
Abarbanell, J. S., Bushee, B. J., & Smith Raedy, J. (2003). Institutional investor preferences and price pressure: The case of corporate spin‐offs. The Journal of Business, 76(2), 233-261.
Agrawal, A., & Mandelker, G. N. (1990). Large shareholders and the monitoring of managers: The case of antitakeover charter amendments. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 25(2), 143-161.
Albuquerque, A. (2009). Peer firms in relative performance evaluation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 48(1), 69-89.
Almazan, A., Hartzell, J. C., & Starks, L. T. (2005). Active institutional shareholders and costs of monitoring: Evidence from executive compensation. Financial management, 34(4), 5-34.
An, H., & Zhang, T. (2013). Stock price synchronicity, crash risk, and institutional investors. Journal of Corporate Finance, 21, 1-15.
Baiman, S., & Rajan, M. V. (1995). The informational advantages of discretionary bonus schemes. The Accounting Review, 557-579.
Baker, G., Gibbons, R., & Murphy, K. J. (1994). Subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), 1125-1156.
Baker, G. P., Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1988). Compensation and incentives: Practice vs. Theory. The Journal of Finance, 43(3), 593-616.
Banker, R. D., & Datar, S. M. (1989). Sensitivity, precision, and linear aggregation of signals for performance evaluation. Journal of Accounting Research, 27(1), 21-39.
Barro, J. R., & Barro, R. J. (1990). Pay, performance, and turnover of bank ceos. Journal of Labor Economics, 8(4), 448-481.
Bebchuk, L. A., & Fried, J. M. (2003). Executive compensation as an agency problem. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(3), 71-92.
Bernardin, H. J., & Buckley, M. R. (1981). Strategies in rater training. Academy of Management Review, 6(2), 205-212.
Bjerke, D. G., Cleveland, J. N., Morrison, R. F., & Wilson, W. C. (1987). Officer Fitness Report Evaluation Study.
Blanchard, O. J., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1994). What do firms do with cash windfalls? Journal of Financial Economics, 36(3), 337-360.
Blume, M. E., & Keim, D. B. (2014). The changing nature of institutional stock investing. Critical Finance Review, 6, 1-41.
Bol, J. C. (2008). Subjectivity in compensation contracting. AAA Management Accounting Section (MAS) 2006 Meeting Paper, Journal of Accounting Literature, 76, 1-24.
Borochin, P., & Yang, J. (2017). The effects of institutional investor objectives on firm valuation and governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 126(1), 171-199.
Brickley, J. A., Lease, R. C., & Smith Jr, C. W. (1988). Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 267-291.
Bushee, B. (2004). Identifying and attracting the “right” investors: Evidence on the behavior of institutional investors. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 16(4), 28-35.
Bushee, B. J. (1998). The influence of institutional investors on myopic r&d investment behavior. The Accounting Review, 305-333.
Bushee, B. J., Carter, M. E., & Gerakos, J. (2014). Institutional investor preferences for corporate governance mechanisms. Journal of Management Accounting Research, 26(2), 123-149.
Bushee, B. J., & Goodman, T. H. (2007). Which institutional investors trade based on private information about earnings and returns? Journal of Accounting Research, 45(2), 289-321.
Bushee, B. J., & Noe, C. F. (2000). Corporate disclosure practices, institutional investors, and stock return volatility. Journal of Accounting Research, 171-202.
Callen, J. L., & Fang, X. (2013). Institutional investor stability and crash risk: Monitoring versus short-termism? Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(8), 3047-3063.
Carmichael, H. L. (1989). Self-enforcing contracts, shirking, and life cycle incentives. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3(4), 65-83.
Chung, C. Y., & Wang, K. (2014). Do institutional investors monitor management? Evidence from the relationship between institutional ownership and capital structure. The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 30, 203-233.
Chung, R., Firth, M., & Kim, J.-B. (2002). Institutional monitoring and opportunistic earnings management. Journal of Corporate Finance, 8(1), 29-48.
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999). Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 51(3), 371-406.
Cornett, M. M., Marcus, A. J., Saunders, A., & Tehranian, H. (2007). The impact of institutional ownership on corporate operating performance. Journal of Banking & Finance, 31(6), 1771-1794.
Davis, G. F., & Thompson, T. A. (1994). A social movement perspective on corporate control. Administrative Science Quarterly, 141-173.
