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    题名: 從高低情緒強度探討不同情緒調節策略在道德兩難中的效果
    Investigating the effect of different emotion regulation strategies in high and low emotional intensity moral dilemmas
    作者: 黃文希
    Huang, Wen-Hsi
    贡献者: 顏乃欣
    Yen, Nai-Shing
    黃文希
    Huang, Wen-Hsi
    关键词: 道德兩難
    道義取向
    功利取向
    情緒調節
    情緒強度
    膚電反應
    Moral dilemmas
    Deontological
    Utilitarian
    Emotion regulation
    Emotional intensity
    Skin conductance responses
    日期: 2020
    上传时间: 2020-07-01 13:49:27 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 在道德兩難中，人們經常在道義取向與功利取向之間做抉擇。道德判斷的雙重歷程理論認為道義選擇涉及情感直覺的歷程，而功利選擇則涉及審慎思考的歷程。先前相關研究發現，情緒調節的使用會影響人們在道德兩難中的決策偏好(Feinberg et al., 2012; Lee & Gino, 2015; Szekely & Miu, 2015)。除此之外，根據歷程特定時間假設的觀點，個體的認知資源有限，而有限的容量會影響不同情緒調節策略的效果。具體而言，在高情緒強度下，重新評估的使用須佔用較多認知資源以進行語意處理，因此效果會受到影響而降低；而分心的使用依然能夠在早期完全阻擋情緒訊息的進入，因此效果並不會受到太大的影響。故，本研究的目標在於透過道德判斷的雙重歷程理論與歷程特定時間假設來探討人們在道德兩難中的決策行為。本研究預期：在低情緒強度的道德兩難中，分心或重新評估的使用皆能有效降低人們的情緒強度，進而偏好做出功利選擇；而在高情緒強度的道德兩難中，只有分心的使用能有效降低人們的情緒強度，並偏好做出功利選擇。實驗一的結果顯示，在高、低情緒強度的道德兩難中，使用分心、重新評估或表達抑制的實驗參與者在主觀情緒強度上皆有明顯降低，但只有使用分心或重新評估的實驗參與者偏好做出功利選擇。實驗二加入膚電反應與心跳反應作為情緒的生理指標，結果顯示，在高、低情緒強度的道德兩難中，使用分心或重新評估的實驗參與者在主觀上與生理上，其情緒強度皆有明顯降低，並偏好做出功利選擇；相對地，使用表達抑制的實驗參與者並未表現出上述現象。綜合以上的實驗結果，本研究基本上支持道德判斷的雙重歷程理論：人們若能有效降低在道德兩難中感受到的情緒強度，將偏好做出功利選擇。而本研究不完全支持歷程特定時間假設：在高情緒強度的道德兩難中，使用重新評估的實驗參與者仍然可以有效降低其情緒強度，並偏好做出功利選擇。
    In moral dilemma studies, people often have to make a binary choice between two different courses of action: deontological or utilitarian. Dual process theory of moral judgment suggested that deontological decisions are driven by automatic emotional processes while utilitarian decisions are driven by controlled cognitive processes. Previous studies found that emotion regulation strategies can affect people`s decision inclinations in moral dilemmas. In addition, according to the process-specific timing hypothesis, individuals have limited cognitive resources, and it will affect the effectiveness of different regulation strategies. More specifically, under high emotional intensity condition, compared to distraction, reappraisal requires a large amount of cognitive resources to regulate emotions, so its efficacy is being affected. Therefore, the aim of present research is to explore people’s decision-making preferences in moral dilemmas through the dual process theory of moral judgment and the process-specific timing hypothesis. The present study attempted to predict in low emotional intensity dilemmas, people using distraction or reappraisal can effectively reduce their emotional arousal and make more utilitarian choices; while in high emotional intensity dilemmas, only people using distraction can successfully reduce their emotional arousal and make more utilitarian choices. In experiment 1, the results showed that regardless of high or low emotional intensity dilemmas, participants using distraction, reappraisal or suppression reduced their subjective emotional arousal, but only participants using distraction or reappraisal were more likely to make utilitarian choices. In experiment 2 including skin conductance responses (SCRs) and heart rate as physiological indicators, the results revealed that regardless of high or low emotional intensity dilemmas, participants using distraction or reappraisal reduced their subjective and physiological arousal, and they preferred to make utilitarian choices. By contrast, participants using suppression didn’t reduce their physiological arousal and make more utilitarian choices. To sum up, the present study supported the dual process theory of moral judgment and not fully supported the process-specific timing hypothesis. On one hand, participants using distraction or reappraisal can successfully reduce the emotional arousal in moral dilemmas and make more utilitarian choices. On the other hand, in high emotional intensity conditions, participants using reappraisal still can reduce the emotional arousal in moral dilemmas and make more utilitarian choices.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    心理學系
    105752010
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0105752010
    数据类型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202000493
    显示于类别:[心理學系] 學位論文

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