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| Title: | 以競合觀點探討創投與新創團隊的互動
Exploring the Interaction Between Venture Capitalists and Entrepreneurs from the Perspective of Co-opetition |
| Authors: | 夏寧
Hsia, Ning |
| Contributors: | 吳豐祥
Wu, Feng-Shang
夏寧
Hsia, Ning |
| Keywords: | 創投
新創團隊
競合
互動
Venture capitalist
Entrepreneur
Co-opetition
Interaction |
| Date: | 2019 |
| Issue Date: | 2020-05-05 12:01:07 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 自二十世紀下半葉開始，創投產業的誕生為相對缺乏資源的新創公司帶來高速成長的契機，雙方緊密的投資互動替新創事業的影響力帶來加乘作用，為跨國的科技、經濟、社會帶來巨大而全面地翻轉，當今名聲響亮的大型企業在曾經是小型新創公司時，背後幾乎都有創投在背後給予資金、連結人脈，令人不禁想一探究竟雙方互動關係的本質與特色，以對於此投資模式有更多的認識。
過往學界對於創投與新創的關係主要以監督、控制為中心的代理人理論出發，或是揣摩雙方合作與不合作動機的囚犯困境理論，以及從正面角度探討雙方如何增強合作信心的信任理論出發來描繪其互動特徵。
本研究跳脫過往理論觀點，觀察到創投與新創團隊的投資行為屬於合作關係，但由於雙方在投資協議過程中不可避免地會為了經濟利益與公司控制權等相關權利義務進行談判，又創投投資的模式相對一般公開市場融資方式，有高度參與新創事業發展的行為，在投資後管理階段易與新創公司有更多的互動，因而容易有意見不一致的衝突與拉扯產生，因此雙方的關係並非只是純粹的合作，而是同時有合作與競爭的因子存於其中。故本研究選擇以競合觀點切入，試圖回答下列三項研究問題：(1)創投與新創團隊的關係是否能被競合關係描述或解釋？(2)雙方合作過程中，什麼事件會導致彼此意見分歧與彼此目標的不一致？(3)如何降低雙方競合關係中的競爭程度，並提高合作程度？
本研究屬於探索性研究，適合採用深入的質性研究取向，因此以深度訪談法分別訪談了四位創投投資人與四位新創創辦人，並將其回答的逐字稿以紮根理論法的譯碼方式對雙方的互動現象作歸納式的整理。
本研究所得到的結論如下：
1. 創投與新創事業間的互動關係可以被競合理論描述，雙方是為了共創價值而選擇進入競合關係，且新創方對於競合特性的存在相對於創投方有更強烈的感受，此競合關係會跨越時間而持續有動態變化，甚至有助於提升新創公司經營績效。
2. 創投與新創團隊之間會在新創估值、股權分配、董事席次、人事安排、相關權利、公司發展方向上出現競爭行為，其競爭結果易對新創方的核心事業造成重大影響。
3. 創投與新創團隊於投資評估時，若能提前溝通對於投資條件的期待以及退場機制，將有助於降低期待落差，且雙方若能適時站在對方角度設想，將有助於提昇雙方合作程度。
4. 當創投方願意尊重新創團隊自決和給予團隊容錯空間，或是當新創團隊成員具有募資經驗者，將有助於提昇雙方合作程度。
本論文最後並提出研究結果的學術貢獻、實務意涵與後續研究建議。
Over the past two decades, the relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs is mainly investigated by scholars based on three major theories: (1) agency theory, focusing on the supervision and control behavior; (2) prisoner’s dilemma theory, trying to figure out the incentives and decisions of whether to cooperate or not for both sides; and a more positive perspective – (3) trust and confidence theory, explaining how to enhance the confidence in cooperation.
However, the study argues that there is another way to depict their relationship. Although the interactive behavior between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs can be regarded as cooperation, there still exists inevitable bargaining in economic interest and the right of control during the period of deal structuring. Moreover, venture capitalists are usually more participative in investing new ventures compared to other financing institutions, giving rise to divergent opinion or even conflict during the stage of post-investment. As a result, the relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs is not just cooperation. Instead, they cooperate and compete simultaneously.
The study examines several research problems from the co-opetition perspective. First, could the relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs be described as coopetition? Second, during the cooperation process, what are the major situations which would result in diverging opinions and partially congruent interest? Third, how to decrease the degree of competition and increase the degree of cooperation between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs?
This research has its nature of exploration. Thus, adopting a qualitative case study approach for the investigation is appropriate. Through the coding method of grounded theory, we interviewed four venture capitalists and four entrepreneurs. The preliminary conclusions include: (1) The relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs can be described as co-opetition. Both sides decide to be involved in the relationship because they want to create value together. In addition, entrepreneurs are more sensitive to the co-opetition than venture capitalists. Furthermore, the co-opetition between them will have dynamic changes as time goes by, and it may have positive impact to the performance of the ventures. (2) Venture capitalists and entrepreneurs compete with each other mainly on the venture’s valuation, equity distribution, the numbers of the board of directors, personnel arrangements and venture’s strategic direction. In addition, the outcomes of the competition will have great impact on the venture’s core businesses. (3) If the venture capitalists and entrepreneurs can negotiate on the expectation of the term sheet and exit method in advance during the investment evaluation stage, the expectation gap between them can be reduced. Moreover, if both parties can put themselves into the other’s shoes, then the degree of cooperation between them can be increased. (4) If venture capitalists can respect the self-determination of-, and leave a certain room of making mistakes to entrepreneurs, and the members of new venture team possess the experiences of fund raising, then the cooperation between them can be enhanced.
Finally, the thesis is provided with theoretical contribution, implication for practices, and the suggestions for future research. |
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三、 網路資料
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https://findit.org.tw/upload/research/research_20180720010.pdf(2019/8/15) |
| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
科技管理與智慧財產研究所
107364102 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107364102 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| DOI: | 10.6814/NCCU202000418 |
| Appears in Collections: | [科技管理與智慧財產研究所] 學位論文
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