政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/136488
English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  全文笔数/总笔数 : 113451/144438 (79%)
造访人次 : 51257752      在线人数 : 899
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
搜寻范围 查询小技巧：
  • 您可在西文检索词汇前后加上"双引号"，以获取较精准的检索结果
  • 若欲以作者姓名搜寻，建议至进阶搜寻限定作者字段，可获得较完整数据
    •  进阶搜寻
    政大機構典藏 > 法學院 > 法律學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/136488


    请使用永久网址来引用或连结此文件: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/136488


    题名: 歐盟結合管制規範之研究— 以歐盟最新發展及我國公平會對於結合案件申報處理原則之研究為中心
    European Union Merger Control Regulations: A Study on the Latest Development in European Union and the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission’s Disposal Directions (Guidelines) on Handling Merger Filings
    作者: 賴宛瑩
    Lai, Wan-Ying
    贡献者: 吳秀明
    Wu, Shiow-Ming
    賴宛瑩
    Lai, Wan-Ying
    关键词: 結合管制
    水平結合
    垂直結合
    多角化結合
    歐盟法
    歐盟水平結合評價指導原則
    歐盟非水平結合評價指導原則
    結合案件申報處理原則
    歐盟執委會
    公平交易委員會
    Merger control
    Horizontal merger
    Vertical merger
    Conglomerate merger
    EU laws
    EU horizontal merger guidelines
    EU non-horizontal merger guidelines,
    Taiwan Fair Trade Commission’s Disposal Directions (Guidelines) on Handling Merger Filings
    European Commission
    Taiwan Fair Trade Commission
    日期: 2012
    上传时间: 2021-08-04 15:40:51 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 我國公平交易委員會於西元2006年發布「公平交易委員會對於結合申報案件之處理原則」，規範水平結合、垂直結合及多角化結合產生限制疑慮之考量因素與結合所適用之作業程序等。該處理原則除賦予公平交易法第13條第1項所稱「整體經濟利益」及「限制競爭不利益」更為明確之意義外，對於公平交易委員會結合案件論理架構亦造成不小的影響，實有進一步探究之必要。而公平交易委員會於制訂該處理原則時，亦大幅參考歐盟於2004年發布之結合管制規則與水平結合評價指導原則等相關規範。此外，本文認為歐盟之結合實體審查標準，無論是在規範面與實務面（包括歐盟執委會之結合案件決定，以及初審法院與歐洲法院之判決），均有相當之參考價值。

    準此，本文設計下述架構，從經濟分析的學理與比較法觀點，解析我國公平結合管制標準可更精進之處：第二章藉由經濟分析探討水平結合及非水平結合（即垂直結合與多角化結合）之促進競爭效果及反競爭效果之差異。第三章主要對於歐盟結合管制之沿革、結合管制規則、相關市場界定公告及最新發展進行介紹。第四章以及第五章分別就歐盟對於水平結合與非水平結合之實質審查標準，從法規面以及實務面進行介紹和探討，以作為我國法之參考。第六章，則分析及檢討我國公平交易法以及結合案件處理原則關於結合管制之規範，並針對實務上的相關案例進行整理分析。第七章則為結論與建議。
    In 2006, the Fair Trade Commission promulgated the “Fair Trade Commission Disposal Directions (Guidelines) on Handling Merger Filings (the “Disposal Directions”)”, which stipulate the factors to assess the effects of the likely competition restrictions that may cause by of horizontal mergers, vertical mergers and conglomerate mergers and the relevant review procedures. The Disposal Directions is worth of further study since the Disposal Directions not only clarified “overall economic benefits of mergers” and “disadvantages from competition restrictions incurred by mergers” referred to in Paragraph 1 of Article 13 of Taiwan Fair Trade Act, but also significantly changed the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission’s review structure of merger filings. Also, when stipulating the Disposal Directions, the Taiwan Trade Commission made lots of reference to the relevant European merger control regulations, such as “Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (i.e. EU Merger Regulations)” and “Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentration between undertakings” promulgated in 2004 by European Union. Furthermore, European Union’s substantial criteria for reviewing merger filing, from both normative perspectives and practical perspectives (including the European Commission’s decisions on merger filings and the judgements rendered by the Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice of European Union), can be a good reference to Taiwanese laws.

