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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/136292


    Title: 獨立董事與經理人能力之關聯
    The Association Between Independent Directors and Managerial Ability
    Authors: 廖若晴
    Contributors: 潘健民
    廖若晴
    Keywords: 獨立董事
    經理人能力
    Independent director
    Managerial ability
    Date: 2021
    Issue Date: 2021-08-04 14:29:43 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 為了提高公司透明度及公司效率，主管機關在公司治理的範疇中，額外發展出了獨立董事的監管機制，獨立董事除了對公司經營面能達到監督效果，對於公司的經理人人選也會有所影響。本研究以2005至2019年之東京證券交易所上市公司為研究對象，旨在探討獨立董事的設置與公司經理人的能力之關聯。
    本研究透過獨立董事的有無及獨立董事的比例，此兩項作為指標去衡量其對經理人能力之影響。實證結果發現，當公司有獨立董事時，經理人能力是會較高的。同時也發現，獨立董事的比例與經理人能力之間是呈現正相關的。在後續的追加測試中也發現，若獨立董事有證券業及保險業相關背景時，經理人能力也是較高的。
    In an effort to improve corporate efficiency and financial transparency , government authorities have developed a mechanism, independent directors, to improve corporate governance. The role of independent directors is designed to monitor the operations of the firms to enhance corporate governance. . Using data from firms listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2019, this paper investigates and aims to explore the association between independent directors and managerial ability.
    This paper uses two measures to examine the association between independent directors and managerial ability: (1) the exisitence of independent directors; and (2) the ratio of independent directors in board. The results show that when managerial ability is likely to be higher when the firm has independent directors in the board. The results also identify a positive association between the ratio of independent directors and managerial ability.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    108353018
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108353018
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202100697
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Accounting] Theses

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