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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/130613


    Title: 企業策略、政治關聯與稅務風險
    Business Strategy, Corporate Political Connections, and Tax Risk
    Authors: 陳妍君
    Chen, Yan-Jyun
    Contributors: 何怡澄
    郭振雄
    陳妍君
    Chen, Yan-Jyun
    Keywords: 稅務風險
    企業策略
    政治關聯
    Tax risk
    Business strategy
    Corporate political connections
    Date: 2020
    Issue Date: 2020-07-01 13:54:59 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本篇研究目標為企業策略、政治關聯與稅務風險的關聯性，以 1999 年至 2013 年間臺灣的上市櫃公司為研究對象，參考 Miles and Snow (1978, 2003) 的策略分類法，將企業分為穩健者、分析者及先驅者三種類型，並將政治關聯變數依政治影響力逐漸累加，藉此探討不同政治關聯分類與不同企業策略型態之交互作用對未來稅務風險的影響。

    實證結果發現：第一，穩健者型企業與稅務風險不具關聯性；先驅者型企業與稅務風險呈顯著正相關，且其稅務風險程度高於穩健者，代表企業策略形態越接近先驅者（穩健者），其稅務風險程度越高（低）。第二，政治關聯與稅務風險不具關聯性。第三，政治關聯不會降低穩健者的稅務風險，但會降低先驅者的稅務風險，顯示政治關聯可以幫助先驅者型企業在選擇更具風險的避稅策略時，降低租稅法規適用的不確定性及查核方面的稅務風險，因此相較於沒有政治關聯的先驅者型企業，有政治關聯的先驅者型企業其稅務風險較低。第四，工具變數法的實證結果亦顯示，在解決內生性問題後，即使董事政治關聯的定義擴大至涵蓋全部政府職位，企業董事會成員亦會降低先驅者的稅務風險程度，表示建立政治關聯也是一種企業策略，透過選任具政治影響力的人擔任董、監事或獨立董事，可以降低企業的稅務風險。
    This paper investigates the relationship between business strategies, corporate political connection, and tax risk, using the listed company in Taiwan from 1999 to 2013. Using Miles and Snow`s (1978, 2003) theoretical business strategy framework, we separate our sample into Defender, Analyzer, and Prospectors strategy types, and gradually accumulates corporate political connection variables according to their political influence. We then examine whether the association between different strategy types and tax risk differ across different corporate political connections.

    The empirical results show that: first, the relation between Defenders and tax risks are not significant. On the other hand, Prospectors are positively related to tax risk, suggest that Prospectors not only engage in more tax avoidance but do so in more risky, uncertain ways (Higgins et al., 2015). Second, the relationship between corporate political connections and tax risks are not significant. Third, corporate political connections can reduce the tax risks of Prospectors by bringing lower detection risk and obtaining critical information regarding future changes in tax codes or the strictness of tax enforcement (Dyreng et al., 2019).

    The empirical results of the instrumental variable method also show that after solving the endogenous problem, even if the definition of corporate political connections is extended to cover all government positions, the members of the company ’s board of directors still can reduce the tax risk of the Prospectors, indicating that establishing political connections is also a kind of business strategies. By selecting people with political influence as the company ’s board of directors, supervisors, or independent directors, the tax risk of the enterprise can be reduced.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政學系
    106255012
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106255012
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202000530
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Public Finance] Theses

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