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    Title: 政府的政策效果評估 —以中國金融與汽車產業為例
    The Effect of Government Policy —Evidence from China’s Finance and Vehicles Industries
    Authors: 姚煒
    Yao, Wei
    Contributors: 胡偉民
    Hu, Wei-Min
    姚煒
    Yao, Wei
    Keywords: 政府政策評估
    金融業
    汽車產業
    Government Policy
    Financial Industry
    Vehicles Industry
    Date: 2021
    Issue Date: 2021-03-02 14:46:43 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 第一篇文章利用中國企業層面調查資料,研究了地方政府在私營企業向銀行申請貸款過程中所起的作用。實證結果表明,地方政府提供貸款幫助可以顯著提高私營企業獲得貸款的可能性和貸款規模,而且這一效果在銀行融資困難程度更加嚴重的組別中更強。此外,有證據顯示地方政府的説明行為在一定程度上可以改善銀行部門的信貸配置效率。
    第二篇文章利用2013年起中國所進行的近些年來最大規模的反腐敗工作來驗證其對於中國黨政機關公務用車採購的影響,我們利用中國大陸在2009-2013年的中國汽車登錄數據以及difference-in-difference的方法估計反腐敗工作對於黨政機關公務用車銷量的影響。實證結果發現,在中共中央紀委宣布中央巡視組進行各省反腐敗工作巡視之後才是真正意義上政府反腐敗工作的開始,這也提供了研究政府反腐敗工作成效的一個實證機會,結果表明,黨政機關公務用車的採購在政府公佈限購清單政策之後並無明顯效果,反而是在政府真正開始反腐敗運動之後才有了顯著的政策效果。
    The first article investigates the role of local government in the process of private enterprises securing bank loans by using a survey of private enterprises in China. We find that local government help significantly increases the likelihood of private firms obtaining bank credit and the size of bank loans. Especially, such effect is much stronger when it is more difficult for firms to obtain bank loans. We also provide some evidence that local government help can to some extent improve the credit allocation efficiency of the banking sector.
    The second article investigates the effects of a national anti-corruption policy in China focused on the purchase of official vehicles by using Chinese car purchase data from 2009 to 2013, difference-in-differences analysis shows that announcement of inspections of provincial governments by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) on May 17, 2013 has effect on government official vehicles purchase, while having no effect after announcement of purchasing limitations policy.
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    Description: 博士
    國立政治大學
    財政學系
    104255505
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0104255505
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202100374
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 學位論文

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