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| Title: | 衡量中美兩強競爭對亞太中小型國家的經濟衝擊
Evaluating the economic impacts of US-China competition on small and medium countries in the Asia-Pacific region |
| Authors: | 江宜芬
Chiang, Yi-Fen |
| Contributors: | 王信實
Wang, Shinn-Shyr
江宜芬
Chiang, Yi-Fen |
| Keywords: | 國家權力
中等強國
抗衡
扈從
避險
亞太地區
貿易依存度
state power
middle power
balancing
bandwagoning
hedging
Asia-Pacific Region
trade dependence |
| Date: | 2019 |
| Issue Date: | 2020-01-03 16:02:27 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 在國際政治中的權力不對稱結構之下，我們常常會發現中小型國家長期以來在兩個或更多大國之間掙扎求生，並努力尋找自己定位的現象，而這種情況在亞太地區的國家中尤為明顯。隨著中國的崛起，中美之間的權力角逐日益激烈，因此，對於亞太地區的中小型國家來說，目前最重要的就是如何處理與美國和中國之間的關係。為了深入研究這個問題，我認為國家權力的大小會影響中小型國家對於中國和美國的戰略。針對這議題，亦參考有關中小國家戰略的現有理論，例如平衡、避險、扈從等策略。
在本文之中將會說明及驗證，國家權力越強，則該國選擇平衡策略的可能性越大，在經濟上對美國或中國的傾向波動性越小;另一方面，對於美國或中國經濟傾向波動較大的弱勢國家來說，因為在經濟上仰賴貿易或是受制於美國或中國的協助，在策略上較沒有選擇，這類國家最有可能選擇隨波逐流。中等權力因為介於兩者之間，因此在此區間的這類國家較可能展現各種不同的戰略選擇，因為他們對於美國或中國等大國方面擁有更高的自由度。
為了驗證這些假設，我構建了一個經濟指標 - 對美國和對中國的貿易依存度，用以量化這些中小型國家對中國和美國的戰略，來驗證這些國家選擇的策略是否符合我的假設。從我的分析結果可以看出，處於中等權力的國家在選擇與兩大國關係的策略表現上相對來說比較靈活自由。
Under state power asymmetry in international politics, we can often find a phenomenon that small and medium countries have struggled between two or more great countries for a long time and strive to find their own position. This phenomenon nowadays can be clearly observed in the Asia-Pacific region.
With the rise of China, the competition of power between China and the United States is increasing. Therefore, for small and medium countries in the Asia-Pacific region, the most important thing recently is how to manage the relationship between the two major countries—the United States and China. To delve into this issue, I assume that state power will influence the strategy of small and medium countries between China and the United States. In other words, referring to the existing theories about small and medium countries` strategies, such as balancing, bandwagoning, hedging, and so on.
This thesis will show that the stronger the country`s power, the more likely for that country to choose a balanced strategy, and the economic tendency toward the United States or China will be less volatile; On the other hand, for the weaker power country, which will show a greater volatility of economic tendency toward the United States or China, also, this kind of country will most likely to choose to follow the trend. Countries with medium power will show a variety of strategic choices because they have a higher degree of freedom in choosing sides of great powers like the United States or China.
To validate these assumptions, I construct an economic indicator － trade dependence toward the United States and China, in order to quantify these middle powers’ strategies with China and the United States, and to examine whether the variable of strategies follows the pattern of my expectations. My analysis shows that countries in the middle of the state’s power showed great freedom in the selection of strategy toward relationship with the two great powers. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
應用經濟與社會發展英語碩士學位學程(IMES)
106266003 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106266003 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| DOI: | 10.6814/NCCU201901281 |
| Appears in Collections: | [應用經濟與社會發展英語碩士學位學程 (IMES)] 學位論文
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