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    题名: 高階經理人薪酬差距與公司績效之關聯—論公司創新程度之影響
    Top Management Compensation Gap and Firm Performance: The Impact of Innovation
    作者: 詹詠晴
    Chan, Yung-Chin
    贡献者: 李佳玲
    Lee, Chia-Ling
    詹詠晴
    Chan, Yung-Chin
    关键词: 高階經理人
    薪酬差距
    公司績效
    創新
    Top Manager
    Compensation Gap
    Corporate Performance
    Innovation
    日期: 2022
    上传时间: 2022-08-01 17:07:11 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究探討高階經理人總薪酬差距與公司績效之關聯性，並進一步將薪酬區分為長期薪酬與短期薪酬，分析兩種薪酬差距與公司績效之關聯。接著運用競賽理論，研究創新程度是否能影響高階經理人薪酬差距與公司績效之關聯性。本研究利用北美公開公司2010-2019年之資料進行實證研究，並得出以下研究結果。
    首先，高階經理人總薪酬差距和公司績效間存在顯著的正向關係。此外，長期薪酬差距同樣與公司績效間存在顯著的正向關係，但短期薪酬差距與公司績效間無顯著關聯。本研究同時發現，創新可以調節高階經理人總薪酬差距與長期薪酬差距與公司績效之關聯性。意即，若公司創新程度愈高，將會加強高階經理人總薪酬差距與長期薪酬差距對公司績效產生之正面影響。此外，在總薪酬維持在同樣水平的情況下，若總經理獲得的長期薪酬與短期薪酬皆高於其餘經理人，將會對公司績效產生負面影響；若長期薪酬低於總經理，但在短期薪酬上獲得補償，將會對高階經理人達到一定的激勵效果，提升公司績效。最後，除了與本期績效外，總薪酬差距和長期薪酬差距皆同樣與公司未來績效間存有一定程度正相關，表示若擴大總薪酬差距或長期薪酬差距，能夠提升公司未來績效。
    This study investigates the correlation between the compensation gap of top managers and corporate performance. Furthermore, this study divides the top management compensation into long-term and short-term compensation to analyze the relations between the two types of compensation gaps and corporate performance. Using tournament theory, this study then examines whether the degree of innovation strengthens the effect of the top management compensation gap on firm performance. Collecting data from North America public firms from 2010 to 2019, the study makes conclusions as follow.
    First, there is a significant positive relation between the top management compensation gap and company performance. In addition, the relation between the long-term pay gap and company performance is significant and positive, too. Meanwhile, there is no significant relationship between the short-term pay gap and company performance. Second, the study found that innovation moderates the correlation between the total and long-term compensation gaps of top manager and firm performance. That is, the higher the level of innovation is, the higher the positive impact of the total compensation gap and the long-term compensation gap on the performance of the firm. Third, on the condition that the total compensation remains at the same level, if a CEO receives higher long-term compensation and short-term compensation than other top managers, an incentive effect on top managers themselves can be seen, and the company`s performance can be thus observed improved; if top managers receive lower short-term compensation than a CEO but are compensated in their long-term pay, an incentive effect on top managers themselves can be seen, and the company`s performance can be thus observed improved. Finally, the study found that the total pay gap and the long-term pay gap also have a certain degree of positive relation with the company`s future performance, indicating that if the total pay gap or long-term pay gap is widened, the company`s future performance can be thus observed improved.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    109353021
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109353021
    数据类型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202200803
    显示于类别:[會計學系] 學位論文

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