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| Title: | 薪酬委員會與高階經理人薪酬之關聯--控制股東的影響
When controlling shareholders control the seats do they control manager’s compensation? : The role of controlling shareholders plays in selecting compensation committee |
| Authors: | 莊朝宇
Chuang, Chao-Yu |
| Contributors: | 徐愛恩
莊朝宇
Chuang, Chao-Yu |
| Keywords: | 代理問題
控制股東
席次盈餘偏離
薪酬委員會
Agency problem
Controlling shareholders
Deviation of control right and cash flow right
Compensation committee |
| Date: | 2021 |
| Issue Date: | 2021-08-04 14:31:11 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 我國公司股權結構主要為集中型，主要代理問題存在於控制股東與少數股東之間，卻參考美國為解決經理人與股東間之代理問題之作法。我國金管會強制上市櫃公司於2011年底設置薪酬委員會，期望增加高階經理人薪酬之合理性及透明度。因此，本研究探討我國借鏡美國公司治理，設置薪酬委員會是否能夠有效解決我國控制股東與少數股東間之代理問題。
本研究以我國2005年至2019年上市櫃公司為樣本。研究結果顯示，我國設置薪酬委員會無法增加高階經理人薪酬與公司績效之關聯性，亦無法降低其薪酬受席次盈餘偏離之影響。然，當席次盈餘偏離程度較低時，設置薪酬委員會可以提升高階經理人薪酬與公司績效之關聯性，但仍無法降低受到席次盈餘偏離之影響。綜合來說，當控制股東與少數股東之間利益較一致時，薪酬委員會較能發揮其效果，增加高階經理人薪酬績效敏感性。但不論席次盈餘偏離程度，均無法透過設置薪酬委員會解決控制股東與少數股東之間的代理問題。
The shareholding structure of Taiwanese companies is mainly centralized, and the main agency problem is between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders; nevertheless, most Taiwanese companies adopt the US approach which solve the agency problem between managers and shareholders to mitigate the conflict. Financial Supervisory Commission forced Taiwanese listed companies to set up compensation committee at the end of 2011 with the expectation to increase the rationality and transparency of manager’s compensation. This study investigates the effectiveness of the compensation committee to solve the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.
Based on a sample of Taiwanese listed companies from 2005 to 2019, the results indicate that the compensation committee cannot increase the correlation between the manager’s compensation and company performance, nor can it reduce the impact of the deviation of control right and cash flow right. However, when the degree of deviation of control right and cash flow right is low, compensation committee can increase the correlation between the manager’s compensation and company performance while impact of the deviation of control right and cash flow right still cannot be reduced. In conclusion, when the interests of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders are more consistent, the compensation committee can better exert its effect and increase the manager’s pay-performance sensitivity. Regardless of the degree of deviation of control right and cash flow right, the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders cannot be solved by setting up a compensation committee. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
108353035 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108353035 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| DOI: | 10.6814/NCCU202100684 |
| Appears in Collections: | [會計學系] 學位論文
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