政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/131782

政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/131782

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政大典藏 > College of Social Science > Department of Economics > Theses > Item 140.119/131782

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/131782

Title:	探討既有航空公司嚇阻策略的有效性：以美國西南航空為例 The effectiveness of incumbents` entry deterrence strategies: Evidence from the Southwest Airlines
Authors:	陳以倫 Chen, Yi-Lun
Contributors:	江品慧陳以倫 Chen, Yi-Lun
Keywords:	航空市場進入嚇阻策略 Airline industry Entry Entry deterrence
Date:	2020
Issue Date:	2020-09-02 12:45:16 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	本文以美國西南航空(Southwest Airlines)為例，以潛在進入者的角度探討既有航空公司嚇阻策略的有效性。先依序討論從形成威脅到觀察進入的區間長短不同下，既有航空公司之嚇阻策略是否是影響西南航空進入的重要因素。接著將資料分為兩期，第1期為1993年Q1到2004年Q4，第2期則是2005年Q1到2019年Q3，分析不同期嚇阻策略有效性的差異。　　本研究發現:(一)從形成威脅到觀察進入的區間長短不同，除了既有航空公司嚇阻策略有效性有所差異，影響西南航空是否進入的市場特性變數和自身市場特性變數也有所差異。(二)既有航空公司在第2期採取降價或增加產能之嚇阻策略都相對第1期更為有效。(三)既有航空公司採取增加產能之嚇阻策略相對降價之嚇阻策略有效。　　In this paper, we adopt the model of city-pair entry for Southwest Airlines, standing in a potential entrant`s perspective, to discuss the effectiveness of incumbents` entry deterrence strategies. We estimate whether　incumbents` entry deterrence matters for Southwest Airlines under different time intervals from threat of entry to observe entry. We also divide our data into two periods: the first period is from 1993 Q1 to 2004 Q4, and the second period is from 2005 Q1 to 2019 Q3, to compare the effectiveness of the incumbents` entry deterrence strategies between these two periods. 　　We find that under different intervals from threat of entry to entry, not only the effectiveness of incumbents` entry deterrence strategies are different, but market-specific variables and carrier-market-specific variables affecting whether Southwest Airlines enters the market are distinct. Our results also suggest that incumbents` entry deterrence strategies works better in period 2, rather than period 1. Moreover, incumbents` entry deterrence strategy of capacity expansion is more effective than that of price reduction.
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Description:	碩士國立政治大學經濟學系 107258005
Source URI:	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107258005
Data Type:	thesis
DOI:	10.6814/NCCU202001284
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Economics] Theses

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