    Considering the above, based on economic analysis and comparative law approach, this thesis intends to propose certain improvements on the merger control criteria of Taiwan. In Chapter 2, I introduce competitive effects and anti-competitive effects of horizontal mergers and non-horizontal mergers (i.e. vertical mergers and conglomerate mergers) from the view of economic analysis. Chapter 3 introduces a brief history of merger control in the European Union, EU Merger Regulations, the Commission Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market for the Purpose of Community Competition Law, and other latest developments in European laws. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, I introduce and analyze the European Union’s substantial review criteria for merger filings from both normative perspectives and practical perspectives. In Chapter 6, I examine the merger control regulations under Taiwan Fair Trade Act and the Disposal Directions and conduct relevant case study in Taiwan. The conclusion of my thesis is in Chapter 7.
    參考文獻: 中文文獻
    公平交易委員會（2011），認識公平交易法，十三版，台北：行政院公平交易委員會。
    王泰銓（2000），歐洲事業法（二）— 歐洲競爭規範，二版，台北：五南。
    王國樑（2003），管理經濟學，台北：東華。
    朱華君（2007），反托拉斯法對寡占事業規範之研究，國立臺北大學法學系碩士論文。
    江國棟（1998），水平結合之福利分析，國立中央大學產業經濟研究所碩士論文。
    吳成物（2001），競爭法對於企業購併行為之規範，月旦法學雜誌，68期，頁64-83。
    吳秀明（2004），十年來公平法上之獨占管制，收於：競爭法之發軔與展開，頁309-384，台北：元照。
    ______（2010），德國限制競爭防止法(Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen)—最新修正內容及全文翻譯，收於：競爭法研究，頁364-455，台北：元照。
    沈麗玉（2001），事業結合管制之規範與實務問題研究，銘傳大學法律研究所碩士論文。
    林心怡（2003），論全球化時代美國與歐體國際結合管制差異與衝突之緩和，國立台灣大學法律研究所碩士論文。
    ______（2005），論全球化時代美國與歐體國際結合管制差異與衝突之緩和，公平交易季刊，13卷2期，頁101-178。
    林育烽（1998），垂直合併之經濟分析，國立中央大學產業經濟研究所碩士論文。
    林智瑋（2007），結合規範中自我預防及治癒機制之研究—以歐體競爭法為中心，國立臺北大學法學系碩士論文。
    邱德儒（2012），美國水平指導原則之修正對於我國水平結合管制之啟示，國立東華大學財經法律研究所碩士論文。
    侯文賢（2009），我國公平交易法關於結合管制之研究—兼論中國反壟斷法之管制規範，中國文化大學法律學研究所碩士論文。
    張守鈞（1993），個體經濟理論與應用第二冊—產商決策理論與產品市場均衡分析，台北：全英。
    莊春發（2007），論水平結合管制的準則—整體經濟利益與限制競爭不利益，收於：行政院公平交易委員會編，第14屆競爭政策與公平交易學術研討論文集，頁，台北：行政院公平交易委員會。
    莊春發、陳志民（2001），我國家用液化石油氣市場開放後之結合競爭問題與公平交易法之關係，收於：行政院公平交易委員會編，第七屆競爭政策與公平交易法學術研討會論文集，頁，台北：行政院公平交易委員會。
    陳正倉 等（2007），產業經濟學，二版，台北：雙葉。
    黃中信（2008），市場占有率在獨占與結合管制之定位，逢甲大學財經法律研究所碩士論文。
    黃靖元（2006），美國反托拉斯法專利授權案件市場界定之研究，世新大學法學院碩士論文。
    楊宏暉（2001），競爭法對於搭售行為之規範，國立政治大學法律研究所碩士論文。
    詹鎮榮（2011），行政處分附款法制之傳統與革新—從公平交易法上之結合管制出發，公平交易季刊，19卷4期，頁1-57。
    廖義男（1983），西德營業競爭法，國立臺灣大學法學論叢，13卷1期，頁89-131。
    ______（1995），事業結合四則實務之檢討，國立臺灣大學法學論叢，25卷1期，頁17-28。
    ______（1995），憲法與競爭秩序之維護，收於：公平交易法之理論與立法，頁1-11，台北：自版。
    劉孔中（1998），論結合管制之理論及實務，公平交易季刊，6卷2期，頁1-38。
    劉華美（2001），論結合管制，月旦法學雜誌，69期，頁81-100。
    歐陽節（2001），垂直合併的研究：以台灣液化石油氣市場為例，國立中央大學產業經濟研究所。
    顏雅倫（2001），我國結合管制之檢討與前瞻—以金融產業之結合為例，國立台灣大學法律研究所碩士論文。
    蘇欣眉（2007），論美國、歐盟及我國對跨國事業結合之管制，中國文化大學法律學研究所碩士論文。



