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    Title: 美中戰略競爭與台海地區穩定之比較研究
    U.S. - China Strategic Competition and Regional Stability in the Taiwan Strait: Comparative Studies
    Authors: 卡琳娜
    Galina, Gagaeva
    Contributors: 劉復國
    連弘宜
    Liu, Fu-Kuo
    Lien, Hong-Yi
    卡琳娜
    Gagaeva Galina
    Keywords: 戰略競爭
    地區穩定
    中美關係
    俄美關係
    研究比較
    Strategic Competition
    Regional Stability
    US-China Relations
    US-Russia Relations
    Comparative Study
    Date: 2022
    Issue Date: 2022-08-01 18:44:46 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 近年來中國的快速發展引發了中美兩個大國之間經濟、軍事和高科技平衡的轉變。 為應對威脅美國國家利益並削弱其全球領導地位的中國崛起和地區增長，華盛頓不同政府一直在製定遏制中國的政策，並建立其地區和國際夥伴關係和聯盟體系，以將盟友團結起來對抗中國 . 因此，美中戰略競爭不僅影響雙方發展和國家利益，還針對影響地區穩定。
    本研究主要關注中美在亞太地區，尤其是台灣海峽的戰略競爭問題。具體來說：“美中戰略競爭的本質是什麼？兩國如何追求國家利益？為什麼地區安全會受到威脅？”。為了分析美中競爭對台海穩定的影響，該研究檢驗了三個假設：中國經濟實力越強，美國政策越親台；美國的政策越親台，中國的行為越激進；中國形象越激進，美國政策越親台，地區穩定越失衡。該研究也分析了美中競爭加劇與台海地區穩定存在若干關聯。此外，本研究還對歐洲和亞洲地區大國競爭的影響進行了比較研究，比較了烏克蘭和台海衝突的歷史背景、美國在這兩個地區的外交政策以及小國在大國戰略競爭中的作用。
    研究得出的結論是，兩個大國之間的戰略競爭是不可避免的，但地區安全在很大程度上取決於對一個國家利益造成損害的程度（是可以容忍的還是極其危險的），以及兩國的立場。 第三小黨及其選擇一方或遠離衝突的意願，確保與雙方的關係平衡。
    China’s rapid development in the recent years provoked shifts in economic, military, and high-tech balance between China and the U.S. as two great powers. To counter China’s rise and regional growth, which threatens the U.S. national interests and undermines its global leadership, different Washington administrations have been working on China’s containment policy and building up its regional and international system of partnerships and alignments to bring allies together aiming to counter China. In result, U.S. - China strategic competition not only impacts the development and national interests of the two parties, but also targets the third countries influencing regional stability.
    This study focuses primarily on the questions of strategic competition between China and the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, and in the Taiwan Strait in particular. Specifically: “What is the nature of U.S. – China strategic competition? How the two countries pursue their national interests? And why the regional security is put under the threat?”. At the aim of analyzing the possible outcomes of U.S. – China competition on the stability in the Taiwan Strait, the study has tested three Hypothesis: The more economically powerful China becomes, the more pro-Taiwan the U.S. policy gets; The more pro-Taiwan the U.S. policy becomes, the more aggressively China behaves; The more aggressive China’s image is, and the more pro-Taiwan American policy is, the more imbalanced the regional stability is – and found several correlations between U.S. – China intensified competition and regional stability in the Taiwan Strait. Besides, this study has conducted comparative studies between the impacts of great powers’ competition in the European and Asian region, comparing historical background of the conflicts in Ukraine and the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. foreign policy in these two regions, as well as the strategic importance and role of the small states/actors in the outbreak of the great powers’ strategic competition – Ukraine and Taiwan.
    The study has concluded, that the strategic competition between the two great powers is inevitable, but the regional security relies heavily on the scope of damages caused to one’s national interests (whether they can be tolerated or vitally dangerous), as well as the position of the third smaller parties and their willingness to either choose one side or stay away from the conflict, ensuring balance in their relations with both parties.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    外交學系
    109253026
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109253026
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202200824
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Diplomacy] Theses

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