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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/146400
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/146400


    Title: 資本結構、機構投資人持股比例與公司面臨經濟衰退時績效變動之關聯
    Capital Structure, Institutional Ownership and Firm Performance During Economic Recession
    Authors: 黃姿菱
    Huang, Tzu-Ling
    Contributors: 徐愛恩
    Tsui, Stephanie
    黃姿菱
    Huang, Tzu-Ling
    Keywords: 資本結構
    機構投資人持股
    經濟衰退
    公司績效
    Capital structure
    Institutional ownership
    Recession
    Firm performance
    Date: 2023
    Issue Date: 2023-08-02 13:26:03 (UTC+8)
    Abstract:   資本結構與股權結構中,皆存有代理成本相關問題,進而影響公司績效表現。雖然過去文獻已廣泛討論資本結構與股權結構對公司績效之影響,但大多將研究期間設定於經濟環境較穩定之狀態,較少研究經濟動盪時刻資本結構及股權結構與公司績效之間關聯性,因此本研究欲探討發生經濟衰退前的財務槓桿比率及機構投資人持股比例,是否也能降低公司代理問題,從而影響經濟衰退後公司績效表現。
      本研究以美國上市公司為樣本,並以2008年金融海嘯事件與2019年新冠肺炎疫情作為經濟衰退代表事件,研究經濟衰退前財務槓桿比率及機構投資人持股比例對經濟衰退後公司績效發展之間的關聯性。研究結果顯示,金融海嘯期間財務槓桿比率與公司績效呈顯著正相關,然而機構投資人持股比率與公司績效表現實證結果部分不顯著,而在新冠肺炎期間實證結果皆不顯著。
    The problems of agency costs in capital structure and shareholding structure affect the firm performance. Although the effects of capital structure and shareholding structure on firm performance have been widely discussed in the past, most of the studies have been conducted in a stable economic period, rather than in the economic recession. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to discuss whether the financial leverage ratio and institutional ownership before the recession could reduce the agency problem of firms and affect the firm performance after the recession.
    This study uses the 2008 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic as representative events to study the pre-recession effect of financial leverage ratio and institutional ownership on the post-recession, U.S. listed firm performance. The results show that financial leverage was significantly and positively correlated with firm performance, but that institutional ownership and firm performance were partially insignificant during the 2008 financial crisis. However, the results show that during the COVID-19 pandemic, those relationships were not significant.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    110353030
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110353030
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 學位論文

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