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| Title: | 企業網絡連結與租稅規避
Network connections among firms and tax avoidance |
| Authors: | 林子傑
Lin, Tzu-Chieh |
| Contributors: | 何怡澄
郭振雄
林子傑
Lin, Tzu-Chieh |
| Keywords: | 社會網絡分析
董事會連結
租稅規避
social network analysis
board interlocks
tax avoidance |
| Date: | 2019 |
| Issue Date: | 2019-08-07 16:50:25 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 社會網絡是資訊流通的渠道，公司管理階層能藉由其自身之社會網絡接觸到各種能應用於公司的資訊。社會學學習理論指出個體會模仿社會網絡中其他個體之行為，進而造成公司觀念及策略的擴散。本研究探討企業網絡關係與租稅規避的關係，欲檢驗避稅策略是否會隨社會網絡連結而由低稅率公司向外擴散，本文於主要分析中以董事會連結（board interlocks）當作企業網絡關係的代理變數。除在主要迴歸分析研究探討與低稅率公司連結的各種特性外，並於額外分析部分再引入網絡中心度概念及企業策略特性加以分析。
本研究以2002年至2016年的臺灣上市櫃公司（排除TDR、KY股與金融業）為研究樣本，使用一般最小平方法進行迴歸分析。結果發現，公司自身如存在與低稅率公司的連結或是位在整個社會董事會連結網絡的中心皆有助於增加其避稅程度。
Information diffuses through social networks. Social learning theory discussed in sociology indicates that one would imitate other individuals` actions, and therefore leads to diffusion of concepts and strategies. This study discusses the relation between firms` network connections and tax avoidance and hopes to examine whether tax avoidance strategies transfer from low-tax firms to other firms through network connections. In this study, I primarily use board interlocks to measure network connections. Besides considering different attributes of the board interlocks, this study also takes the concept of network centrality and firms’ business strategies into consideration for additional analysis.
This study focuses on listed Taiwanese companies from 2002 to 2016, using ordinary least square (OLS) regression method to test the hypotheses. The empirical results show that if the firm itself has connections with low-tax firms or has a higher level of degree of centrality, it will avoid more taxes. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系
106255002 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106255002 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| DOI: | 10.6814/NCCU201900339 |
| Appears in Collections: | [財政學系] 學位論文
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