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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/136311


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    題名: 高階經理人薪酬與債務資金成本之關聯：以臺灣上市櫃公司為例
    Relationship between Executive Compensation and Cost of Debt: Evidence from Listed Companies in Taiwan
    作者: 謝旻軒
    Hsieh, Min-Hsuan
    貢獻者: 徐愛恩
    Tsui, Ai-An
    謝旻軒
    Hsieh, Min-Hsuan
    關鍵詞: 債務資金成本
    高階經理人薪酬
    經理人持股比例
    公司治理機制
    Cost of debt
    Executive compensation
    Managerial ownership
    Corporate governance mechanisms
    日期: 2021
    上傳時間: 2021-08-04 14:33:23 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 近年來，經理人薪酬成為熱門討論議題，許多肥貓企業也紛紛浮上檯面。本研究之目的在於探討企業高階經理人薪酬之結構與其債務資金成本之關聯性，並檢視不同的經理人持股比例是否對於其債務資金成本之高低亦有影響。本文以代理理論為基礎，利用2016年至2019年期間台灣的上市櫃公司為樣本。實證結果顯示，在其他條件不變下，薪資結構中有較高現金基礎誘因薪酬的公司有較低的債務資金成本。有較高經理人持股比例之企業亦傾向有較低之債務資金成本。
    This study examines how executive compensation affects the cost of debt financing. Using management pay data from Taiwan, companies with higher cash-like incentive compensation in the salary structure have lower costs of debt, ceteris paribus. Moreover, this study provides evidence that companies with higher managerial ownership tend to have lower debt costs. The result suggests that executive compensation and managerial stock ownership can be used when determining credit terms.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    108353111
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108353111
    資料類型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202100746
    顯示於類別:[會計學系] 學位論文

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