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    Title: 關係人之性質對審計公費及盈餘品質之影響
    The Impact of the Nature of Related Parties on Audit Fee and Earnings Quality
    Authors: 王泓文
    Wang, Hung-Wen
    Contributors: 周玲臺
    Chou, Ling-Tai Lynette
    王泓文
    Wang, Hung-Wen
    Keywords: 關係人性質
    審計公費
    盈餘品質
    Nature of related parties
    Audit fee
    Earnings quality
    Date: 2020
    Issue Date: 2020-09-02 11:40:55 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究以我國關係人交易頻繁之上市櫃電子公司為研究對象,分別將關係人銷貨交易及關係人進貨交易二項類別,針對審計公費以及盈餘品質二大議題討論,並且參考Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2017)之分類方法手工蒐集各交易對象之關係人交易,亦即區分為直接投資關係人以及非直接投資關係人兩群。首先,以審計公費衡量查核人員的審計努力與投入,探討不同交易對象對於查核人員的查核規劃之影響,發現直接投資關係人銷貨及進貨交易皆呈顯著正向關係,亦即直接投資關係人交易正面影響查核人員之查核努力與投入,但非直接投資關係人交易則未有顯著證據。再者,以裁決性應計項目之絕對值作為衡量盈餘品質之代理變數,探討不同交易對象對於盈餘品質之影響,發現與非直接投資關係人之進貨交易及直接投資關係人之銷貨交易傷害盈餘品質之證據,隱含查核人員的審計努力與投入,並無法完全消除公司利用非直接投資關係人進貨交易與直接投資關係人銷貨交易,以進行盈餘管理之效果。
    This study investigates audit fee and earnings quality of listed electronic companies with frequent related party transactions in Taiwan. We use the classification method of Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2017) to hand-collect related party transactions and their counterparties, which are divided into two groups: business related parties and non-business related parties. First of all, we use audit fees to measure audit efforts, and investigate how different related transaction counterparties may impact on auditors’ audit planning. We find that the sales and purchase transactions with business related parties have significant positive relationships with audit fees, that is, auditors enhance their examination of business related party transactions. In addition, absolute discretionary accruals are used as a proxy for earnings quality to test the effect of the nature of related parties. Our empirical results show that the purchase transactions with non-business related parties and the sales transactions with business related parties are harmful to earnings quality, implying that no evidence supports audit efforts completely constrain companies’ earnings management behavior through purchase transactions with non-business related parties and sales transactions with business related parties.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    107353019
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107353019
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202001697
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Accounting] Theses

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