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    题名: Shapley value衡量的股權結構與資本支出之關聯
    The relationship between equity structure as measured by Shapley value and capital expenditure
    作者: 林盛冠
    Lin, Sheng-Kuan
    贡献者: 蕭明福
    Shaw, Ming-Fu
    林盛冠
    Lin, Sheng-Kuan
    关键词: 大股東
    追蹤資料
    資本支出
    Shapley value
    Tobin`s Q
    日期: 2020
    上传时间: 2020-09-02 12:45:51 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本文將台灣上市公司大股東分成內部大股東及外部大股東兩類，並且為了減少股東股份所有權原始數據與其真實影響力之間的差距，於是將股份所有權轉化為Shapley value來衡量，發現內外部大股東與公司資本支出的相互關係為 : 內部大股東與公司資本支出的關係為負相關，外部大股東與公司資本資出的關係為正相關。而若比較股東股份所有權未轉化及轉化為Shapley value前後所得出迴歸結果之差異，可以發現到說，Shapley value可有效縮小股份原始數據與其真實影響力之間的差距，不會因其原始數據絕對數量的大小，造成迴歸結果出現矛盾。
    此外，本文也依照Tobin’s Q的高低將公司分類，進一步進行股東股份所有權與公司資本支出變動率的分組迴歸。迴歸結果顯示，內部大股東與公司資本支出變動率的關係，會隨著公司Q值的提升而傾向更強烈的負相關，這可能與台灣擁有眾多家族企業有關；外部大股東則是與之相反，隨著公司Q值的提升，其與公司資本變動率的正相關關係會愈來愈強烈，推測是與投資人會依照公司前景來做選擇，在多承受相同的風險下，高成長公司會比低成長公司較受投資人的青睞。
    除此之外，本文也將產業依主計處分類標準，個別分類進行迴歸，發現本文之模型較適合運用在衡量傳統行業，例如 : 紡織、食品製造、營建工程等；但在衡量另外一些產業可能就不是那麼合適，例如 : 航空運輸、資訊服務或批發業等，推測與產業興盛的先後有關。
    另外在財務指標的方面，發現到說，槓桿比率在不同公司間的效用有相異的情形，在Q值小的公司，槓桿越高，資本變動率越低；相反的，Q值高的公司，槓桿越高，資本變動率越高，公司可能會比較積極的去做一些新的投資計劃。除此之外，在公司投資機會低時，也就是Q值不高的情況下，公司的資本支出會與公司規模大小呈顯著負相關，表示說小公司可能會因資訊相對的不透明，或者監督機制發揮的困難，而導致公司會有過度投資的情況。
    參考文獻: 一、中文參考文獻
    王振寰、溫肇東 (2011)， 《家族企業還重要嗎? 》，新北市:巨流圖書。
    王育偉、鄭揚耀 (2013)， 「公司治理、資本支出決策與公司價值」，《管理與系統》，20(4)，665-695。
    林嬋娟、張哲嘉 (2009)， 「董監事異常變動、家族企業與企業舞弊之關聯」，《會計評論》，48(1)，1-33。
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    經濟學系
    107258020
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107258020
    数据类型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202001411
    显示于类别:[經濟學系] 學位論文

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