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| Title: | 企業宣告標準必要專利之策略研究
Investigating the Enterprises’ Strategies of Declaring Standard Essential Patents |
| Authors: | 陳又君
Chen, You-Jyun |
| Contributors: | 宋皇志
Sung, Huang-Chih
陳又君
Chen, You-Jyun |
| Keywords: | 標準必要專利
產業技術標準
標準制定組織
智財政策
智財策略
Standard Essential Patent
Technology Standard
Standard Setting Organization
Intellectual Property Policy
Intellectual property strategy |
| Date: | 2021 |
| Issue Date: | 2021-09-02 18:13:52 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 標準必要專利作為對產業發展有重要影響之專利群，應受到特殊的規範和管理。若欲達成前述目標，首先需釐清哪些專利確實為施行標準時所需之「必要專利」。然而，目前標準必要專利之界定，係經由企業在參與標準制定組織時，自行將所擁有之專利宣告為標準必要專利，無須經他方認證。與此同時，因標準必要專利可為企業帶來龐大利益，故企業可能藉由不同宣告策略，如過度宣告、未完全宣告等宣告不精確行為，試圖為自身創造最大利益。在此情況下，由企業自行宣告之標準必要專利，與實施標準時必定所需之專利將產生落差。該些行為及其所產生之落差，可能影響標準必要專利是否能受到適當的規範與管理，進而影響到後續標準的普及、乃至產業的發展。考量到標準必要專利宣告行為可能對產業造成之影響，此議題時應受關注與討論。然，過去與標準必要專利相關之研究，多著重於被宣告為標準必要專利的專利之特性，或後續FRAND授權、訴訟與判決，較缺乏以企業觀點為基礎，探討宣告行為，及該些行為產生之影響。故本研究透過回顧文獻，以及對參與標準制定之專家進行深度訪談，探討企業之標準必要專利宣告策略，及該些行為可能產生之影響，以期填補以企業觀點出發探討標準必要專利宣告之研究缺口，並供標準制定組織在未來制定智財政策時作為參考。
本研究發現，企業之標準必要專利宣告策略，需與後續授權、訴訟行為結合，方能產生商業價值，因此本研究提出將企業標準必要專利宣告情形，在策略面分為「攻擊型」與「保守型」，在行為面分為「過度宣告」與「未完全宣告」之二維度分析框架，並說明四情境下企業策略與行為背後考量，及其可能對標準實施者所造成之影響。此外，標準之實施可能因宣告不精確，導致後續授權談判與訴訟成本增加。據此，本研究亦提出相應智財政策建議，作為未來改善方向之參考。
As a group of patents that have important impact on the development of industries, SEPs needed to be regulated under special policies. To achieve the goal, which patents are indeed “essential” when implementing a technology standard must be clarified first. However, currently, Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) are defined by enterprises’ own declaration of their patents that they recognize as “essential” when they participating Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs), without certified by other parties. At the meantime, considering that SEPs could bring huge benefits to enterprises, enterprises may have their own declaration strategies to maximize their benefits, such as over-declaration or under-declaration. Thus, inaccurate declaration may happen. Under the circumstances, there may be a gap between SEPs declared by enterprises, and patents that are truly essential when implementing technology standards. These declaration behaviors and the resulting gaps may affect whether SEPs could be properly regulated and managed, which may further affect the adoption of technology standards and even the development of industries.
With the impact that may occurred from declaration of SEPs, it is noteworthy that how SEPs declarations are done. However, previous research mainly focuses on characteristics of SEPs, or subsequent FRAND patent license, litigations, and judgments. There is a lack of observations about SEPs declaration that based on enterprises’ perspective. Therefore, by reviewing previous literature and conducting in-depth interviews with experts involved in standard setting process, this study investigates enterprises’ strategies of SEPs declaration and the possible impact that may derived from such behaviors. The aim of this study is to fill the research gap of SEPs declaration under enterprises opinion, and thus serve as a reference for policymakers in SSOs when developing IP policies.
This study makes 3 major contributions. Firstly, in order to generate commercial value from patents, enterprises need to link their SEPs declaration strategies to subsequent patent license or litigations. Therefore, this study proposes a two-dimensional analysis framework for enterprises’ SEPs declaration, that is, from strategic perspective, it could be divide into “aggressive” or “conservative”; from behavioral perspective, it could be classified into “over-declaration” or “under-declaration”. For the four scenarios under the two-dimensional framework, this study also provides enterprises considerations behind in each scenario, and the possible impact on standard implementers. Secondly, from standard implementers’ perspective, the inaccuracy of SEPs declaration may result in an increase of cost of subsequent patent license negotiations and litigations. Finally, this study also proposes suggestions of IP policies accordingly, to serve as a reference for future IP policymakers. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
科技管理與智慧財產研究所
107364101 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1073641011 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| DOI: | 10.6814/NCCU202101483 |
| Appears in Collections: | [科技管理與智慧財產研究所] 學位論文
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| 101101.pdf | | 975Kb | Adobe PDF2 | 0 | View/Open |
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