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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/127741


    Title: 混合寡占市場下利潤稅的中立性公營廠商目標函數一般化的情況
    Profit Tax Neutrality in a Mixed Oligopoly When a Public Firm Pursues General Objectives
    Authors: 李品逸
    Li, Pin-Yi
    Contributors: 翁堃嵐
    李品逸
    Li, Pin-Yi
    Keywords: 混合寡占市場
    民營化政策
    利潤稅中立性
    一般化目標函數
    Mixed oligopoly
    Privatization policy
    Profit tax neutrality
    General objectives
    Date: 2019
    Issue Date: 2019-12-06 09:24:51 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文在公營廠商的目標函數一般化的情況下，探討同質混合寡占市場下利 潤稅中立性以及最適的民營化政策。依據本文研究結果顯示: (1) 在混合寡占市場下，由於公營廠商的目標函數並非追求利潤之極大，因此在釋股比例為外生的情況下，利潤稅的課徵對廠商的產出決策將不具中立性，然而在釋股比例為內生的情況下，課徵利潤稅對產出決策及社會福利水準均具有中立性。(2) 在考慮外人持股的開放體系下，不論民營化程度為外生或內生，利潤稅的中立性將無法成立。
    This paper considers the case where a public firm pursues general objectives. We discuss the profit tax neutrality theorem and the optimal privatization policy under the
    homogenous mixed oligopolistic market. The major findings are as follow (1) The objective function of public firms is not pursuit of maximizing profits under mixed oligopolistic market. When the privatization level is exogenously given, the profit tax which affects market equilibrium is no longer neutral. However, under the optimal privatization policy, an exogenous increase of profit tax rate will not affect market equilibrium and the social welfare level (i.e. profit tax is neutral) (2) The model of foreign shareholding is considered.Regardless of whether the degree of privatization is exogenous or endogenous, the neutrality of the profit tax doesn’t hold.
    Reference: 中文文獻
    林宛儀 (2012)，〈公營廠商民營化的最適釋股比例分析—考慮租稅的情況〉，《經濟論文》，頁1-29。
    翁永和、羅鈺珊、劉碧珍 (2003)，〈市場結構與最適民營化政策〉，《經濟論文》，頁149-169
    翁堃嵐、林宛儀、郭虹儀 (2014)，〈混合寡占市場下利潤稅的中立性與最適釋股比例〉，《應用經濟論叢》，第96期。
    翁堃嵐、吳家恩(2009)，〈查核不確定下廠商之生產與逃漏決策〉，《經濟研究》，第45卷第1期，頁1-9 。
    邱俊榮、黃鴻 (2006)，〈公營廠商民營化的最適釋股比例分析〉，《經濟論文叢刊》，第34眷第2期，頁245-259。
    賴紫琳 (2018)，〈公共社會企業下的民營化政策與中立性〉。
    國家發展委員會官方網站 https://www.ndc.gov.tw/。

    英文文獻
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政學系
    106255027
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106255027
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU201901255
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Public Finance] Theses

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