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    題名: 盈餘串、經理人過度自信與分析師跟隨
    無
    作者: 蕭琬琳
    貢獻者: 林禹銘
    蕭琬琳
    關鍵詞: 盈餘串
    經理人過度自信
    分析師跟隨
    Earnings strings
    Analyst following
    CEO overconfidence
    日期: 2020
    上傳時間: 2020-09-02 11:41:16 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 盈餘串的形成，為公司經營成果的鮮明特徵，而分析師身為企業信息中介者，有助於提升資本市場整體效率，角色不可或缺；本文首先探討盈餘串與分析師跟隨行為之關聯性。此外，過度自信為經理人普遍存在的個人特質，對企業影響甚鉅，本文繼而探討經理人過度自信與盈餘串之間的關聯，以及經理人過度自信是否會影響分析師跟隨意願。本文以北美地區2004年至2018年上市櫃公司為樣本，實證結果發現，具有盈餘串之公司分析師跟隨數目較多；而經理人之過度自信與盈餘串形成及分析師跟隨數目，皆呈正向關係。本文除可作為盈餘串、分析師跟隨，以及經理人過度自信相關文獻之補充，而以上重要議題實證結果，在實務上亦具有參考價值。
    The formation of earnings strings is a distinctive characteristic for a firm. Besides, analyst serves as an information intermediary role in capital market. This study first focuses on these two important issues and examines the relation between earnings strings and analyst followings. Additionally, overconfidence is a common personal characteristic among CEOs. This study then investigates the association between CEO overconfidence and earnings string, and whether CEO overconfidence will affect analyst following. Based on the samples of US-listed companies from 2004 to 2018, this study shows that enterprises with earnings strings or an overconfident CEO have more analyst followings. Moreover, CEO overconfidence has positive effect on earnings strings. The empirical results in this study could supplement the relevant literatures and provide the reference for the field of practices.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    107353030
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107353030
    資料類型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202001180
    顯示於類別:[會計學系] 學位論文

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