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    题名: Perceptual Particularity from a Phenomenological Perspective
    知覺的個殊性：一個現象學的視角
    作者: 陳貴正
    Chen, Kuei-Chen
    贡献者: 政治大學哲學學報
    关键词: perceptual particularity ; semantic particularity ; phenomenological particularity ; Husserlian phenomenology 
    知覺個殊性 ; 語義個殊性 ; 現象學個殊性 ; 胡塞爾現象學
    日期: 2021-01
    上传时间: 2021-11-17 16:17:18 (UTC+8)
    摘要: The paper considers how phenomenologically-minded philosophers should think about the phenomenon Susanna Schellenberg (2016) calls perceptual particularity: in perception, we experience objects in their particularity. For example, if I see a pumpkin, I do not simply see the properties it shares with other objects, such as orange and roundness. What I see is a particular pumpkin that has all these properties. Much work has been done to investigate the phenomenon, but relatively few philosophers have addressed the concern of this paper: how should those sympathetic with Husserlian phenomenology approach perceptual particularity? I will explore this issue by engaging with two recent Husserlian accounts of perceptual particularity, i.e. those defended by A. D. Smith (2008) and Walter Hopp (2011). Both of them focus on a kind of perceptual particularity that Schellenberg describes as semantic. I will argue that this is not the best use of the theoretical resources offered by their theories. The Husserlian ideas invoked by Smith and Hopp are more fruitful when they are applied to a different kind of perceptual particularity, which Schellenberg describes as phenomenological. The nature of phenomenological particularity is itself a complex issue, and I shall argue that a satisfactory analysis of it can be formulated on the basis of Hopp`s Husserlian theory.
    本文的主題是關懷現象學傳統的哲學家應如何理解知覺的個殊性（perceptual particularity）。Susanna Schellenberg（2016）以此概念描述知覺經驗使人感知個殊物（particulars）的性質。舉例而言，若我正看著一顆南瓜，則我可能會察覺到該南瓜具有「橘色」、「圓形」等性質──但這些該南瓜與其他南瓜共享的性質不會是我所經驗到的全部。我也將經驗到擁有這些可共享性質的個體，亦即作為個殊物的該南瓜。近期在心智哲學中針對這種關於個殊物的經驗有不少討論，但我們也應探問現象學學者對這種經驗所能提出的分析。在此，我將批判地檢視A. D. Smith（2008）與Walter Hopp（2011）所主張的胡塞爾式知覺理論，藉以探究如何參考胡塞爾現象學的視角而去分析知覺的個殊性。我主張，雖然Smith與Hopp嘗試使用胡塞爾式的概念工具來討論Schellenberg形容為語義性質（semantic）的個殊性現象，但這些概念工具並無法有效地處理此一議題。若要用更為理想的方式使用這些概念工具，我們應該以之分析Schellenberg形容為現象學性質（phenomenological）的個殊性現象。我將討論現象學個殊性所涉及的複雜議題，並嘗試在Hopp的理論基礎之上提出對該現象的分析。
    關聯: 政治大學哲學學報, 45, 91-132
    数据类型: article
    DOI 連結: https://doi.org/10.30393/TNCUP.202101_(45).0003
    DOI: 10.30393/TNCUP.202101_(45).0003
    显示于类别:[政治大學哲學學報 THCI Core] 期刊論文

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