Dechow, P. M., & Sloan, R. G. (1991). Executive incentives and the horizon problem: An empirical investigation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 14(1), 51-89.
Den Hartog, D. N., Boselie, P., & Paauwe, J. (2004). Performance management: A model and research agenda. Applied Psychology, 53(4), 556-569.
Dong, M., & Ozkan, A. (2008). Institutional investors and director pay: An empirical study of uk companies. Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 18(1), 16-29.
Dorata, N. T., & Petra, S. T. (2008). Ceo duality and compensation in the market for corporate control. Managerial Finance.
Duggal, R., & Millar, J. A. (1999). Institutional ownership and firm performance: The case of bidder returns. Journal of Corporate Finance, 5(2), 103-117.
Ederhof, M. (2010). Discretion in bonus plans. The Accounting Review, 85(6), 1921-1949.
Edmans, A., Goncalves-Pinto, L., Groen-Xu, M., & Wang, Y. (2018). Strategic news releases in equity vesting months. The Review of Financial Studies, 31(11), 4099-4141.
Finkelstein, S., & Hambrick, D. C. (1990). Top-management-team tenure and organizational outcomes: The moderating role of managerial discretion. Administrative Science Quarterly, 484-503.
Gaspar, J.-M., Massa, M., & Matos, P. (2005). Shareholder investment horizons and the market for corporate control. Journal of Financial Economics, 76(1), 135-165.
Gaver, J. J., Gaver, K. M., & Austin, J. R. (1995). Additional evidence on bonus plans and income management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 19(1), 3-28.
Ghalayini, A. M., & Noble, J. S. (1996). The changing basis of performance measurement. International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 16(8), 63-80.
Gibbons, R., & Murphy, K. J. (1990). Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers. ILR Review, 43(3), 30-S-51-S.
Gibbs, M., Merchant, K. A., Stede, W. A. V. d., & Vargus, M. E. (2004). Determinants and effects of subjectivity in incentives. The Accounting Review, 79(2), 409-436.
Gibbs, M. J., Merchant, K. A., Stede, W. A. V. D., & Vargus, M. E. (2005). The benefits of evaluating performance subjectively. Performance Improvement, 44(5), 26-32.
Gillan, S., & Starks, L. T. (2003). Corporate governance, corporate ownership, and the role of institutional investors: A global perspective. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance Working Paper(2003-01).
Gong, G., Li, L. Y., & Shin, J. Y. (2011). Relative performance evaluation and related peer groups in executive compensation contracts. The Accounting Review, 86(3), 1007-1043.
Gosselin, M. (2005). An empirical study of performance measurement in manufacturing firms. International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management.
Graves, S. B. (1988). Institutional ownership and corporate r&d in the computer industry. Academy of Management Journal, 31(2), 417-428.
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1980). Takeover bids, the free-rider problem, and the theory of the corporation. The Bell Journal of Economics, 42-64.
Hallock, K. F. (1997). Reciprocally interlocking boards of directors and executive compensation. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 32(3), 331-344.
Harris, M. M. (1994). Rater motivation in the performance appraisal context: A theoretical framework. Journal of Management, 20(4), 735-756.
Hartzell, J. C., & Starks, L. T. (2003). Institutional investors and executive compensation. The Journal of Finance, 58(6), 2351-2374.
Healy, P. M. (1985). The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(1-3), 85-107.
Himmelberg, C. P., & Hubbard, R. G. (2000). Incentive pay and the market for ceos: An analysis of pay-for-performance sensitivity. Tuck-JFE Contemporary Corporate Governance Conference.
Holmström, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. The Bell Journal of Economics, 74-91.
Holmstrom, B. (1982). Moral hazard in teams. The Bell Journal of Economics, 324-340.
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The American Economic Review, 76(2), 323-329.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (2019). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Corporate Governance , 77-132.
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990). Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), 225-264.
John Harry III, E., Gao, Z., Hwang, Y., & Wu, W.-T. (2018). Performance periods in ceo performance-based equity awards: Theory and evidence. The Accounting Review, 93(2), 161-190.
John, T. A., & John, K. (1993). Top‐management compensation and capital structure. The Journal of Finance, 48(3), 949-974.
Joshi, P., Kumar, R., & Al-Ajmi, J. (2011). An empirical study of the use and usefulness of financial, non-financial and subjective measures for performance evaluation in industrial companies in bahrain. International Journal of Managerial and Financial Accounting, 3(2), 140-169.
