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    题名: 吃虧欲人知：人際互動中主動吃虧的重要條件
    I need people to know i choose to suffer losses: The important conditions of taking the initiative to suffer losses in interpersonal interaction.
    作者: 馬依妍
    Ma, Yi-Yan
    贡献者: 孫蒨如
    馬依妍
    Ma, Yi-Yan
    关键词: 主動吃虧
    吃虧是福
    互動對方
    第三方
    價
    值
    基於值的選擇
    後續互動
    知情與否
    Take the initiative to suffer losses
    Suffering a loss is a blessing
    Interacting partner
    The third party
    Value
    Worth
    Worth-based choice
    Subsequent interaction
    Know or not know
    日期: 2023
    上传时间: 2023-02-01 14:13:50 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 在華人社會中，我們常聽到「吃虧是福」的概念，很多人將此作爲一種爲人處事的原則，在生活中經常做出主動吃虧的選擇。前人的研究提出了「基於值的選擇」機制，認爲人們在面對吃虧情境時，會比較「價」和「值」，放棄了眼前的「價」以謀求後續的「值」從而決定吃虧。本研究進一步探討個體願意吃虧的重要條件及其運作機制，首先定義了「主動吃虧」的概念，其次將重點放在「人際互動」情境，認爲「主動吃虧」想要獲得後續的「值」只有在滿足某些特定條件時才可成立。本研究認爲個體在決定是否要主動吃虧時所考量的兩個重要條件爲：1. 吃虧需人知，2. 需要有後續互動的可能，需「人」知的「人」分別為在人際互動情境下與自己「直接互動的對方」或「間接互動的第三方」。研究一和研究二均使用自編的情境腳本，研究一為2（互動對方知道/不知道自己吃虧）×2（與對方有/無後續互動可能）的受試者間設計，研究二則為2（第三方知道/不知道自己吃虧）×2（與第三方有/無後續互動可能）的受試者間設計。結果發現，人們主動吃虧的確「欲人知」，如果互動對方或是在場的第三方能夠知道自己吃虧，受試者都會選擇多吃點虧。另外，若與互動對方有後續互動可能時，則會考量值的維度，例如獲得後續回報、做人情和做朋友等因素；若是第三方在場時，受試者會基於第三方是否知情來考量值的維度，例如自己能藉由吃虧給其留下好印象等。最後，結果也發現，在第三方知情的情況下吃虧，意願會較高，感受也會較好。而倘若一定要吃虧、不能拿走全部自己應得的，此時人們也不會願意做齊頭式平等分配，通常吃虧的底線會在兩者之間做出折衷的中間值分配。
    In the Chinese society, we often hear people say: “Suffering a loss is a blessing.” Many people take this as a principle of dealing with relationships and worldly ways, and often take the initiative to suffer losses in life. Previous studies have proposed a "worth-based choice" mechanism, which suggests that when people face a disadvantageous situation, they will compare "value" and "worth", and may give up the immediate "value" that can be obtained in order to seek subsequent "worth". Our research further explores the important conditions and operating mechanism of individuals willing to suffer losses. We propose that there are two important conditions should be meet for an individual to “take the initiative to suffer losses " to obtain sequent "worth": 1) The interacting partner or the third party needs to know about the loss; 2) Sequent interaction with the interacting partner or the third party is required. Both Study 1 and Study 2 used self-compiled scenarios. Study 1 was a 2 (the suffering loss was known / not known by the interacting partner) × 2 (subsequent/no subsequent interaction with the interacting partner) between-participants design. Study 2 was a 2 (the suffering loss was known / not known by the third party) ×2 (subsequent/no subsequent interaction with the third party) between-participants design. Results showed that people who take the initiative to suffer losses do "want others to know". If the interacting partner or the third party can know that they are suffering, they are willing to suffer more. In addition, if there is subsequent interaction with the interacting partner, the dimensions of “worth” will be considered, such as obtaining follow-up returns, giving a favor, and being friends. When an individual suffers a loss and the third party knows it, the dimension of "worth" will also be highlighted, for example, the individual will try to leave a good impression on the third party by suffering a loss. At this time, the individual is more willingness to suffer losses and the feeling is less negative. The results also found that if the individual must suffer a loss and cannot take all what he deserves, the individual will not be willing to make an equal distribution. Usually, the bottom line of the loss will be a compromise between the two.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    心理學系
    108752027
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108752027
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[心理學系] 學位論文

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