政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/124693
English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  全文笔数/总笔数 : 113325/144300 (79%)
造访人次 : 51186044      在线人数 : 876
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
搜寻范围 查询小技巧：
  • 您可在西文检索词汇前后加上"双引号"，以获取较精准的检索结果
  • 若欲以作者姓名搜寻，建议至进阶搜寻限定作者字段，可获得较完整数据
    •  进阶搜寻
    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 財務管理學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/124693


    请使用永久网址来引用或连结此文件: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/124693


    题名: 家族企業多角化併購與市場反應之探討
    Family Firm Diversified M&A and Market Performance
    作者: 詹愷恩
    Chan, Kai-En
    贡献者: 吳啟銘
    詹愷恩
    Chan, Kai-En
    关键词: 家族企業
    多角化併購
    代理人理論
    管家理論
    併購績效
    Family Firms
    Diversification
    M&A
    Agency theory
    Stewardship theory
    日期: 2019
    上传时间: 2019-08-07 16:03:34 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究探討家族企業進行多角化併購與市場反應績效之關係，以公司治理
    之變數探討市場對於家族企業進行多角化併購時的反應，著重於代理理論以及管家理論之間的探討，進一步將家族企業的特有性質家族企業創辦人以及家族接班狀況納入研究。本文以台灣經濟新報(TEJ)併購資料庫中2001 年至2017年之多角化併購案件為樣本進行研究。研究發現，樣本中之家族企業在執行多角化併購時市場會反應其對於代理人問題之疑慮，導致當公司偏離程度愈大其市場反應績效愈差。但樣本中之多角化併購案件中並無反應出市場對於家族企業的管家理論行為。另外，家族企業的多角化併購行為當中考量創辦人仍否任職以及家族企業的接班狀況進行分析後，發現創辦人任職與否之無顯著性，但影響方向為正。而市場是否會對二代以上接班人之多角化併購行為給予負面評價，實證結果發現與預期方向一致，為負向關係但並無顯著性。
    This study explores the relationship between diversified M&A (diversification) and market response performance (CAR) in Taiwan’s family firms, and explores the reaction of the market to the diversified M&A of family firms based on the variables of corporate governance, focusing on the discussion between agent theory and stewardship theory, and further the unique nature of the family business founders and family succession status are included in the study. The sample of the diversified M&A cases from 2001 to 2017 in the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) M&A Database. The study found that the family companies in the sample responded to the agent`s problems when performing a diversified M&A, resulting in a worse market performance as the company deviated. However, the diversified M&A cases in the
    sample did not reflect the market`s stewardship theory behavior for family businesses.
    In addition, in the diversified M&A activities of the family business, it is considered that the founder still has the position and the succession of the family business. After discovering that the founder has no significant position, the direction of influence is positive. Whether the market will give a negative evaluation of the diversified M&A behavior of the second generation or more successors, the empirical results are consistent with the expected direction.
    參考文獻: 林宛瑩, & 許崇源. (2008). 台灣集團企業之控股型態及公司治理衡量指標之研究與建議. 交大管理學報, 1, 269-312.

    林灼榮, 李秀英, 彭作奎, & 施佩雯. (2017). 集團企業家族控股, 董事會組成與企業績效之關聯性-配對法之應用. 企業管理學報, (113), 31-60.

    戴怡蕙. (2017). 控制股東的股權偏離程度與公司績效: 持股率與類別的調節效果. 會計審計論叢, 7(2), 85-115.

    Kuo, T., & Wang,C.Y.(2017).公司治理如何影響家族企業之績效? 長期縱貫分析 (How Does Corporate Governance Affect the Performance of Family Businesses? A Long-Term Longitudinal Analysis).

    Lin, C. J., Pan, C. J., & Wang, T. W. (2015). 從家族企業論析自由現金流量與投資決策之關聯性. 臺大管理論叢, 26(1), 95-123.

    Cubbin J. S. and D. Leech (1983). The Effect of Shareholding Dispersion on the
    Degree of Control in British Companies: Theory and Measurement, TheEconomic Journal, 93(370), pp. 351-369

    Claessens S., S. Djankov, L.H.P. Lang, (2000). The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1-2),
    pp. 81-112.

    Cucculelli, M. and Micucci, G. (2008). Family succession and firm performance:Evidence from Italian family firms. Journal of Corporate Finance, 14(1), 17-31.

    Craninckx, K. and Huyghebaert, N. (2015). Large shareholders and value creationthrough corporate acquisitions in Europe. The identity of the controlling
    shareholder matters, European Management Journal, Vol. 33 No. 2, pp. 116-131.

    Duggal, R., & Millar, J. A. (1999). Institutional ownership and firm performance: Thecase of bidder returns. Journal of Corporate Finance, 5(2), 103-117.

    Feldman, E.R., Amit, R.R. and Villalonga, B. (2016), Corporate divestitures andfamily control, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 37, pp. 429-446.

    Gomez‐Mejia, L. R., Makri, M., & Kintana, M. L. (2010). Diversification decisions infamily‐controlled firms. Journal of management studies, 47(2), 223-252.

    Gleason, K.C., Pennathur, A.K. and Wiggenhorn, J. (2014), Acquisitions of familyowned firms: boon or bust?, Journal of Economics and Finance, Vol. 38 No. 2,pp. 269-286.

    Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,Agency Costsand Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, pp. 305-360.

    Worek, M. (2017). Mergers and acquisitions in family businesses: current literatureand future insights. Journal of Family Business Management, 7(2), 177-206.
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財務管理學系
    106357003
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106357003
    数据类型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU201900549
    显示于类别:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

    文件中的档案:

    档案 大小格式浏览次数
    700301.pdf654KbAdobe PDF20检视/开启


    在政大典藏中所有的数据项都受到原著作权保护.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏，無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用，惟仍請適度，合理使用本網站之內容，以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用，則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

    2.本網站之製作，已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益，如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者，請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw)，維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - 回馈