Kefe, I. (2019). The determination of performance measures by using a balanced scorecard framework. Foundations of Management, 11(1), 43-56.
Kim, S., & Ng, J. (2018). Executive bonus contract characteristics and share repurchases. The Accounting Review, 93(1), 289-316.
Lee, S. P., & Chen, H. J. (2011). Corporate governance and firm value as determinants of ceo compensation in taiwan: 2sls for panel data model. Management Research Review.
Li, J., Lam, K., Qian, G., & Fang, Y. (2006). The effects of institutional ownership on corporate governance and performance: An empirical assessment in hong kong. Management International Review, 46(3), 259-276.
Lillis, A. M. (2002). Managing multiple dimensions of manufacturing performance—an exploratory study. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 27(6), 497-529.
Lingle, J. H., & Schiemann, W. A. (1996). From balanced scorecard to strategic gauges: Is measurement worth it? Management Review, 85(3), 56.
Longenecker, C. O., Sims Jr, H. P., & Gioia, D. A. (1987). Behind the mask: The politics of employee appraisal. Academy of Management Perspectives, 1(3), 183-193.
Lovett, S., Rasheed, A. A., & Hou, W. (2022). Stock options, restricted stock, salary, or bonus? Managing ceo compensation to maximize organizational performance. Business Horizons, 65(2), 115-123.
Ma, F. (2019). Subjective ceo pay and long-term incentives. Available at SSRN 3314100.
Manheim, D. (2018). Building less flawed metrics: Dodging goodhart and campbell`s laws.
Milgrom, P. R., & Roberts, J. (1992). Economics, organization and management englewood cliffs (nj), 1992.
Montgomery, C. A. (1994). Corporate diversificaton. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(3), 163-178.
Murphy, K. J. (2000). Performance standards in incentive contracts. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 30(3), 245-278.
Murphy, K. J., & Jensen, M. C. (2011). Ceo bonus plans: And how to fix them. Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper, 12-022.
Nisar, T. M. (2007). Evaluation of subjectivity in incentive pay. Journal of Financial Services Research, 31(1), 53-73.
O`Neill, M., & Swisher, J. (2003). Institutional investors and information asymmetry: An event study of self‐tender offers. Financial Review, 38(2), 197-211.
Pan, H.-H., Liao, Y.-P., & Chung, M.-C. (2019). 薪酬委員會之專業性與高階經理人薪酬相對績效評估. 會計評論(68), 119-159.
Parrino, R., Sias, R. W., & Starks, L. T. (2003). Voting with their feet: Institutional ownership changes around forced ceo turnover. Journal of Financial Economics, 68(1), 3-46.
Prendergast, C. (1999). The provision of incentives in firms. Journal of Economic Literature, 37(1), 7-63.
Prendergast, C. (2002). Uncertainty and incentives. Journal of Labor Economics, 20(S2), S115-S137.
Prendergast, C., & Topel, R. H. (1996). Favoritism in organizations. Journal of Political Economy, 104(5), 958-978.
Pucheta‐Martínez, M. C., & García‐Meca, E. (2014). Institutional investors on boards and audit committees and their effects on financial reporting quality. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 22(4), 347-363.
Rajan, M. V., & Reichelstein, S. (2006). Subjective performance indicators and discretionary bonus pools. Journal of Accounting Research, 44(3), 585-618.
Rajgopal, S., Shevlin, T., & Zamora, V. (2006). Ceos` outside employment opportunities and the lack of relative performance evaluation in compensation contracts. The Journal of Finance, 61(4), 1813-1844.
Rumelt, R. P. (1974). Strategy, structure, and economic performance.
Ryan Jr, H. E., & Wiggins III, R. A. (2002). The interactions between r&d investment decisions and compensation policy. Financial Management, 5-29.
Shleifer, A. (1985). A theory of yardstick competition. The RAND Journal of Economics, 319-327.
Tsui, S. (2013). Relative performance evaluation and the use of discretionary bonuses in executive compensation.
Wahal, S., & McConnell, J. J. (2000). Do institutional investors exacerbate managerial myopia? Journal of Corporate Finance, 6(3), 307-329.
Woods, A. (2012). Subjective adjustments to objective performance measures: The influence of prior performance. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 37(6), 403-425. |
