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    题名: 高階經理人一般管理能力與人才流動性之關聯：論薪酬結構之影響
    The Association between General Managerial Ability and Talent Mobility among Top Managers: The Impact of Compensation Structure.
    作者: 戴琪瑋
    Tai, Chi-Wei
    贡献者: 李佳玲
    Lee, Chia-Ling
    戴琪瑋
    Tai, Chi-Wei
    关键词: 總經理能力
    薪酬結構
    總經理離職
    代理問題
    CEO abilities
    Compensation structure
    CEO turnover
    Agency problem
    日期: 2023
    上传时间: 2023-08-02 13:25:37 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 總經理的行為一直是各領域廣泛討論的對象。隨著公司在組織和規模上的多樣化，對總經理的需求也由具公司特定技能之專家型總經理逐漸轉為具一般管理能力的通才型總經理。一般管理能力較佳的總經理在勞動力市場上更具吸引力，導致更多的外部機會。如何設計薪酬結構以減輕外部機會帶來的離職問題，對公司而言至關重要。
    本研究探討了總經理能力、薪酬結構和離職間的關係。結果表明，總經理的一般管理能力與離職呈正相關。當總經理的能力較高時，薪酬績效敏感性和薪酬存續期間對總經理能力和離職間的關係具有負向調節作用。然而，當總經理的能力較低時，調節作用不明顯。此外，總經理的能力對離職具有長期效果，且當總經理的能力較高時，薪酬績效敏感性的調節作用具有長期效果，而薪酬存續期間則無。當總經理的能力較低時，兩者皆不具長期效果。
    The behavior of CEOs in public companies has been a subject of extensive research across various fields. As companies have become more diverse in size and organizational structure, there has been a shift from hiring specialist CEOs with firm-specific skills to generalist CEOs with general managerial abilities. CEOs with better general managerial abilities are more attractive in the labor market, leading to more external opportunities. How companies design compensation structures to mitigate the turnover problems arising from CEOs` external opportunities is crucial for companies.
    This study examines the relationship between CEO abilities, compensation structure, and CEO turnover. The results show that CEOs` general managerial ability is positively related to CEO turnover. The pay-performance sensitivity and the pay duration have a negative moderating effect on the relationship between CEO ability and turnover when CEOs have high general managerial abilities. However, these moderating effects are not significant when CEOs have low abilities. Further analysis revealed that the effect of CEOs` ability on turnover has a long-term effect. When the CEO`s ability is high, the negative moderating effect of pay-performance sensitivity has a long-term effect, while pay duration has no long-term effect. When the CEO`s ability is low, neither has a long-term effect.
    參考文獻: 黃振豊、陳薇如與張雅婷，2016，核心代理問題之道德風險對高階經理人薪酬與企業績效關係之影響，管理學報，第33卷第2期：213-238。
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    110353025
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110353025
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[會計學系] 學位論文

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