    外文文獻
    Aghion, Philippe, and Bolton, Patrick. 1987. Contracts as a Barrier to Entry. American Economic Review, 77, 388-401.
    Alese, Femi. 2008. (Fore)closing the Gap: The Commission’s Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines- A " Response" to Simon Bishop. European Competition Law Review,29(3), 196-207.
    Avenel, Eric and Barlet, Corinne. 2000. Vertical Foreclosure, Technological Choice, and Entry on the Intermediate Market. Jounral of Economics and Management Strategy, 9, 211-230.
    Bishop, Simon. 2008. (Fore)Closing the Gap: The Commission’s Draft Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines. European Competition Law Review, 29(1), 1-4.
    Bishop, S., Lofaro, A., Rosati, F., and Young, J. 2005. The Efficiency-Enhancing Effects of Non-Horizontal Mergers. Retrieve from RBB Economics Report 45-48. http://www.edis.sk/ekes/non_horizontal_mergers.pdf
    Bishop, Simon, and Walker, Mike. 2002. The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application, and Measurement. London, U.K.: Sweet & Maxwell/Thomson Reuters.
    Bernheim, B. Douglas and Whinston, Michael D. 1998. Exclusive Dealing. Journal of Political Economy, 106, 64-103.
    Bork, Robert, H. 1978. The Antitrust Paradox, New York, N.Y.: The Free Press.
    Carlton, Dennis W., and Waldman, Michael. 2002. The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries. RAND Journal of Economics, 33, 194-220.
    Choi, J.P. 2003. Antitrust Analysis of Mergers with Bundling in Complementary Markets: Implications for Pricing, Innovation and Compatibility Choice. Retrieve from NET Institute Working Paper #03-02 1-31.http://archive.nyu.edu/bitstream/2451/28380/2/Choi_03-02.pdf
    Church, J. 2004. The Impact of Vertical and Conglomerate Mergers on Competition. Retrieve from Final Report for EC Commission DGMP Directorate B Merger Task Force. http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/studies_reports/merger_impact.pdf
    Cook, John, and Kerse, Christopher. 2009. EC Merger Control. London, U.K.: Sweet & Maxwell.
    Fountoukakos, Kyriakos, and Ryan, Stepehn. 2005. A New Substantive Test for EU Merger Control, European Competition Law Review,6(5), 277-296.
    Goyder, Joanna, and Albors-Llorens, Albertina. 2009. Goyder’s EC Competition Law. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.
    Ilzkovitz, Fabienne, and Meiklejohn, Roderick. 2006. European Merger Control: Do We Need an Efficiency Defense?, In F. Ilzkovitz and R. Meiklejohn (Eds.) European Merger Control: Do We Need An Efficiency Defense? (pp.43-83). Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar.
    Ivaldi, M., Jullien, B., Rey, P., Seabright, P. and Tirole, J. 2003. The Economics of Tacit Collusion. Retrieve from Final Report for DG Competition http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/studies_reports/the_economics_of_tacit_collusion_en.pdf
    Jones, Alison, and Sufrin, Brenda. 2008. EC Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.
    Kocmut, Mitja. 2006. Efficiency Considerations and Merger Control-Quo Vadis. European Competition Law Review, 27(1), 19-27.
    Korah, Valentine. 2008. An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice. Oxford, U.K.: Hart Press.
    Lindsay, Alistar, and Berridge, Alison. 2009. The EC Merger Regulation: Substantive Issues. London, U.K.: Sweet & Maxwell.
    Majumdar, Adrian, et al. 2009. Nokia/NAVTEQ- Navigating the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines. European Competition Law Review, 30(10), 487-490.
    Motta, Massimo. 2004. Competition Policy—Theory and Practice. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
    Nalebuff, B. 2003. Bundling Tying and Portfolio Effect. Retrieve from DTI Economics Paper. http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file14774.pdf
    Neven, D.J. 2005. The Analysis of Conglomerate Effects in EU Merger Control. Retrieve from Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva and CEPR http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/conglomerate.pdf
    Ordover, Janusz A., Saloner, Garth, and Salop, Steven C. 1992. Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure: Reply. American Economic Review,82, 698-703.
    Padilla, Jorge. 2005. Efficiencies in Horizontal Mergers: Williamson Revisited. Competition Law and Policy,1.
    Ramos, A., Mohan, T., and Carloni, F. 2009. Evaluating Vertical Mergers Post Non-Horizontal Guidelines: An Economic-Based Approach?. Global Competition Centre working paper 03/097-8. Retrieve from http://www.coleurop.be/content/gclc/documents/GCLC%20Working%20Paper%2003-09.pdf
