政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/131186

政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/131186

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政大機構典藏 > 社會科學學院 > 財政學系 > 學位論文 > Item 140.119/131186

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題名:	移動性資本對公共政策之影響 The Impact of Mobile Capital on Public Policy
作者:	趙珮涵 Chao, Pei-Han
貢獻者:	賴育邦 Lai, Yu-Bong 趙珮涵 Chao, Pei-Han
關鍵詞:	租稅競爭環境政策外溢效果資本稅租稅天堂租稅查緝 tax competition environmental policy spillover effect capital tax tax haven tax enforcement
日期:	2020
上傳時間:	2020-08-03 18:13:04 (UTC+8)
摘要:	本文採用兩地區多階段模型，探討政府以不同公共政策競爭移動性資本時，對社會福利之影響。在兩地區政府先後訂定合作之租稅與環境政策時，均衡資本稅率及污染排放配俄水準均具效率。而當兩地區政府先合作訂定環境政策，再分別訂定資本稅率時，各地區政府合作訂定之污染排放標準具效率，但當分權決定資本稅率時，各地區為吸引資本移入，訂定之均衡資本稅率低於最適水準，公共財提供不足。當兩地區政府共同決定租稅歧視政策後，再分別訂定各地區之資本稅率時，各地區政府為提高聯合社會福利，將極大化租稅歧視程度，提供移動資本租稅優惠，降低移動資本之有效稅率。而租稅歧視程度擴大亦使均衡資本稅率高於傳統租稅競爭文獻，說明租稅天堂的存在可能對社會福利提升有正面影響，並緩解租稅競爭導致向下沉淪情形。此外，在兩地區政府先合作訂定資本稅率，而租稅查緝程度則由各地區自行訂定下，兩地區政府為極大化聯合福利水準，會將資本稅率訂在最高的水準，剝奪固定資本之資本報酬。但各地區政府對移動資本之均衡租稅查緝程度過於寬鬆，導致最適公共財提供水準不足。 The dissertation is based on a setting with a sequential game between two symmetric jurisdictions. I intend to discuss the impact of the jurisdictions competing for mobile capital on social welfare with different public policies. I find that when jurisdictions cooperate in both the tax and the environmental policies, the two policies are set efficiently. In the case that governments choose non-cooperative capital tax rates after deciding coordinated environmental policy, the coordinated environmental standards will be set at the optimal level. However, the governments would set the capital tax rate suboptimally low in order to compete for mobile capital, leading the public goods underprovided. In the case that governments coordinate the tax discrimination policy first and then choose the capital tax rates non-cooperatively, the government will set the tax preferences given to mobile capital firms at the highest level, and hence lower the effective tax rate of mobile capital. The finding that the government would be lenient to multinational firms could suggest that the equilibrium capital tax rate is higher than the result derived from traditional tax competition literature. The result implies the existence of tax havens can enhance global welfare, and mitigate the race to the bottom in public goods provision due to tax competition. When the tax enforcement level in different jurisdictions is set respectively, even though the governments cooperate in the tax policy, the public goods provision is still below the optimal level. Although coordination in tax policy leads to a high capital tax rate, which deprives the net return from immobile capital, the governments will loosen the tax enforcement requirement on the mobile capital in order to discriminate mobile capital from immobile capital.
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描述:	博士國立政治大學財政學系 101255501
資料來源:	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101255501
資料類型:	thesis
DOI:	10.6814/NCCU202001031
顯示於類別:	[財政學系] 學位論文

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