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    题名: 董監事責任險對公司經營效率之影響：以台灣上市櫃公司為例
    Effects of D&O Liability Insurance on Efficiency：Evidence from Publicly Traded Firms in Taiwan
    作者: 劉昱吟
    Liu, Yu-Yin
    贡献者: 鄭士卿
    劉昱吟
    Liu, Yu-Yin
    关键词: 董監事責任險
    效率
    資料包絡法
    日期: 2019
    上传时间: 2019-08-07 16:15:38 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 近年來公司治理之議題受到社會高度重視，屢屢傳出因錯誤決策而使投資人利益受侵害之事件，為了降低其影響，主管機關鼓勵上市櫃公司投保董監事責任保險。然而，有關公司投保董監事責任險之意圖，學界持正反兩派不同的看法，認為董監事責任險除了可以加強公司治理外，也可能存在道德風險。為了瞭解董監事責任險對公司之經營效率帶來正面或負面的影響，本文以2010年至2017年台灣上市櫃公司為研究對象，分析是否投保董監事責任險與投保金額比例高低對公司經營效率分別帶來甚麼影響。
    本文以Tobit迴歸法進行實證分析。藉由資料包絡分析法(DEA)所求出的純技術效率(PTE)、規模效率(SE)、總技術效率(TE)三個效率值為迴歸式應變數，是否投保董監事責任險及投保比例高低為主要自變數，搭配其他與公司治理及財務相關的控制變數進行分析。研究結果顯示，有投保董監事責任險的公司有較好的純技術效率(PTE)表現，但規模效率(SE)的表現較差，整體而言，是否投保董監事責任險對總技術效率(TE)的影響並不顯著，投保比例高低也得出相同結果。進而探討規模大小與規模效率(SE)的關係後發現，規模小於中位數的族群，有投保董監事責任險者之規模效率顯著高於未投保者，規模大的族群則呈現相反的結果，顯示造成整體規模不效率的原因在於部分規模較大的公司。
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    風險管理與保險學系
    106358007
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106358007
    数据类型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU201900512
    显示于类别:[風險管理與保險學系] 學位論文

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