    Rasmusen, Eric B., Ramseyer, J. Mark, and Wiley, John S. Jr. 1991. Naked Exclusion. American Economic Reiew, 81, 1137-1145.
    Reckens, An. 2007. Welfare Standard, Substantive Test, and Efficiency Considerations in Merger Policy: Defining the Efficiency Defense. Journal of Competition Law and Economics 3(2), 149-179.
    Ridyard, Derek. 2003. The Role of Economics in European Merger Control. In N. Levy and C. Cook (Eds.), European Merger Control Law: A Guide to the Merger Regulation. Newark, N.J.: LexisNexis.
    Riordan, Michael H. and Salop, Steven C. 1995. Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach. Antitrust Law Review, 63, 513-568.
    Ritter, Lennart, and Braun, W. David. 2005. European Competition Law: A Practitioner’s Guide. Deventer, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law and Taxation.
    Röller, L.-H., Stennek, J., and Verboven, F. 2005. Efficiency Gains from Merger. Retrieve from the Research Institute of Industrial Economics http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/efficiency_gains.pdf
    van Rompuy, B. 2008. The Standard of Proof in EC Merger Control: Conclusion form the Sony BMG Saga. Retrieve from Institute for European studies working paper 4/2008. http://www.ies.be/files/IES%20Working%20Paper%204_Ben%20Van%20Rompuy.pdf
    Rose, Vivien, and Bailey, David. 2008. Bellamy &Child – European Community Law of Competition. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
    Ryan, Stephen A. 2003. Reform of the EU Merger Control System — A Comprehensive Package of Proposals. Competition Policy Newsletter, 1, 9-13.
    Salinger, Michael A. 1991. Vertical Mergers in Multi-Product Industries and Egdeworth`s Paradox of Taxation. Journal of Industrial Economics, 39, 545-556.
    Schwalbe, Ulrich, and Zimmer, Daniel. 2009. Law and Economics in European Merger Control. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
    Simpson, J., and Wickelgren, A. 2001. The Use of Exclusive Contracts to Deter Entry. Retrieve from Federal Trade Commission Working Paper 241. http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp241.pdf
    Spengler, Joseph J. 1950. Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy. Journal of Political Economy, 58, 347-352.
    Stefandis, Christoduolos. 1998. Selective Contracts, Foreclosure, and the Chicago School View. Journal of Law and Economics,2, 429-450.
    Svetlicinii, Alexandr. 2007. Assessment of the Non-Horizontal Mergers: Is there a Chance for the Efficiency Defense in Merger Control?. European Competition Law Review, 28 (10), 529-538.
    Voigt, Stefan, and Schmidt, André. 2005. Making European Merger Policy More Predictable, Boston, MA: Springer.
    Volcker, Sven B. and O’Daly, Cormac. 2006. The Court of First Instance’s Impala Judgment: A Judicial Counter-Reformation in EU Merger Control. European Competition Law Review.27(11) 589-596.
    Weck, Thomas, and Scheidtmann, Andre. 2008. Non-Horizontal Mergers in the Common Market: Assessment under the Commission’s Guidelines and Beyond. European Competition Law Review, 29(8), 480-489.
    Werden, Gregory J., and Froeb, Luke M. 1996. Simulation as an Alternative to Structural Merger Policy in Differentiated Products Industry. In M. B. Coate and A. N. Kleit (Eds.), The Economics of the Antitrust Process, Boston, M.A.: Kluwer Academic Publishers .
    Whish, Richard. 2008. Competition Law, Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
    Whinston, Michael D. 1990. Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion. American Economic Reiew, 80, 837-859.
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    法律學系
    95651027
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0095651027
    数据类型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202101099
    显示于类别:[法律學系] 學位論文

    文件中的档案:

    档案 描述 大小格式浏览次数
    102701.pdf6795KbAdobe PDF2195检视/开启


    在政大典藏中所有的数据项都受到原著作权保护.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏，無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用，惟仍請適度，合理使用本網站之內容，以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用，則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

    2.本網站之製作，已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益，如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者，請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw)，維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - 回馈