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    題名: 單一選區下三政黨的攻擊與提名策略之賽局分析
    Three-Party Game of Attack`s and Nomination`s Strategy in Single Member District Election
    作者: 温姵瑩
    Wen, Pei-Ying
    貢獻者: 王智賢
    Wang, Jue-Shyan
    温姵瑩
    Wen, Pei-Ying
    關鍵詞: 單一選區
    政黨攻擊
    政黨提名
    子賽局完全均衡
    Single-member district
    Party attack
    Party nomination
    Subgame perfect equilibrium
    日期: 2023
    上傳時間: 2023-07-06 16:38:57 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 綜觀臺灣之近年選舉過程中，新興政黨與長久主導政壇的兩政黨間，常透過提名或不提名候選人的方式，表達政黨或候選人選擇模糊化政治光譜與否的情形，以及政黨間目標攻擊對象的選擇，也會帶給其他政黨競選利弊等效果。本文建立三政黨競選賽局模型，探討單一選區選舉中，新崛起政黨提名決策的競選效益條件為何，以及分析政黨攻擊策略選擇的合理性。依據均衡結果得出，政黨攻擊對象選擇與提名決定皆取決於政黨的各自淨好處大小比較，與環境無關。另外在衍生模型中，政黨1與2的攻擊對象搭配組合將影響政黨3的提名決定，以及當政黨3不提名的原始淨好處愈大時，若政黨1與2選擇攻擊政黨3時，則政黨3愈不容易提名。此外，若政黨3不提名原始淨好處較小(大)時，則其將提名(不提名)。
    Overviewing Taiwan’s electoral process in recent years, there has been a tendency for emerging political parties and the two long-standing dominant parties to express their stance on political spectrum ambiguity through the nomination or non-nomination of candidates. Meanwhile, choosing the target of the attack among the parties also brings the effect of the advantages and disadvantages to other parties’ campaigns. In this paper, a three-party game theoretical model is developed not only to analyze the conditions for the campaign benefit of the nomination decisions made by the emerging parties in single-member district elections, but also to discuss the rationality of parties’ attack strategy choices. According to the equilibrium results, we conclude that parties’ attack target selection and nomination decisions depended on the comparison of the respective net benefits of the parties instead of the environment. Furthermore, in the derivative model, the combination of attack targets of party 1 and 2 affects the nomination decision of party 3, and while party 3’s original net benefit of not nominating is getting larger, party 3 is less likely to nominate if party 1 and 2 choose to attack party 3. In addition, if party 3 has a smaller original net benefit in non-nominating, it will nominate. Conversely, if party 3 has a larger original net benefit in non-nominating, it won’t nominate.
    參考文獻: I. 中文部分

    王宏恩，2015，〈政黨標籤的規模效應─以2014年村里長選舉為例〉，《選舉研究》，22(1): 109-141。
    王智賢，2007，〈勸退參選的賽局分析〉，《經濟研究》，43(2): 149-180。
    王智賢、陳虹羽，2021，〈單一選區下三政黨的合作與競爭之賽局分析〉，《選舉研究》，29(1): 1-30。
    田弘華、劉義周，2005，〈政黨合作與杜瓦傑法則：連宋配、國親合的賽局分析〉，《臺灣政治學刊》，9(1): 3-37。
    林繼文，2008，〈以輸為贏：小黨在日本單一選區兩票制下的參選策略〉，《選舉研究》，15(2): 37-66。
    崔曉倩、吳重禮，2007，〈政黨與未獲提名候選人之參選決策分析〉，《選舉研究》，14(1): 119-143。

    II. 英文部分

    Burden, Barry C.. 2006.“A Tale of Two Campaigns: Ralph Nader`s Strategy in the 2004 Presidential Election.” PS: Political Science and Politics 39(4): 871-874.
    Callander, Steven. 2005.“Electoral Competition in Heterogeneous Districts.” Journal of Political Economy 113(5): 1116-1145.
    Ergun, Selim Jürgen. 2008.“Centrist’s Curse? An Electoral Competition Model with Credibility Constraints.” The Singapore Economic Review 60(5): 1550055.
    Fell, Dafydd. 2014.“Measuring and Explaining the Electoral Fortunes of Small Parties in Taiwan’s Party Politics.” Issues and Studies 50(1): 153-188.
    Lem, Steve B., and Conor M. Dowling. 2006.“Picking Their Spots: Minor Party Candidates in Gubernatorial Elections.” Political Research Quarterly 59(3): 471-480.
    Lynch, Philip, Richard Whitaker, and Gemma Loomes. 2011.“The UK Independence Party: Understanding a Niche Party’s Strategy, Candidates and Supporters.” Parliamentary Affairs 65(4): 733-757.
    Ridout, Travis N. and Jenny L. Holland. 2010.“Candidate Strategies in the Presidential Nomination Campaign.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 40(4): 611-630.
    Sokolin, Alexey. 2006.“Electoral Competition and Duverger’s Law.” Ph. D. diss. Amherst College, Massachusetts.
    Xefteris, Dimitrios. 2012.“Mixed equilibriums in a three-candidate spatial model with candidate valence.” Public Choice, 158, 101-120.
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政學系
    110255006
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110255006
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[財政學系] 學位論文

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